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• W2007196787 abstract "Adapting to visual collisions increases the tendency to see the colliding objects as sliding over one another, rather than as one ‘launching’ another, but only in the adapted retinal location. This demonstrates a low-level perceptual component to the interpretation of the causes of visual events. Adapting to visual collisions increases the tendency to see the colliding objects as sliding over one another, rather than as one ‘launching’ another, but only in the adapted retinal location. This demonstrates a low-level perceptual component to the interpretation of the causes of visual events. Imagine a billiard ball rolling directly towards another: it makes contact, stops and then the other ball rolls forwards. Naturally, we see a collision and have the impression that the first ball caused the second to move. The philosopher David Hume [1Hume D. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Hackett, Indianapolis1748/1977Crossref Google Scholar, 2Hume D. A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press, Oxford1739/1978Google Scholar], however, proposed that we could not deduce the action of the second ball from only knowing about the first. Many alternative scenarios are possible. Hume reasoned that our impression that the one ball caused the action of the other must come from induction. By induction we conclude all swans are white because all swans we have ever seen are white. Hume thought seeing many examples of one ball hitting another allowed us to relate cause to the effect. As they reported recently in Current Biology, however, Rolfs et al. [3Rolfs M. Dambacher M. Cavanagh P. Visual adaptation of the perception of causality.Curr. Biol. 2013; 23 (250–254)Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (61) Google Scholar] have found that adaptation to collisions can actually reduce the impression of one object ‘launching’ another, and that this only occurs for the adapted region of the visual field, providing evidence for a perceptual component to the interpretation of launching as a causal interaction. Michotte [4Michotte A. The Perception of Causality. Basic Books, New York1946/1963Google Scholar] took Hume’s scenario and studied it by varying the spatiotemporal parameters of ‘launching’, while asking subjects to report their impressions of whether one ball caused the action of the other. Because he found that the detailed spatiotemporal properties of the display had a systematic effect on the perception of launching, he viewed the causal impression as perceptual rather than consciously inferred [5Scholl B.J. Tremoulet P.D. Perceptual causality and animacy.Trends Cogn. Sci. 2000; 4: 299-309Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (691) Google Scholar]. However, Michotte relied on subjective reports. In their new work, Rolfs et al. [3Rolfs M. Dambacher M. Cavanagh P. Visual adaptation of the perception of causality.Curr. Biol. 2013; 23 (250–254)Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (61) Google Scholar] exploited a modification to Michotte’s launch display which provides for a gradual transition between causal and non-causal percepts. If the first ball in the launching paradigm continues after first contact, covering the second ball before it moves off, then it appears to pass over rather than launch the second ball. Rolfs et al. [3Rolfs M. Dambacher M. Cavanagh P. Visual adaptation of the perception of causality.Curr. Biol. 2013; 23 (250–254)Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (61) Google Scholar] varied the amount of coverage from trial to trial and recorded the percentage of trials on which subjects reported the passing percept. Passing increased systematically with overlap. After viewing multiple instances of collisions, however, the tendency to see passing for any particular degree of overlap increased. Therefore, viewing collisions reduced the tendency of subjects to see a collision in a partly ambiguous display. A crucial observation was that the effect of adaptation only occurred when the test stimuli were presented in the same retinal location as the adaptor; no change in responding occurred for test events located at another retinal location. If the adaptation altered expectations in a more cognitive non-spatial system used for inferring causal relations, then there would be no reason for the adaptation to be space-specific. Rolfs et al. [3Rolfs M. Dambacher M. Cavanagh P. Visual adaptation of the perception of causality.Curr. Biol. 2013; 23 (250–254)Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (61) Google Scholar] went further. The adaption may be localised to the same position relative to the point of fixation (a retinotopic frame of reference) or in the same spatial location on the screen (a spatiotopic frame of reference). The authors separated these alternatives by shifting the point of fixation between adaptation and test. They found the adaption effect was completely retinotopic, allowing them to conclude that the adaptation must be occurring somewhere within the retinotopically mapped peripheral or cortical visual system. This is strong evidence that the effect is perceptual, rather than the result of conscious inference or anchoring [6Hunt W.A. Anchoring effects in judgement.Am. J. Psychol. 1941; 54: 395-403Crossref Google Scholar]. In the case of anchoring, the observers might simply be reporting how different the test stimulus appeared in comparison to the just previously seen adaptor. Rolfs et al.’s [3Rolfs M. Dambacher M. Cavanagh P. Visual adaptation of the perception of causality.Curr. Biol. 2013; 23 (250–254)Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (61) Google Scholar] results take us away from the simple cataloguing of conditions for perceived causality, because now perceptual causality can be manipulated by altering the adaptive state of the visual system. We do, however, need to consider what is being adapted. Clearly the localised spatial region is not being desensitised to causality in the most general sense, as there is no evidence that any other causal attribution at that spatial location would be affected by collision adaptation. Timing is an important determiner of causal relationships. We know that perceived duration [7Johnston A. Arnold D. Nishida S. Spatially localized distortions of event time.Curr. Biol. 2006; 16: 472-479Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (262) Google Scholar] and timing [8Hogendoorn H. Verstraten F. Johnston A. Spatially localised time shifts of the perceptual stream.Front. Psychol. 2010; 1: 12Crossref PubMed Scopus (10) Google Scholar] can be altered at specific retinotopic locations after motion adaptation and that adaptation to temporal offsets can alter audiovisual timing [9Fujisaki W. Shimojo S. Kashino M. Nishida S. Recalibration of audiovisual simultaneity.Nat. Neurosci. 2004; 7: 773-778Crossref PubMed Scopus (449) Google Scholar]. If adaptation altered the spatiotemporal characteristic of the collision, this could have a knock on effect on the tendency to see launching or passing over. Many low-level properties of the stimulus giving rise to the pass percept are similar to those inducing the collision percept, and Rolfs et al. [3Rolfs M. Dambacher M. Cavanagh P. Visual adaptation of the perception of causality.Curr. Biol. 2013; 23 (250–254)Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (61) Google Scholar] found no effect of adapting to passing over, suggesting low-level adaptation is not a key factor, but we should note the passing over adaptor and the collision adaptor are necessarily physically different. In a supplemental experiment, Rolfs et al. [3Rolfs M. Dambacher M. Cavanagh P. Visual adaptation of the perception of causality.Curr. Biol. 2013; 23 (250–254)Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (61) Google Scholar] measured the proportion of launching as a function of the temporal delay between the first stimulus stopping and the second moving: there was no clear temporal shift in the function after adaptation, although there was a reduction in launching, suggesting that timing is not affected in this paradigm. Hume pointed out that temporal coincidence was not enough to relate two events, we also require a necessary connection, which means the cause has the power to deliver the effect. One aspect of necessary connection is the notion of contingency. Contingency can be reduced if events sometimes occur without the cause and sometimes the cause does not generate the effect. This was studied by Schlottman and Shanks [10Schlottmann A. Shanks D.R. Evidence for a distinction between judged and perceived causality.Quart. J. Exp. Psychol. A. Hum. Exp. Psychol. 1992; 44: 321-342Crossref PubMed Scopus (124) Google Scholar], who showed that the experience of colour changes in the second stimulus which reliably indicated whether it moved or not did not appear to alter the quality of the launch percept, supporting the view that launching was perceptual rather than a consequence of cognitive inference. Interestingly, adapting to passing over, in which the cause did not deliver the effect, had little influence. Adaptation may alter some perceived property of the objects involved rather than acting on the perception of causality directly. In a very general sense, perception refers to the processes by which we encode the causes of the dynamic visual images impinging on our retinae. When looking at a statue we effortlessly become aware of the three-dimensional shape of the form, the colour of the material, the direction of the illumination and where we are in relationship to the object. We do this even though each of those physical causes combine to determine the brightness of the image at any given point. Much of what is often referred to as mid-level vision is concerned with studying how we unravel the causes of the image — the inverse problem [11Marr D. Vision. Freeman, San Fransisco1982Google Scholar]. The behaviour of objects can also allow us to perceive aspects of their physical nature. Uniform motion implies rigidity. The wobble of jelly implies compliance. The gloop of honey implies viscosity. The relative speeds before and after a collision can influence the perception of relative mass [12Gilden D.L. Proffitt D.R. Understanding collision dynamics.J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 1989; 15: 372-383Crossref PubMed Scopus (94) Google Scholar]. Rolfs et al. [3Rolfs M. Dambacher M. Cavanagh P. Visual adaptation of the perception of causality.Curr. Biol. 2013; 23 (250–254)Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (61) Google Scholar] consider adaptation changes the tendency to infer transfer of motion from one object to another — a transfer of the object property of momentum. This implies adaptation of a perceptual relationship rather than an adaptation of an object property per se. But if that inference is derived from experience (induction), even at a perceptual level as advocated by Helmholtz and Southall [13Helmholtz H.v. Southall J.P.C. Helmholtz's Treatise on Physiological Optics. Dover Publications, New York1962Google Scholar], it is not clear why repeated evidence of collisions should undermine it. Furthermore, object properties, and presumably their relations, are properly tied to objects rather than spatial locations. A full explanation of causal adaptation will need to outline what type of retinotopically specified representation is altered in the neural pathway between the stimulus and the ensuing percept. Nevertheless, this new paradigm offers a way to study the perception of causality through adaptation, opening up many new avenues of investigation." @default.
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• W2007196787 title "Causality: Perceiving the Causes of Visual Events" @default.
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