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• W1998941710 abstract "The question of whether, and if so how, learning can be transfered from previously experienced games to novel games has recently attracted the attention of the experimental game theory literature. Existing research presumes that learning operates over actions, beliefs or decision rules. This study instead uses a connectionist approach that learns a direct mapping from game payoffs to a probability distribution over own actions. Learning is operationalized as a backpropagation rule that adjusts the weights of feedforward neural networks in the direction of increasing the probability of an agent playing a myopic best response to the last game played. One advantage of this approach is that it expands the scope of the model to any possible nxn normal-form game allowing for a comprehensive model of transfer of learning. Agents are exposed to games drawn from one of seven classes of games with significantly different strategic characteristics and then forced to play games from previously unseen classes. I find significant transfer of learning, i.e., behavior that is path-dependent, or conditional on the previously seen games. Cooperation is more pronounced in new games when agents are previously exposed to games where the incentive to cooperate is stronger than the incentive to compete, i.e., when individual incentives are aligned. Prior exposure to Prisoner's dilemma, zero-sum and discoordination games led to a significant decrease in realized payoffs for all the game classes under investigation. A distinction is made between superficial and deep transfer of learning both---the former is driven by superficial payoff similarities between games, the latter by differences in the incentive structures or strategic implications of the games. I examine whether agents learn to play the Nash equilibria of games, how they select amongst multiple equilibria, and whether they transfer Nash equilibrium behavior to unseen games. Sufficient exposure to a strategically he" @default.
• W1998941710 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W1998941710 creator A5044971636 @default.
• W1998941710 date "2015-03-31" @default.
• W1998941710 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W1998941710 title "Transfer of conflict and cooperation from experienced games to new games: a connectionist model of learning" @default.
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• W1998941710 doi "https://doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2015.00102" @default.
• W1998941710 hasPubMedCentralId "https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/4379898" @default.
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