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• W2007409401 abstract "This paper derives sufficient conditions for a class of games of incomplete information, such as first price auctions, to have pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE). The paper treats games between two or more heterogeneous agents, each with private information about his own type (for example, a bidder's value for an object of a firm's marginal cost of production), and the types are drawn from an atomless joint probability distribution which potentially allows for correlation between types. Agents' utility may depend directly on the realizations of other agents' types, as in Milgrom and Weber's (1982) formulation of the auction. The restriction we consider is that each player's expected payoffs satisfy the following single crossing condition: whenever each opponent uses a nondecreasing strategy (that is, an opponent who has a higher type chooses a higher action), then a player's best response strategy is also nondecreasing in her type. The paper has two main results. The first result shows that, when players are restricted to choose among a finite set of actions (for example, bidding or pricing where the smallest unit is a penny), games where players' objective functions satisfy this single crossing condition will have PSNE. The second result demonstrates that when players' utility functions are continuous, as well as in mineral rights auction games and other games where winning creates a discontinuity in payoffs, the existence result can be extended to the case where players choose from a continuum of actions. The paper then applies the theory to several classes of games, providing conditions on utility functions and joint distributions over types under which each class of games satisfies the single crossing condition. In particular, the single crossing condition is shown to hold in all first-price, private value auctions with potentially heterogeneous, risk-averse bidders, with either independent or affiliated values, and with reserve prices which may differ across bidders; mineral rights auctions with two heterogeneous bidders and affiliated values; a class of pricing games with incomplete information about costs; a class of all-pay auction games; and a class of noisy signaling games. Finally, the formulation of the problem introduced in this paper suggests a straightforward algorithm for numerically computing equilibrium bidding strategies in games such as first price auctions, and we present numerical analyses of several auctions under alternative assumptions about the joint distribution of types." @default.
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• W2007409401 title "Single Crossing Properties And The Existence Of Pure Strategy Equilibria In Games Of Incomplete Information" @default.
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• W2007409401 doi "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.139701" @default.
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