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• W2012915067 abstract "Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes Cited in Adam Schwarz (1999:165–166). There is also the additional viewpoint to consider in that Islam reached Indonesia very late, that is, at the time when it was in its lower level of decline in terms of political and cultural achievements, the Islamic current that permeated Indonesia was not strong enough to change the cultural life of the indigenous people completely. For example, Islamic doctrine and behaviour was accepted differently in Aceh than it was in the Minangkabau area and in Java. This division was further subjected to social norms or verbal laws within each village. The Dutch sought to manage Islam, which was a potential rallying force of anti‐Dutch feelings, by emasculating political Islam whilst promoting its spiritual growth. The Suharto government inherited and applied this old Dutch policy during the earlier half of his dictatorship. (Schwarz 1999:121). (Schwarz 1999:168). The structure and enforced unity of these Muslim political parties, especially Masyumi, allowed for the advent of Islam as a potent political force during and after the independence struggle. See Anshari (1979 Anshari Saifuddin 1979 The Jakarta Charter 1945: The Struggle For An Islamic Constitution in Indonesia (Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia) [Google Scholar]:30). It is useful to note that the Jakarta Charter did not advocate an Islamic state but rather called upon the state to administer sha'riah to make Indonesians good Muslims. For instance, Abdurrahman Wahid, the leader of Nahdatul Ulama, who later became Indonesia's fourth president argued that Islam does not recognise the total separation between religion and politics, and that the state should reflect the norms of the majority. The ‘Islamisation of law’ as advocated through Sha'riah would represent Islamic representation in formal agencies so as to ensure the enactment of rules and regulations in accordance to Islamic teachings. See Schwarz (1999:162–193). 7. Other reasons include how the acceptance of Islamic parties (that were made to be based on the Pancasila in 1984) into the New Order fold allowed Muslims to be open and proud of their religion as it did not oppose the state regime, as well as the manner in which the depoliticisation of Indonesia drove students in particular to view Islam activities as an alternative to banned political activities. An economic explanation suggested that many Muslims lost their economic and political power under the early New Order as foreign capital ruined cottage industries like batik and textile. (Schwarz 1999:173–174). Singapore security officials have indeed described it as a ‘deeply clandestine terrorist organisation’. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore's letter to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on the request for the addition of JI to the list of terrorist maintained by the UN. http://app10.internet.gov.sg/scripts/mfa/sections/press/report_press.asp?1633 One of the prominent DI leaders today, Al Chaidar, argued that the rise of Islamic extremism should be understood as a reaction to Suharto's persecution of Islamic forces. While some adopted fundamentalist teachings, others adopted political extremism to counter the regime. In this regard, Jama'ah Islamiyyah was created for the purpose of establishing Dawlah Islamiyyah through the strategies of imam (belief), hidjrah (migrating) and jihad (war). See Al Chaidar (2002 Al Chaidar 2002 ‘Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Darul Islam's Response Towards Indonesian Democracy, 1949–1982’ Paper presented at a Regional Workshop on Contemporary Islamic Movements in Southeast Asia: Militancy, Separatism, Terrorism and Democratisation Process, 28–31 October, Bogor, Indonesia, organised by The RIDEP Institute and Fredrich‐Ebert‐Stiftung, Indonesia [Google Scholar]). Professor Eqbal Ahmad recount of this is most instructive: ‘In 1985, President Ronald Reagan received a group of bearded men. These bearded men I was writing about in those days in The New Yorker, actually did. They were very ferocious‐looking bearded men with turbans looking like they came from another century. President Reagan received them in the White House. After receiving them, he spoke to the press. He pointed towards them, I’m sure some of you will recall that moment, and said, “These are the moral equivalent of America's founding fathers”. These were the Afghan Mujahiddin. These were at the time, guns in hand, battling the Evil Empire. They were the moral equivalent of our founding fathers! In August 1998, another American President ordered missile strikes … to kill Osama Bin Laden and his men in the camps in Afghanistan. I do not wish to embarrass you with the reminder that Mr Bin Laden…was only a few years ago the moral equivalent of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson! He got angry over the fact that he has been demoted from “Moral Equivalent” of your “Founding Fathers”. So he is taking out his anger in different ways'. See Ahmad (n.d Ahmad Eqbal n.d. ‘Terrorism: Theirs and Ours’ at http://www.sangam.org/ANALYSIS/Ahmad.htm [Google Scholar].). While Bashir is the Emir in every sense of the word, he is more the spiritual leader. However, for long, the field commander and operations chief of the JI in Southeast Asia was Hambali. As Hambali was appointed by Sungkar, a person whom Hambali looked up to and from whom he took his orders, following Sungkar's death, there appears to be division between Bashir and Hambali, with the former being unable to control the latter. According to a Malaysian security official, if Bashir, following Sungkar's death was JI's ‘godfather’, then Hambali was the ‘consigliere’. Since then, Hambali has been accused of masterminding various bombing operations in Indonesia and the Philippines as well as organising the ‘Singapore Plan’, which among others targeted truck bombings of American, Australian, British and Israeli interests in Singapore as well as various Singapore targets. For details, see Ahmad (n.d.) Ahmad Eqbal n.d. ‘Terrorism: Theirs and Ours’ at http://www.sangam.org/ANALYSIS/Ahmad.htm [Google Scholar] . Also refer to a five parts report titled ‘Asia’s Own Osama',at http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/malay_terror/hambali.html Interestingly, the JI's Chief of Operations, until his capture in August 2002, lived in Cambodia from late 2002 to early 2003. For details on the JI network in Cambodia, see Phann (2003 Phann Ana Doyle Kevin 2003 ‘Radicals Try to Strengthen Ties in Cambodia’ The Cambodian Daily (Weekend Saturday, 13) [Google Scholar]). In December 2001 and August 2002, the Internal Security Department of Singapore arrested 15 and 21 JI members respectively who planned to bomb a number of Western targets and key military installations in Singapore. Gunaratna (2002:186–190) The PUPJI was allegedly written in May 1996 by Abdullah Sungkar, the founder of the JI. This was written for the Majelis Qiyadah Markaziyah Al‐Jamaah Al‐Islamiyah. The original name of the JI was Al‐Jamaah Al‐Islamiyah. This was later shortened to Jemaah Islamiyah. See ‘Menyingkap Organisasi ‘Teroris’ dalm PUPJI (1 & 2). Cited in http://mail2.factsof.de/pipermail/national/2003‐September/019999.html; http://mail2.factsof.de/pipermail/national/2003‐September/020017.html Interview with senior official, Coordinating Ministry for Political and Security Affairs, Jakarta, Indonesia. Despite many allegations being made about Saddam's support for international terrorism, no real evidence was ever offered by Washington to confirm this. In fact, on 18 September 2003 President Bush stated that ‘we have had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September 11’. Despite Washington's allegations of Saddam's link with international terrorism, what has happened following the Iraqi strongman's ouster is that the danger of terrorism, especially in Iraq has increased rapidly, perpetrated both by Saddam loyalists and foreign groups. See ‘Bush: No Evidence Saddam Hussein Involved in 9–11 Terror Attacks’, http://bigjweb.com/artman/publish/article_1021.shtml; ‘After Saddam, the real terrorist threat’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 22 August 2003. Admiral Dennis Blair, the former Commander‐in‐Chief of US forces in the Pacific, for instance, stated on 5 February 2002 that despite the Congressional ban, some cooperation was being undertaken with the Indonesian military. However, he made it clear that ‘the US could not resume a full military relationship with Indonesia until its armed forces completed reforms that bring the standards of conduct and accountability to what we expect of advanced armed forces’. Cited in The Sydney Morning Herald, 6 February 2002. Interview with senior official, Coordinating Ministry for Political and Security Affairs, Jakarta, Indonesia." @default.
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• W2012915067 title "The challenge of militant Islam and terrorism in Indonesia" @default.
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