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• W2018579616 abstract "Since Vives (1984), Cheng (1985) and Okuguchi (1987), the equilibria in Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies with product differentiation have been known to differ. Okuguchi (2005) has shown that Bertrand priceadjusting oligopoly with product differentiation and symmetric firms is quasi-competitive but not perfectly competitive in the limit state of infinite number of firms. This paper formulates and analyzes two types of Cournot output-adjusting oligopoly with product differentiation and symmetric firms, in one of which symmetric firms producing the same goods are assumed to collude, and in the other, collusion is ruled out. The limit states are shown to be different in two oligopolies but they are both quasi-competitive. It is well known, since the seminal paper of Ruffin (1971), that the Cournot oligopoly without product differentiation and symmetric firms is quasi-competitive in the sense that the equilibrium industry output increases with an increase in the number of firms, and that the equilibrium product price converges to the competitive one under a set of reasonable conditions on the inverse market demand function and the firm’s cost function. Okuguchi (1973) has extended Ruffin’s result taking into account asymmetric firms and adapting the method of the proof of Debreu and Scarf (1963) of the equivalence of the core and the perfectly competitive equilibrium in the limit state of a pure exchange economy. Two kinds of equilibria are conceivable for Cournot oligopoly without product differentiation and with symmetric firms with identical cost functions. The first equilibrium emerges when all firms behave with a priori knowledge that their equilibrium outputs are the same. The second equilibrium occurs when all symmetric firms do not know in advance that their equilibrium outputs are identical. This is the case of non-collusion and was first systematically analyzed by Ruffin (1971). In section 2 we will analyze the differences between the two equilibria in Cournot oligopoly without product differentiation and with symmetric firms. The difference of the equilibria in Cournot oligopoly without product differentiation and with symmetric firms and with or without collusion was first suggested by Kemp and Shimomura (1995). We will find that the Cournot oligopoly equilibria are quasi-competitive but do not converge to a perfectly competitive equilibrium when the number of firms becomes infinite and when collusion exists. If oligopoly consists of firm producing differentiated products, the firm may choose price or output as a strategic variable. If its strategy is price, the oligopoly is called Bertrand oligopoly with product differentiation, and if it is output, we have Cournot oligopoly with product differentiation. In Bertrand oligopoly with product differentiation, the firm chooses its profit-maximizing price assuming that its rivals’ prices are not affected by its own price choice. On the other" @default.
• W2018579616 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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• W2018579616 date "2007-05-01" @default.
• W2018579616 modified "2023-10-14" @default.
• W2018579616 title "Quasi-Competitive Cournot Oligopoly with Product Differentiation and Symmetric Firms" @default.
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• W2018579616 doi "https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2007.00413.x" @default.
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