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• W1987223104 abstract "BOOK REVIEWS 235 necessary conditions of one's actions, while human choice rests with the application of the principle of sufficient reason. The interpretation would bring into the open yet another aspect of Leibniz's affinity with Spinoza's doctrine: that a man is free to the extent that he is active (in the sense of the term as defined in Spinoza's Ethics). W. VON LEYDEN 'University o] Durham Berkeley: The Philosophy o] Immaterialism. By I. C. Tipton. (London: Methuen; New York: Harper & Row, 1974. Pp. 397) This is a careful and extended examination of Berkeley's immaterialism, primarily as expressed in the Principles and Three Dialogues. Tipton tries to make sense of the central features of Berkeley's doctrine and where he finds an argument weak, he says so. Thus we are given a sensitive and critical presentation of Berkeley's position interwoven with much of the twentieth-century commentary material. Such material is itself subjected to rigorous crutiny. The net result is a book which will be of use to all who are troubled by Berkeleian problems. It will be used as a guide both to Berkeley and to the critical literature. Although Tipton aims for, and often achieves, a truly remarkable level of fairness in treating Berkeley and his commentators, I found myself worrying about such a goal. The risk in attempting to present fairly and equitably all sides of several discussions is that one will lose sight of Berkeley's own concerns. Yet it is a risk one must take if one intends to present so much of the literature. And that is what Tipton has opted to do. Students of Berkeley must be grateful to him for providing so dispassionate, objective, and judicious art account. There are what seem to this reviewer to be occasional lapses. For example, Tipton rejects (pp. 242ff.)the argument that from the differing perceptions of a thing's extension as perceived by a man and a mite it follows that we cannot determine the real extension of the object. Tipton thinks that this sort of sceptical argument can be dismissed when each party to the dispute spells out his standard of reference. Berkeley was much too sensitive to sceptical arguments for that move. He was challenging the thesis that we can determine the real extension of an object when we have conflicting perceptual claims. Of course one can formulate a standard of reference. But such a standard must be justified. If it is a mere assumption then it does not help establish the real extension-even if the man and the mite resolve their disagreement. Sextus Empiricus, Bayle, and the sceptics generally, provided a myriad of difficulties with criteria and their establishment . Berkeley's own account of the real was formulated with these precise difficulties in mind. I call this a lapse because although Tipton is sympathetic to much of the discussion of 'sense' and 'sensations' since the advent of the linguistic turn in English philosophy, he has also sought to understand both Pyrrhonian scepticism and Berkeley's strategy to eliminate its philosophical leverage. There is another area where the majority view held by modern commentators may have made it difficult for Tipton to get at the Berkeleian texts, i.e., that of the serf or spirit. Despite Luce's efforts to provide a corrective, most interpreters of Berkeley-especially those (like Bennett) who are cavalier with the historical data--base their readings on a set of supposedly Lockean steps. The assumption in our culture that some form of behavioral analysis of mind is common-sensical and is reflected in our ordinary talk, has undoubtedly made it easier to read Berkeley as operating within (and, of course, failing within) a Lockean framework. And yet Berkeley gives many clues to his commitment to something very like Cartesian dualism. Unlike Locke, Berkeley (1) takes scepticism seriously enough to try to refute it; (2) maintains that ideas have a necessary 236 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY relation to minds; (3) speaks sympathetically of innate idea doctrines; (4) rejects abstractionist theories of concept formation; (5) holds that the mind always thinks; (6) takes his Principles to establish the natural immortality of the soul. I suspect that..." @default.
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• W1987223104 title "Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism (review)" @default.
• W1987223104 doi "https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2008.0289" @default.
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