FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2016049018> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2016049018 endingPage "221" @default.
• W2016049018 startingPage "221" @default.
• W2016049018 abstract "Introduction Diversity of organizational form is characteristic of the insurance industry. life insurance segment of the industry is dominated by mutual and stock companies. While mutual companies are far less numerous (about 5 percent of all legal reserve companies), they control almost half of the industry assets and are responsible for about 38 percent of the life insurance coverage in force. Over the last 40 years, the number of mutual life insurers has remained relatively stable, while the number of stock life companies has increased significantly.[1] In stock companies, the customer and ownership functions are distinctly separate, while these functions are merged in mutual life insurers. At least in theory, ownership rights in mutual insurers are vested in the policyholders of the company. actual degree of control exercised by policyholders has been debated (see Anderson, 1973; Greene and Johnson, 1980; Hetherington, 1969; and Kreider, 1972, for example). differences in ownership structure between mutual and stock companies naturally focus attention on the efficiency of the two organizational forms and the agency theory implications of changes in ownership structure. Previous cross-sectional empirical studies examining the performance of mutual and stock savings and loan associations (see Hadaway and Hadaway, 1981; Nicols, 1967; O'Hara, 1981; Simpson and Kohers, 1979; and Verbrugge and Goldstein 1981, for example) and mutual and stock insurers (Frech, 1980 and Spiller, 1972) concluded that stock organizations performed better than mutual organizations in terms of a set of performance measures. However, Fama and Jensen (1983), Hansmann (1985), Mayers and Smith (1981, 1986), and Smith (1986) argue for the potential efficiency of both types of organizations, theorizing a tradeoff between the costs and benefits of each form of organization. This view was summarized clearly by Smith (1986, p. 705): The different ownership structures create different incentives for the contracting parties, thus the different costs of controlling the resulting incentive problems lead to the efficiency of the various ownership structures. survival of both organizational forms has also been offered as proof of their efficiency. Fama and Jensen (1983, p. 345) note: Organizations compete for survival, and the form of organization that survives in an activity is the one that can deliver the product demanded by consumers at the lowest price while covering costs. According to Jensen and Smith (1985, p. 97), competition and survivorship produce an efficient utilization of resources. possibility of wealth transfers among various claimholders has been examined in the context of agency theory. Mayers and Smith (1986, pp. 75-76) note that stockholders of an insurer have incentives to increase the value of their stock at the policyholders' expense by making unanticipated changes in investment, financing, and dividend policies. mutual form of organization represents one way of reducing the costs of controlling incentive conflicts between stockholders and policyholders. After demutualization, however, policyholders are no longer the residual claimants of the firm, and the possibility of expropriation by stockholders increases to the extent that the policyholders' disciplining mechanisms (such as policy termination or policy loans) become less effective. Another form of incentive conflict is found between owners and managers. Because owners of mutual insurers must rely on less effective control mechanisms, managers have greater opportunities to take advantage of the policyholders. For example, more perquisite consumption and nepotism should be observed at mutual organizations than stock organizations. Hence, Smith (1986, p. 708) suggests that mutuals should have a comparative advantage in areas requiring little managerial discretion and in offering long-term contracts where renewal options are more valuable. …" @default.
• W2016049018 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W2016049018 creator A5027458467 @default.
• W2016049018 creator A5077718869 @default.
• W2016049018 date "1992-06-01" @default.
• W2016049018 modified "2023-10-18" @default.
• W2016049018 title "Ownership Structure and Performance: The Demutualization of Life Insurers" @default.
• W2016049018 cites W103650626 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W1506537093 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W1595605331 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W1827033679 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W1887512089 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W1978705328 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W1991795148 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W2000953097 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W2002586189 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W2005101696 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W2018935393 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W2039699990 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W2051387202 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W2062852189 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W2082475877 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W2104626092 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W2132070532 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W2147448303 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W2167444648 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W2315073360 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W2327340836 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W2330942105 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W2332421310 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W2752617332 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W3125898175 @default.
• W2016049018 cites W612270470 @default.
• W2016049018 doi "https://doi.org/10.2307/253189" @default.
• W2016049018 hasPublicationYear "1992" @default.
• W2016049018 type Work @default.
• W2016049018 sameAs 2016049018 @default.
• W2016049018 citedByCount "65" @default.
• W2016049018 countsByYear W20160490182012 @default.
• W2016049018 countsByYear W20160490182013 @default.
• W2016049018 countsByYear W20160490182014 @default.
• W2016049018 countsByYear W20160490182015 @default.
• W2016049018 countsByYear W20160490182016 @default.
• W2016049018 countsByYear W20160490182017 @default.
• W2016049018 countsByYear W20160490182018 @default.
• W2016049018 countsByYear W20160490182019 @default.
• W2016049018 countsByYear W20160490182021 @default.
• W2016049018 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W2016049018 hasAuthorship W2016049018A5027458467 @default.
• W2016049018 hasAuthorship W2016049018A5077718869 @default.
• W2016049018 hasConcept C121955636 @default.
• W2016049018 hasConcept C144133560 @default.
• W2016049018 hasConcept C73283319 @default.
• W2016049018 hasConceptScore W2016049018C121955636 @default.
• W2016049018 hasConceptScore W2016049018C144133560 @default.
• W2016049018 hasConceptScore W2016049018C73283319 @default.
• W2016049018 hasIssue "2" @default.
• W2016049018 hasLocation W20160490181 @default.
• W2016049018 hasOpenAccess W2016049018 @default.
• W2016049018 hasPrimaryLocation W20160490181 @default.
• W2016049018 hasRelatedWork W2016662386 @default.
• W2016049018 hasRelatedWork W2117113921 @default.
• W2016049018 hasRelatedWork W2120405564 @default.
• W2016049018 hasRelatedWork W2150249679 @default.
• W2016049018 hasRelatedWork W2167985812 @default.
• W2016049018 hasRelatedWork W2580708102 @default.
• W2016049018 hasRelatedWork W2804987199 @default.
• W2016049018 hasRelatedWork W3121785297 @default.
• W2016049018 hasRelatedWork W3196420090 @default.
• W2016049018 hasRelatedWork W41636562 @default.
• W2016049018 hasVolume "59" @default.
• W2016049018 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2016049018 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W2016049018 magId "2016049018" @default.
• W2016049018 workType "article" @default.