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- W200109500 abstract "Moral hazard may arise when the hidden actions of an insured individual affect the probability distribution of the insured outcome. Attempts to distinguish moral hazard from adverse selection empirically have been vexed. The economics literature contains a small number of studies that have attempted to distinguish the effect of ex ante moral hazard in markets for road traffic crash (RTC) insurance from adverse selection. These studies, which have almost exclusively sought to analyse claims data, have reported mixed results. The principal aim of this dissertation is to test for evidence of ex ante moral hazard in a market for automobile insurance. This dissertation commences with an historical review of the early economic thought, which has underpinned the development of the concept of moral hazard before reviewing the relevant contemporary theoretical and empirical literature. The thesis then extends a promising and recent line of enquiry that exploits the survey data to test for evidence of asymmetric information. This dissertation argues that survey data can confer advantages not available to claims data to an econometrician wanting to test for moral hazard. To support this argument an instrumental variable approach is used in conjunction with household survey data to identify ex ante moral hazard empirically in a market for insurance. The implications of this method are discussed. An Australian survey data set is then analysed to test for ex ante and ex post moral hazard in the market for comprehensive car insurance. Two new tests for ex ante moral hazard using (i) a recursive model and (ii) an instrumental variable, to control for endogeneity in cross-sectional RTC are presented. A statistically significant ex ante moral hazard effect is reported with both models. The results are then subjected to falsification test whereby the analysis is repeated in sub-samples of at-fault and not-at-fault RTCs. No evidence of moral hazard is reported in the sub-sample of not-at-fault RTCs, which supports the interpretation of the initial result. Supplemental evidence of ex post moral hazard is also reported." @default.
- W200109500 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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- W200109500 date "2011-08-01" @default.
- W200109500 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
- W200109500 title "Moral Hazard: Empirical Evidence in the Australian Market for Automobile Insurance" @default.
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