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- W2016093233 endingPage "117" @default.
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- W2016093233 abstract "What do courts play the establishment and maintenance of constitutional democracies? To address this question, we elaborate a model that draws on existing substantive literature and on theories that assume strategic behavior on the part of judges, executives, and legislatures. This model, turn, leads to several behavioral predictions the interactions among the relevant political actors. Although those predictions could be assessed many distinct contexts, we focus on Russia. In particular, we provide a demonstration of how the model helps make sense of the behavior of the Constitutional Court (Konstitucjonnyj sud) light of the difficult political situation it confronted. We conclude with some thoughts on the broader implications of our theory for the study of courts throughout Eastern Europe and how it may well illuminate constitutional other parts of the world. Before World War II, few European States had constitutional courts, and virtually none exercised any significant judicial review over legislation. After 1945 all that changed. West Germany, Italy, Austria, Cyprus, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece, Spain, Portugal and even France . . created tribunals with power to annul legislative enactments inconsistent with constitutional requirements. Many of these courts have become significant-even powerful-actors. -Herman Schwartz (1992:741) European constitutional courts have created situations which legislators feel obliged to enter into constitutional discourse, both an internal discourse and a discourse with the court, to make and to take seriously constitutional arguments, and to cast and recast statutory language the light of potential constitutional objections. -Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone (1994b:417) [T]here is an expansion of judicial power afoot the world's political systems. -C. Neal Tate (1995:27) Today, at the end of the twentieth century, it is scarcely possible to recount, much less understand, the major political and social developments industrial societies without attention to legal norms, courts and judges. -Sally J. Kenney, William A Reisinger & John C. Reitz (1999:1) These quotes, from legal academics and social scientists alike, are just the tip of the iceberg. Indeed, for more than a decade now, the community of law and society scholars has acknowledged the active role courts are playing in ensuring the supremacy of constitutional principles (Henckaerts & Van der Jeught 1998) and democratization efforts throughout the world, but especially Eastern Europe. This expansion of judicial power-or what some term the judicialization of politics (Tate & Vallinder 1995a) raises whole sets of intriguing questions, and unanswered questions at that.1 For, despite an acknowledgment of their importance, we know precious little, as Gibson et al. (1998) recently lamented, about the judicial and legal systems countries outside the United States. We understand little or nothing the degree to which various judiciaries are politicized; how judges make decisions; how, whether, and to what extent those decisions are implemented; how ordinary citizens influence courts, if at all; or what effect courts have on institutions and cultures (p. 343). Certainly no single research endeavor can fill all the voids Gibson and his colleagues identify. What we do instead is tackle one question, albeit one that is of core concern to the Gibson team, as well as to many others laboring this field: What do constitutional courts play the establishment and maintenance of democracies? For judicial specialists, this question is of obvious significance, having served as a focal point for studies on the U.S. Supreme Court for over four decades (Casper 1976; Dahl 1957; Gates 1992; Rosenberg 1991). But there are at least two other groups for which our question might resonate. …" @default.
- W2016093233 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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- W2016093233 date "2001-01-01" @default.
- W2016093233 modified "2023-10-06" @default.
- W2016093233 title "The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government" @default.
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- W2016093233 doi "https://doi.org/10.2307/3185388" @default.
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