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• W1984684900 abstract "AbstractThis article explains how the Turkish business' regime preferences have evolved from pro-authoritarian to pro-democratic in the context of dual transitions, in response to changes in incentive structures shaped by domestic, regional and international parameters. It particularly focuses on big business and highlights the central role that greater exposure to international competition during the course of opening up and liberalization played in the evolution of its regime preferences. The article suggests that the central mechanism which has led to the regime preference change is socialization by strategic calculation facilitated by business' increasing incorporation into transnational networks. It asserts that the Turkish big business' experience is particularly interesting because international exposure not only created new opportunities for big business, but also new divisions and rivalries within the business community. These new rivals formed flourishing alliances with the government, with their accompanying claims to power that challenged the big business' previous hegemony in accessing state resources. In the process, big business' fear of losing its privileged status to rival business groups and the resulting uncertainties led big business to associate democratization with higher benefits, as they became increasingly aware of the link between democratization and diminished uncertainties, through their interaction with transnational business networks. Consequently, big business consolidated its pro-democratic stance as shifting domestic alliances enhanced the need for diminishing uncertainties, while internationalization along with the prospect of EU membership increased the cost of status quo.Keywords: businessdemocratisationTurkeyliberalisationEUregime preferencesEuropeanizationtransnationalisationsocialisationinterest groupsdeveloping countries AcknowledgementsI gratefully acknowledge comments and criticism offered by Sabri Sayari, Yaprak Gursoy, Senem Aydin-Düzgit and Ateş Altinordu on earlier versions of this article. I also thank the reviewers and editors of Democratization for their useful suggestions which helped in improving the manuscript.Notes on contributorIsik Ozel is an assistant professor of political science at Sabancı University. She received her PhD in political science from the University of Washington, Seattle in 2006 and held a postdoc at the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals between 2006 and 2007. Her research and teaching focus on international and comparative political economy and development. She currently works on political economy of regulation, varieties of capitalism in emerging countries, Europeanization and democratization. She has published articles in journals such as the Journal of International Studies, Regulation and Governance, and New Perspectives on Turkey, among others. She has also published several book chapters on political economy and issues of governance. She is currently working on a book entitled ‘Institutions, State-Business Coalitions and Economic Development’.Notes1 http://www.tusiad.org/FileArchive/UMITBOYNERKONUSMA21OCAK20101.pdf (accessed November 18, 2010).2 http://www.tusiad.org/FileArchive/UB_Speech_YIK_eng.pdf (accessed November 18, 2010).3 Prime Minister Erdoğan's speech at the Çorum Meeting, 17 August 2010. http://www.dha.com.tr/n.php?n=0b8dc886-2010_08_17 (accessed November 19, 2010).4 http://www.milliyet.com.tr/tusiad-bitaraf-olan-bertaraf-olur-uyarisi-talihsiz-bir-yaklasim/ekonomi/sondakika/18.08.2010/1277905/default.htm (accessed November 19, 2010).5 Kalaycıoğlu, ‘State and Civil Society in Turkey’; Ozel, ‘Beyond the Orthodox Paradox’.6 The incidence of the excessive tax penalty on Doğan Group, a large conglomerate in Turkey with large shares in media, is pointed out as an example of such intervention. Imposed in 2009, this penalty has widely been interpreted as a ‘revenge of the government on critical voices’ along with ‘a major intervention in the freedom of the press,’ opposed by many including the Human Rights Organizations. http://www.ihd.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1631:dogan-medya-grubuna-verilen-rekor-vergi-cezasi-basin-ozgurlugu-alanindaki-ihlallerin-farkli-yontemlerle-surduruldugunu-gostermektedir&catid=67:genel-merkez&Itemid=2137 http://www.tusiad.org/Content.aspx?mi=1_43 (accessed November 16, 2010).8 Öniş and Türem, ‘Entrepreneurs, Democracy and Citizenship in Turkey’.9 ‘The Military is Infuriated by TUSIAD’, Cumhuriyet, 27 January 1997, 1.10 Prominent business leaders expressed their gratitude for the Turkish military and sent congratulatory messages to the armed forces, that it was the right thing to do, given the chaos in Turkish politics, following the coup in September 1980. See the memoirs of Vehbi Koc (1996) and Sakip Sabanci (1985).11 Bayer and Öniş, ‘Turkish Big Business’; Öniş and Türem, ‘Entrepreneurs, Democracy and Citizenship in Turkey’.12 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development; Checkel, ‘It's the Process Stupid!’.13 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 206–7; Tarrow, ‘Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide’, 173–4.14 Collier et al., ‘Critiques, Responses, and Trade-offs’, 252.15 Bayer and Öniş, ‘Turkish Big Business’, 197.16 Checkel, International Institutions and Socialization in Europe, 7.17 Schimmelfennig, ‘Strategic Calculation and International Socialization’.18 Schimmelfennig focuses on intergovernmental socialization by reinforcement and analyzes political utility calculations of governments as he states that societies in the CEECs are too weak to serve as effective agents of socialization. But, he acknowledges that reinforcement can proceed through transnational channels as well. Schimmelfennig, ‘Strategic Calculation and International Socialization’, 830–1.19 Bellin, ‘Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization’; Bartell and Payne, Business and Democracy in Latin America; Burnell and Calvert, Civil Society in Democratization; Boix, Democracy and Redistribution; Öniş and Türem, ‘Entrepreneurs, Democracy and Citizenship in Turkey’.20 Beetham, ‘Civil Society’.21 Lipset, Economic Development and Political Legitimacy; Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development; Boix and Stokes, ‘Endogenous Democratization’; Acemoğlu and Robinson, Economic Origins.22 Pevehouse, ‘Democracy from the outside-in?’; Diamond, Spirit of Democracy; Hagopian and Mainwaring, Third Wave of Democratization.23 Diamond, Spirit of Democracy; Whitehead, Democracy by Convergence.24 Levitsky and Way, ‘International Linkage and Democratization’.25 Moore, Social Origins.26 Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy.27 Huber and Stephens, ‘Bourgeoisie and Democracy’.28 O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism; Bureaucratic Authoritarianism; ‘Substantive or Procedural Consensus?’.29 O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule.30 Bellin, ‘Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization’, 179.31 Bartell and Payne, Business and Democracy in Latin America.32 Bayer and Öniş, ‘Turkish Big Business’, 181, 184–5.33 Huntington, Third Wave; Przeworski, Democracy and the Market.34 Hagopian and Mainwaring, Third Wave of Democratization, 43.35 Bartell and Payne, Business and Democracy in Latin America.36 Bellin, ‘Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization’; Bayer and Öniş, ‘Turkish Big Business’.37 Chen, ‘Capitalist Development’.38 Levitsky and Way, ‘International Linkage and Democratization’; Yılmaz, ‘External-Internal Linkages in Democratization’.39 Boix, Democracy and Redistribution; Bellin, ‘Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization’.40 Öniş and Türem, ‘Entrepreneurs, Democracy and Citizenship in Turkey’.41 Geddes, ‘What Causes Democratization’.42 Jensen, ‘Democratic Governance’.43 Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins.44 Diamond, Spirit of Democracy; Geddes, ‘What Causes Democratization’; Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition.45 Bayer and Öniş, ‘Turkish Big Business’.46 Collins, ‘Regional Trade Agreements; Pevehouse, ‘Democracy from the outside-in?’.47 Di Quirico, Europeanisation and Democratisation; Kubicek, European Union and Democratization; Pridham, ‘EU Accession and Democratization’; Youngs, ‘Democracy Promotion’ and European Union and Democracy Promotion.48 Youngs, European Union and Democracy Promotion.49 Whitehead, Democracy by Convergence.50 Youngs, ‘Democracy Promotion’, 51.51 Schimmelfennig, ‘Strategic Calculation and International Socialization’.52 Pridham, ‘Unfinished Business’, 21–2.53 Cowles, ‘Setting the Agenda’; Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism.54 Cowles, ‘Transatlantic Business Dialogue’.55 Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism; Carroll, Corporate Power in a Globalizing World; Scheuerman, ‘Liberal Democracy’.56 Aktar, Türk Milliyetçiliği; Gocek, Rise of the Bourgeoisie.57 Keyder, State and Class in Turkey.58 Krueger, ‘Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’; Bugra, State and Business in Modern Turkey; Ozel, ‘Beyond the Orthodox Paradox’.59 Heper, Strong State and Economic Interest Groups; Toprak, ‘Islam and Democracy in Turkey’.60 See ‘Turkey 2010 Progress Report’, European Commission Staff working document, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/tr_rapport_2010_en.pdf (accessed November 14, 2010).61 Arat, ‘Politics and Big Business’.62 Ozel, ‘Beyond the Orthodox Paradox’.63 Interviews with TUSIAD members, 6 January 2004, Istanbul.64 Şenses, ‘Recent Turkish Experience’.65 Bayer and Öniş, ‘Turkish Big Business’.66 Gürsoy, ‘Civil-Military Relations’.67 There is no exact data available for TUSIAD's share in exports. This particular figure is based on the estimates of the General Secretariat of TUSIAD: http://www.tusiad.org/tusiad/verilerle-tusiad/ (accessed November 19, 2010).68 Rough estimates based on Turkish Statistical Institute's cross-temporal data on foreign trade and TUSIAD's estimates on its members' share between 1990 and 2010. Sources: www.tuik.gov.tr http://www.tusiad.org/tusiad/verilerle-tusiad/ (accessed January 24, 2011) and interviews with officials at the Department of Economic Research at TUSIAD (January 18–19, 2011).69 Interviews with TUSIAD members, 1 July 2008 and 3 July 2008, Istanbul.70 Ibid.71 TUSIAD has been an observer since 2009 along with Italy, France, Spain and Greece.72 Recently, TUSIAD participated in the 7th European Summit in June 2009, the Meetings of Council of Presidents in June and December 2009 along with several working commission meetings, as indicated by the latest annual report of TUSIAD. http://www.tusiad.org/FileArchive/2009FaaliyetRapor.pdf, 59–60.73 Interview with a former President of TUSIAD, 5 November 2003, Istanbul.74 According to the latest annual report of TUSIAD (2009), TUSIAD participated in various meetings and committees organized by BIAC such as the Board Meetings, and the meetings held by the Secretary General of the OECD in October 2009. http://www.tusiad.org/FileArchive/2009FaaliyetRapor.pdf, 59–60.75 http://www.ert.be/structure.aspx (accessed February 10, 2011).76 Bülent Eczacıbaşı and Güler Sabancı (both previous Presidents of TUSIAD) are current members of the ERT. http://www.ert.be/members_by_country.aspx (accessed February 10, 2011).77 An important example would be the report entitled ‘Turkey: A New Corporate World for Europe, An Evaluation of the Implications of Potential Turkish Membership of the European Union’ which was published a year before Turkey's accession negotiations started. http://www.ert.be/doc/01673.pdf.78 Interviews with TUSIAD members, 4 January, 2004; 25 July, 2004; 18 August, 2008, Istanbul.79 Interviews with TUSIAD members, 4 January 2004, Istanbul.80 As an example of these reports, See ‘UNICE Reports on the Progress of Lisbon Strategy: Turkey's National Report, A Candidate Country Experience’, Brussels, March 5 2003. http://www.tusiad.us/Content/uploaded/03-07%20LISBON%20STRATEGY%20-%20TURKEY.PDF.81 An interview with a former President of TUSIAD, 3 July 2008, Istanbul.82 Gülalp, ‘Islam and Democracy’.83 Bugra, ‘Claws of the Tigers’; Gümüşçü, ‘Class, Status and Party’.84 Ozel, ‘Islamic Capital and Political Islam’.85 Bugra, Islam in Economic Organizations; Öniş, ‘Political Islam at the Crossroads’.86 Ozel, ‘Beyond the Orthodox Paradox’.87 Following his presidency of the TOBB, Necmettin Erbakan founded the National Order Party in 1970, of which the so-called Anatolian bourgeoisie was a significant constituency.88 Zaman Ekonomi, 6 March 2010., Excerpt from an interview with Rızanur Meral, the Chairman of TUSKON. http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=958685 (accessed May 12, 2011).89 Interviews with TUSKON and MUSIAD members, 14–15 December 2010, Istanbul.90 Interviews with TUSKON and MUSIAD officials, 4 August 2004 and 9 December 2010, Istanbul.91 Currently, the largest 500 companies based outside the traditional industrial centres in Western Turkey realize more than 10% of Turkey's overall exports. ‘An Industry from Scratch is Emerging in Anatolia,’ Ekonomist, 6 October 2010.92 According to recent data, between 1999 and 2009, the number of companies which made into the Largest-1000 list rose from 16 to 32 in Gaziantep; and from 18 to 26 in Kayseri, provinces popularly known as the ‘Anatolian Tigers.’ See Çağlar and Kurtsal (2011).93 Gümüşçü, ‘Class, Status and Party’.94 Ozel, ‘Islamic Capital and Political Islam’.95 http://www.tuskon.org/hakkimizda/?id=tuskon (accessed November 15, 2010).96 The prominent of these platforms are the Economic Coordination Council, Economic and Social Council, the Board for Evaluation of Economic Problems, and the Coordination Council for Improving the Investment Environment.97 Ozel, ‘Beyond the Orthodox Paradox’.98 Interviews with TUSIAD members, 4 January 2004, 1 July 2008, 3 July 2008, Istanbul.99 Interviews with TUSIAD members, 5 July 2008, Istanbul.100 Interviews with TUSIAD members, 3–5 July 2008, 10 June 2010, Istanbul.101 Öniş and Keyman, ‘A New Path Emerges’.102 http://www.turkonfed.org/indexeng.htm (accessed September 1, 2009) and interview with Celal Beysel, the chairman of TURKONFED, 10 September 2009, Bursa.103 Diamond, Spirit of Democracy.104 Bayer and Öniş, ‘Turkish Big Business’, 186.105 Interviews with TUSIAD members, 4 January and 25 July 2004, 1 July and 3, 2008, Istanbul.106 See http://www.tusiad.org/tusiad_cms_eng.nsf/TanitimENG.pdf (accessed July 2, 2009). Öniş and Türem, ‘Entrepreneurs, Democracy and Citizenship in Turkey’.107 Interviews with TUSIAD members, 1 July 2008 and 3 July 2008, Istanbul.108 Interviews with TUSIAD members, 1 July 2008 and 3 July 2008, Istanbul.109 Interview with a TUSIAD member, 25 July 2004, Istanbul.110 Interview with a former President of TUSIAD, 28 July 2004, Istanbul.111 Öniş and Türem, ‘Entrepreneurs, Democracy and Citizenship in Turkey’.112 http://www.tusiad.org/turkish/rapor/demokratik_tur/demoktur.pdf (accessed August 20, 2008).113 See http://www.tusiad.org/turkish/rapor/demokratik_tur/demoktur.pdf (accessed August 20, 2008).114 http://www.tusiad.org (accessed August 25, 2008).115 Milliyet, 24 January 1997, 1.116 ‘The General Staff: What TUSIAD Does is Cheap Heroism’, Hurriyet, 22 January 1997.117 ‘The Military is Infuriated by TUSIAD’, Cumhuriyet, 27 January 1997, 1.118 Interviews with TUSIAD members, 1 July 2008 and 5 July 2008, Istanbul.119 See ‘Ishak Alaton: TUSIAD Made Turkey Lose 13 Years’, Milliyet, 7 February 2011, 8.120 See ‘Democracy Shook TUSIAD’, Milliyet, 24 January 1997; ‘The Report Divided TÜSIAD’, Sabah, 24 January 1997.121 Among the opponents, Asim Kocabiyik and Sakip Sabanci claimed that ‘the report does not represent TUSIAD as a whole, because most of the members do not agree with it … It's been published before any consultation within TUSIAD’. Cumhuriyet, 24 January 1997, 9.122 Milliyet, 11 April 1997.123 Öniş and Türem, ‘Entrepreneurs, Democracy and Citizenship in Turkey’.124 Bayer and Öniş, ‘Turkish Big Business’.125 According to TUSIAD, the 1997 Report ‘became a canon document proving the Turkish private sector's search for a democracy apposite in global standards, and its leadership in this respect’. http://www.tusiad.org/turkish/rapor/demokpers10/10yilguncel.pdf. (accessed August 1, 2008)126 Toprak, ‘Islam and Democracy in Turkey’.127 Interviews with TUSIAD members, 5–6 January 2004 and 25 July 2004, Istanbul.128 Interviews with TUSIAD members, 25 July 2004 and 5 November 2003, Istanbul.129 The ‘pool system’ helped collect the profits of the public enterprises in public banks, facilitating indebtedness between public companies and banks.130 These conglomerates included Kombassan, Yimpas, Kaldera, Kubra and Jetpa. Kombassan Holding, considered as a ‘serious threat’ by the military, won the bid for PETLAS's privatization, a state-owned enterprise producing tires for the Turkish army (Howe, Turkey Today, 142).131 Özcan and Çokgezen, ‘Limits to Alternative Forms of Capitalization’.132 Bayer and Öniş, ‘Turkish Big Business’.133 Checkel, ‘International Institutions and Socialization in Europe’.134 The fact that Mr Gül's wife wore a headscarf created a considerable controversy which had been initiated by the Republican People's Party (CHP). For further explanation on the e-memorandum, see Gürsoy, ‘Businessmen and Democratization’.135 Gursoy, ‘Businessmen and Democratization’.136 Bayer and Öniş, ‘Turkish Big Business’, 192.137 For successive reports on Democratization, see http://www.tusiad.org.tr/information-center/reports/ (accessed May 1, 2011).138 Öniş, ‘Turkish Modernisation and Challenges’.139 Interviews with TUSIAD members, 5–6 January 2004, Istanbul.140 Müftüler-Baç, ‘Turkey's Political Reforms’.141 The Turkish Union of Chambers and Stock Exchanges (TOBB), TUSIAD and the Turkish Employers' Union (TISK) became the leading organisations of this platform which did not yield concrete results due to inter and intra-organisational power struggles within business.142 Bayer and Öniş, ‘Turkish Big Business’, 189.143 Dutz, Us, and Yılmaz, ‘Turkey's Foreign Direct Investment Challenges’.144 http://www.yased.org.tr/webportal/Turkish/Yayinlar/Pages/UDY-2006.aspx145 Currently, the EU is the largest trade partner of Turkey about half of whose trade is with the EU, while Turkey is the seventh largest partner for the EU. Source: www.foreigntrade.gov.tr.146 Interview with a former president of TUSIAD, 20 June 2003, Istanbul.147 Interview with a former president of ISO and TUSIAD, 21 July 2004, Istanbul. Also see Kayhan ‘Türkiye Demokrasi ile Gelisir’.148 Eder, ‘New Regionalism’; Öniş and Türem, ‘Entrepreneurs, Democracy and Citizenship in Turkey’.149 Interview with TUSIAD members, 4 July 2008 and 10 July 2008.150 Noutcheva and Aydin-Düzgit, ‘Lost in Europeanization’.151 Bayer and Öniş, ‘Turkish Big Business’, 196." @default.
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• W1984684900 title "Is it none of their business? Business and democratization, the case of Turkey" @default.
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