FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2008651979> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2008651979 abstract "Managed care has become the dominant delivery system in many areas of the United States. Nearly three fourths of privately insured Americans now receive network-based health care through health maintenance organizations (HMOs), preferred provider organizations (PPOs), and various point-of-service hybrid arrangements.1 Physicians receive over one third of their revenue from managed care, and more than one third of physicians receive some revenue from capitated contracts.2Of managed care's many features, financial incentives to physicians have received the most attention.3 Particular attention has been focused on HMOs that use risk-based capitation financing. Such financing arrangements encourage prevention and cost-effective practice, but also have the potential to discourage care that may be medically appropriate, especially if the omission of such care is unlikely to lead to other negative consequences (e.g., enrollment turnover because of dissatisfaction, revenue losses associated with malpractice cases). Policy makers are concerned that payment incentives confronting individual physicians under some managed care arrangements may distort physicians' clinical judgment.4Health maintenance organizations vary in how much they rely on financial incentives for cost control, both alone and in combination with other mechanisms, such as utilization review and prior approval policies or broader organizational design aimed at changing physician orientation. Hillman has characterized the balance between these two approaches as the difference between incentives and rules.5 Despite some variation, virtually all HMOs depend at least in part on financial incentives using techniques like capitation, withheld funds, and bonuses.This article discusses the current use of financial incentives in managed care. It is organized in three parts. The first part is conceptual and includes general assumptions about financial incentives and their role in managed care, a framework to provide context for them, and four key variables to use in defining the form of financial incentives. The second part is empirical and presents findings from a recent national survey of managed care plans to illustrate how incentives are structured in managed care and the organizational context in which they operate. The third part presents the observations of the author, a nonclinician researcher, and highlights key challenges facing the medical community as it decides how to respond to managed care.Effects of financial incentives in managed care will not be discussed. Though there are several review articles on the performance of managed care, studies focused on the effects of different methods of paying physicians in managed care plans are rare.3,6–8 Rapid change in managed care organizations as well as physician involvement in a number of different health plans present substantial barriers to these types of studies. As a result, most studies have not isolated the effects of financial incentives on physician behavior from effects attributable to organizational or individual physician factors." @default.
• W2008651979 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W2008651979 creator A5026694467 @default.
• W2008651979 date "1999-01-01" @default.
• W2008651979 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W2008651979 title "Financial incentives" @default.
• W2008651979 cites W1975340605 @default.
• W2008651979 cites W1986179577 @default.
• W2008651979 cites W2004834918 @default.
• W2008651979 cites W2010256798 @default.
• W2008651979 cites W2016884721 @default.
• W2008651979 cites W2022956629 @default.
• W2008651979 cites W2025877767 @default.
• W2008651979 cites W2040077593 @default.
• W2008651979 cites W2046273813 @default.
• W2008651979 cites W2052877306 @default.
• W2008651979 cites W2055739294 @default.
• W2008651979 cites W2081284782 @default.
• W2008651979 cites W2089638003 @default.
• W2008651979 cites W2119706674 @default.
• W2008651979 cites W2162553011 @default.
• W2008651979 cites W2282271008 @default.
• W2008651979 doi "https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1525-1497.1999.00260.x" @default.
• W2008651979 hasPubMedCentralId "https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/1496870" @default.
• W2008651979 hasPubMedId "https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9933489" @default.
• W2008651979 hasPublicationYear "1999" @default.
• W2008651979 type Work @default.
• W2008651979 sameAs 2008651979 @default.
• W2008651979 citedByCount "20" @default.
• W2008651979 countsByYear W20086519792012 @default.
• W2008651979 countsByYear W20086519792015 @default.
• W2008651979 countsByYear W20086519792016 @default.
• W2008651979 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W2008651979 hasAuthorship W2008651979A5026694467 @default.
• W2008651979 hasBestOaLocation W20086519792 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConcept C100001284 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConcept C10138342 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConcept C144133560 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConcept C145097563 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConcept C160735492 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConcept C162118730 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConcept C175444787 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConcept C195487862 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConcept C2776196091 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConcept C2776753347 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConcept C2779703844 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConcept C2780265253 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConcept C29122968 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConcept C37226244 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConcept C50522688 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConcept C71924100 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConceptScore W2008651979C100001284 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConceptScore W2008651979C10138342 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConceptScore W2008651979C144133560 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConceptScore W2008651979C145097563 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConceptScore W2008651979C160735492 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConceptScore W2008651979C162118730 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConceptScore W2008651979C162324750 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConceptScore W2008651979C175444787 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConceptScore W2008651979C195487862 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConceptScore W2008651979C2776196091 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConceptScore W2008651979C2776753347 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConceptScore W2008651979C2779703844 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConceptScore W2008651979C2780265253 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConceptScore W2008651979C29122968 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConceptScore W2008651979C37226244 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConceptScore W2008651979C50522688 @default.
• W2008651979 hasConceptScore W2008651979C71924100 @default.
• W2008651979 hasLocation W20086519791 @default.
• W2008651979 hasLocation W20086519792 @default.
• W2008651979 hasLocation W20086519793 @default.
• W2008651979 hasLocation W20086519794 @default.
• W2008651979 hasOpenAccess W2008651979 @default.
• W2008651979 hasPrimaryLocation W20086519791 @default.
• W2008651979 hasRelatedWork W1822583513 @default.
• W2008651979 hasRelatedWork W2046318033 @default.
• W2008651979 hasRelatedWork W2046331003 @default.
• W2008651979 hasRelatedWork W2370665879 @default.
• W2008651979 hasRelatedWork W2384117482 @default.
• W2008651979 hasRelatedWork W2388144220 @default.
• W2008651979 hasRelatedWork W2393400212 @default.
• W2008651979 hasRelatedWork W2873947888 @default.
• W2008651979 hasRelatedWork W3121131775 @default.
• W2008651979 hasRelatedWork W38016732 @default.
• W2008651979 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2008651979 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W2008651979 magId "2008651979" @default.
• W2008651979 workType "article" @default.