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W2018651024 abstract "This essay will provide some ideas about how policy makers can best boost the economic development of older industrial cities. I aim to identify policies with high leverage—with the most economic development benefits compared with costs—for cities that have suffered from deindustrialization and consequent economic decline. This essay is inspired by and draws on the recent book, Retooling for Growth: Building a 21st Century Economy in America's Older Industrial Areas. This book was edited by Richard McGahey, a program officer in the Economic Development Unit at the Ford Foundation, and Jennifer Vey, a fellow in the Metropolitan Policy Program at the Brookings Institution. The book is published by the Brookings Institution. The Brookings Institution, through its Metropolitan Policy Program, has conducted or sponsored policy-oriented research that represents a mainstream moderate position on how to solve these urban problems. This book includes some of the best ideas from scholars and policy practitioners concerned with older cities and their residents. The book does not, however, include any overview chapter that unifies the ideas offered by the various authors. My essay attempts to provide an augmented “book review” by drawing together some themes from this book, identifying issues that need greater emphasis, and disagreeing with some of the book's conclusions. I attempt to move forward the policy dialogue about older industrial cities. The main focus of this essay is on the perspective of a metropolitan area's or city's policy makers on what can be done to improve the economic development of a particular metropolitan area or city. However, a penultimate section will briefly consider the national perspective. What is the economic problem in older industrial cities? I think this is well known, and it is reviewed in the chapters by McGahey (chapter 1), Vey (chapter 2), Wolman, Hill, Blumenthal, and Furdell (chapter 6), Luria and Rogers (chapter 9), and Finkle, Garmise, and Nourick (chapter 11). These cities have lost their former economic base of traditional manufacturing to some combination of suburbs, other U.S. regions, and other countries (the last of which is particularly emphasized by Luria and Rogers). This leaves behind vacant industrial land, which frequently suffers from actual or perceived environmental problems (an issue particularly emphasized by Finkle, Garmise, and Nourick in chapter 11). The loss of jobs also leaves behind increased unemployment and underemployment and persistent poverty with its attendant social problems (these issues are particularly emphasized by Pastor and Benner [chapter 4], Wolman et al. [chapter 6], Turner, Davis, and Cruz [chapter 8], Kazis and Seltzer [chapter 12], and Blackwell and Fox [chapter 13]). What solutions do the book's chapters offer to the economic problem in older industrial cities? In this section, I summarize each chapter's main themes. I also provide some background on the authors, which helps identify their expertise and perspective. Chapter 1, by Richard McGahey of the Ford Foundation, critiques economic development incentives and suggests reforms, discusses industrial clusters, and discusses regional workforce development and regional cooperation. Chapter 2, by Jennifer Vey of the Brookings Institution, discusses state government policies toward older industrial cities. Her chapter mentions many diverse policy interventions: school funding reform, crime reduction policies, revenue sharing, downtown investments, investing in industrial clusters, improving transit, workforce development, and housing programs. Chapter 3, by Randall Kempner of the Council on Competitiveness (an organization involving corporate CEOs, university presidents, and labor leaders concerned with U.S. economic competitiveness) discusses how cities might improve their pools of individuals with “talent” or job skills. Chapter 4, by Manuel Pastor and Chris Benner of the University of Southern California and the University of California-Davis, respectively, discusses how greater equity in metro areas between income groups and between cities and suburbs might promote greater per capita income growth in metro areas. Chapter 5, by Stephen Moret, Mick Fleming, and Pauline Hovey, who are associated with national and local chambers of commerce, discusses the growing role of regional chambers of commerce in economic development in metro areas. Chapter 6, by Harold Wolman (George Washington University and Brookings), Edward Hill (Cleveland State), Pamela Blumenthal (George Washington University), and Kimberly Furdell (George Washington University), identifies cities that have weak growth or have many residents with economic problems and metro areas that have weak growth. The chapter looks at the relationship between weak metro growth and city growth and residents’ economic conditions, and looks at the causes of weakness in metro or city growth or city residents’ economic conditions. Chapter 7, by Ann Markusen (University of Minnesota) and Greg Schrock (University of Illinois-Chicago), argues that regional economic development policy should pay more attention to labor. In particular, economic development policy should focus more on occupations and training, even if these occupations and this training are not linked to export-base industries. Chapter 8, by Mark Turner, Laurel Davis, and Andres Cruz of the consulting firm Optimal Solutions, uses a methodology previously developed by Jobs for the Future to identify “good occupations” for low-skilled workers in four particular metropolitan areas. These identified “good occupations” serve as useful targets for workforce development and education policies. Chapter 9, by Daniel Luria (of the Michigan Manufacturing Technology Center, a manufacturing extension program) and Joel Rogers (University of Wisconsin and Center on Wisconsin Strategy), discusses the causes of manufacturing decline in the north central region of the U.S. and in the U.S. as a whole. Their suggested solutions include reformed national trade policies and regional policies to improve manufacturing productivity and worker job skills. Chapter 10, by Rachel Weber (University of Illinois-Chicago), discusses how economic development incentives can be better designed and monitored to ensure more accountability for results. Chapter 11, by Jeffrey Finkle, Shari Garmise, and Shari Nourick, with Nourick from a consulting firm, and the others from the International Economic Development Council, the most prominent professional association for economic developers in the U.S., recommends that economic development of older cities place more emphasis on developing brownfield sites, improving the competitiveness of small business, improving job skills, and generating high-tech spin-offs from local universities. Chapter 12, by Richard Kazis and Marlene Seltzer of Jobs for the Future, an organization concerned with workforce training and education reform, discusses how workforce development and education can be better linked to economic development. Chapter 13, by Angela Glover Blackwell and Radhika Fox of PolicyLink, a group concerned with more equitable development policy in the U.S., discusses how local development policies can provide more benefits to disadvantaged groups through sectoral training programs, community benefit agreements, and support for minority business enterprises. Chapter 14, by Jeremy Nowak of The Reinvestment Fund, a group that does social investment in development projects in the mid-Atlantic region, and particularly in Philadelphia, discusses how social investment in development projects can promote moderate income housing development, charter school development, reinvestment in older manufacturing companies, and inner-city food retail centers. An appendix to the book presents a policy statement by the American Assembly, sponsor of the conference that led to this book. The American Assembly is a “good government” group started by Dwight Eisenhower in 1950 when he was president of Columbia University and that continues to be affiliated with Columbia University. The appendix focuses on such themes as: reorienting economic development policy toward more selective use of tax incentives and more emphasis on entrepreneurship and clusters, increasing the quality of local human capital through improved schools and workforce training, and improving urban infrastructure with national and state funding. Because of the book's diversity of themes, it is impossible to critique in any detail all of the different chapters’ solutions to older cities’ economic problems. What I offer in this article is a highlighting of proposed solutions that in my view deserve greater emphasis and a highlighting of proposed solutions that I wish had received less emphasis. Similar to other articles and books about older cities, much of the book talks about city or metropolitan economic development as a goal in and of itself. This perspective is incomplete and sometimes misleading. Ultimately, urban and regional policy, like any policy, stands or falls based on its benefits and costs to people, not places. We care about the fate of older industrial cities and their surrounding metropolitan area because of their people. The residents of these older cities and metropolitan areas have ties to the familiar places and people of their home. These ties mean that individuals may gain due to improvements in the economic development of their metropolitan area or city. If people had no ties to particular places, then improvements in just one particular area or city would have no consequences except for those who owned land there. What are these benefits from the economic development of a particular metropolitan area or city? These benefits include: Earnings gains of the original local residents due to becoming employed or moving up to better jobs. Gains in business profits of businesses with some specific advantages in that metropolitan area. Gains in the value of land and real estate that accrue to local real estate owners. Gains to governments in the form of tax revenue exceeding public service costs. Gains to in-migrants to the area. Of these possible benefits, the empirical evidence suggests that the increase in earnings per person of the original local residents is by far the most important. Empirical studies suggest that such earnings gains are likely to be 70 percent of the total gains.1 Therefore, the primary goal of the economic development of older urban areas is to increase the earnings per capita of the original local residents. This perspective is reflected to some degree in the book, but not consistently. The importance of per capita earnings as a goal, as opposed to development or growth in and of itself, receives particular emphasis in chapters by Pastor and Benner (chapter 4), Wolman et al. (chapter 6), Markusen and Schrock (chapter 7), Turner, Davis, and Cruz (chapter 8), Luria and Rogers (chapter 9), Kazis and Seltzer (chapter 12), and Blackwell and Fox (chapter 13). This might seem an academic debate. Economic growth of a region often increases per capita income. So why distinguish between development and per capita earnings as goals? One reason this distinction is useful is that not all types of economic development have equal effects on earnings per dollar of resources. Therefore, if we are focused on the primary goal of increasing earnings per capita, we may choose different policies than we would choose if we valued growth and development in and of itself. Second, if increasing per capita earnings is the goal, this immediately suggests a framework for analyzing economic development. Development becomes linked most of all to what happens in the local labor market. Understanding local labor markets becomes the key to understanding local economic development. We can enhance per capita earnings by increasing the quantity and quality of labor demand. We can also enhance per capita earnings by increasing the quantity and quality of labor supply. Intervening on either side of the market has both advantages and disadvantages. Intervening on both the labor demand and labor supply sides makes sense as a strategy. In contrast, if “urban revitalization” is the goal, it is unclear what exactly this means or what particular policies must be focused on to achieve this goal. In other words, urban economic development policy should be seen as local labor market policy. This clarifies both the goals and methods of urban economic development policy. It could be asked why increasing per capita earnings of urban residents is an important goal. There are other ways to improve the well-being of urban residents. For example, the well-being of urban residents would be improved by lower crime, better housing, better schools, better local air and water quality, and better recreation opportunities. Putting a high priority on urban economic development—higher earnings per capita for urban residents—is justified under the assumption that such higher earnings plays a key catalytic role in improving all aspects of urban life. If per capita earnings are higher for all or most urban residents, then many of these other determinants of urban quality of life would automatically improve. For example, crime will tend to go down, and housing and schools will improve. In addition, with higher per capita earnings, it is easier to find tax revenue to fund policies to further improve the urban quality of life, such as lower class size in schools, environmental clean-ups, and more recreational space. In thinking about how to enhance the economic development of older urban areas—which, per the above discussion, I am interpreting as how to enhance the per capita earnings of the original residents of the area, particularly more needy residents—requires clarifying some ideas. There are some ideas about economic development in the following categories: erroneous ideas that should be disregarded, possibly true ideas that are not particularly useful for policy either because the evidence is ambiguous or because the policy implications are not specific enough, and ideas that are useful because they have more research backing and more specific implications for policy. Erroneous ideas. I have already mentioned one erroneous idea: public policy should value places in and of themselves rather than valuing people. Another erroneous idea is the idea that local policies can be usefully analyzed as if people are perfectly mobile. If people were perfectly mobile, then wages, rents, and all other local characteristics would immediately adjust to equalize well-being across all local areas.2 If people were perfectly mobile, any policy seeking to improve a local area could not improve the well-being of any local resident who was not a landowner. Urban economic development policy could not help the poor. Empirical evidence suggests that this idea is untrue. Policies that affect local labor demand do persistently affect local employment rates and earnings rates for periods of up to 20 years (Bartik 1993a). We can explain this empirical finding as due to a combination of two factors: people are not extremely mobile in the short run and history influences what people are able to do (Bartik 1991). What happens to local labor demand affects the number and types of jobs that imperfectly mobile local residents can obtain in the short run. The history of a person's job experiences affects what jobs he or she is able to get in the future. Job experience affects an individual's job skills, self-confidence, and reputation with employers. All of these factors affect an individual's long-run equilibrium employment rate and wage rate. I have explained this phenomenon under the label of “hysteresis” (when a system's equilibrium depends on the system's history), but perhaps this phenomenon is more simply described as “history matters.” A related erroneous idea is the notion that it is as desirable to try to move people to jobs as jobs to people. Not so, and Roger Bolton demonstrated the contrary some years ago (Bolton 1971; see also Bartik 1994a). Suppose that people have social ties to their home area that they value. Suppose further that labor markets are such that there is some gain to getting a job. For example, suppose that an unemployed person would gain W0 − R (their wage W0 minus some reservation value R they place on their time) from getting a job in their current local area. They could be employed at wage W1 in some other local area but prefer to remain in their current local area. Their preference means they lose utility, whose money value is M, from moving. An incentive B to a business to employ that person in this local area will be effective if B is greater than L, the reduced profits from taking this action rather than the business's best alternative without the incentive. An effective incentive B will have net social benefits if W0 − R is greater than L. If that is the case, there will be some B that is more than L and less than W0 − R that will induce this added hiring of this person in their current local area, and realize net benefits of W0 − R − L. On the other hand, an incentive S to the person to move will not work unless S exceeds M. In that case, the individual has benefits S − M from moving, and taxpayers lose S, so net social benefits of the induced move must be (−M), that is, the difference between the person's expected utility from staying versus their expected utility from moving without any subsidy. Another way to analyze the issue is to focus on whether there are any external benefits or costs of the business's or the person's behavior that justify the business incentive or the moving incentive. Without any government intervention, the individual is acting rationally, because psychological and financial costs from moving to a new area are real costs, and there are no externalities from the person's moving behavior that justify the household moving incentives. On the other hand, the business's hiring of this person in their current area does have external benefits to the person hired. These external benefits justify some level of business incentives. If that justified level of business incentives exceeds the loss in profitability from the hiring, then the business incentives will be both effective and economically efficient. Possibly true ideas that are not current useful guides to policy. One potentially true, but not particularly useful idea, is that there are spillover benefits of a higher percentage of college graduates in a local labor market. These spillover effects could occur if an increase in one resident's educational level increases the productivity of other local workers. These external effects of one person's education on nearby workers’ productivity might occur through several transmission mechanisms: individuals may learn from their neighbors, businesses might design workplaces in part based on average education levels, and a more educated worker might be more inclined to be an entrepreneur who will introduce innovations that raise productivity (Acs and Armington 2006; Glaeser and Gottlieb 2008). Some empirical findings are consistent with spillover benefits of education in local labor markets. An individual's wages appear to be positively affected not only by the individual's own education but also positively affected by the percentage of college graduates in the local labor market (Moretti 2004). These wage increases could be interpreted as evidence of higher productivity due to a higher percentage of college graduates in the local labor market. If these wage increases do not fully adjust for higher productivity, then a higher percentage of college graduates in a local labor market will also attract employment growth. Empirical research suggests that a higher percentage of college graduates in a local labor market is correlated with future growth in that local labor market (Glaeser and Saiz 2004). In the current book, Glaeser's findings are referred to in the chapters by Kempner (chapter 3) and Wolman et al. (chapter 6). These findings help rationalize the idea that policies that increase college graduation in a local economy are important to urban revitalization. There is certainly some serious evidence for this idea of education spillovers in local economies. My own view is that it has some truth. It can sometimes be useful in rhetoric arguing for skills development policies, and I have so used it (Bartik 2005b). Why, then, do I say that this idea is not particularly useful for policy? First, this idea can be challenged. Perhaps the percentage of college graduates is merely a proxy for unobserved attributes of the metropolitan area that independently affect wages and growth (see Lange and Topel 2006). Second, even if there are productivity spillovers of education, the effects of college graduates on growth depend upon whether college graduates’ effects on local productivity exceed their effects on wages, and we do not know when this is most likely to be the case. Third, we do not know which particular skills have the most spillover effects and under what local labor market conditions these spillover effects will be most evident. Do community college skills have spillover effects? Do math and science majors have more spillover effects than other majors? Do spillover effects depend upon what industries the area specialize in? We do not know. This makes it hard to use such spillovers as a way of designing human capital development policies to promote an area's economic development. The spillover research literature is helpful as part of general rhetoric promoting the idea of skills development. It is not so helpful in designing specific policies. A second idea that is not particularly useful, even though it is potentially true, is that a stronger city promotes metropolitan economic development or that lower poverty or inequality in a metropolitan area promotes metropolitan economic development. As argued by Blackwell and Fox in chapter 13, it is quite plausible that “inequity hampers economic growth largely because it prevents the development and optimal utilization of a city's most valuable assets—its people” (pp. 351–352). In addition, there is research, referenced in the current book in the Pastor and Benner and Wolman et al. chapters, that suggests that city growth promotes metropolitan growth (Barnes and Ledebur 1998; Voith 1998). The chapter by Pastor and Benner also presents new evidence that less inequality promotes metropolitan growth. Several chapters in the book (Pastor and Benner, McGahey, and Blackwell and Fox) reference work by my colleagues Randy Eberts and George Erickcek that less inequality and less racial disparity promote stronger metropolitan areas (Eberts, Erickcek, and Kleinhenz 2006). The idea that stronger cities and less inequality promote metropolitan growth is interesting, provocative, and perhaps true. But it is not especially useful for policy for several reasons. First, there are numerous questions that can be raised about whether these results could be explained by reverse causation: stronger metropolitan growth may cause stronger cities and less inequality. Therefore, it is possible that stronger cities and less inequality do not cause faster metropolitan growth. Second, we do not know why or how a stronger city or less inequality may promote metropolitan growth. Therefore, these general findings do not lend substantial support to specific policies to redistribute resources to cities and the poor to promote overall metropolitan growth. For example, advocates of metropolitan tax base sharing will be legitimately asked how they can prove that such sharing with the central city will promote metropolitan growth. But we do not know whether the fiscal condition or level of public services in the central city is the reason for the observed positive correlation between city economic conditions and metropolitan growth. Perhaps the positive correlation is due to some other feature of strong cities, such as the economic vitality of city businesses. Therefore, the observed positive correlations between city economic conditions and metropolitan growth do not provide strong political support for tax base sharing. A third idea that is not particularly useful for policy, even though it is potentially true, is that clusters of related industries have some special synergies that can be usefully exploited for policy purposes. I have no doubt that there are economic reasons for industries clustering together. It is a commonplace of regional economic theory, at least dating back to Alfred Marshall, that these “agglomeration economies” could be due to the advantages to firms from sharing common labor pools or supplier pools, or from stealing ideas from each other. It is certainly plausible and even likely that in some cases, such clustering boosts productivity. If clustering boosts productivity in a knowable and predictable way, this has extremely strong implications for policy. If we know that some firms expanding in the cluster would boost productivity at other firms, we should provide subsidies to help those firms expand. The magnitude of the subsidy should be equal to the magnitude of the external benefits to other firms. However, the problem is that no one knows how large such agglomeration economies are and at what scale of industry or urban activity these agglomeration economies are most important. Are agglomeration economies important up to some particular scale of industrial activity and then unimportant beyond that? We do not know. Therefore, it is difficult to use such cluster findings as a strong rationale for subsidizing one set of industries rather than another. And it is completely impossible to determine the optimal level of such subsidies. These difficulties are discussed in a recent paper by Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008). Clusters may be a useful way for economic development consultants to summarize data. There needs to be some way of simplifying a local economy so it can be analyzed in a smaller number of units. It is impossible to simply consider the local economy as consisting of thousands of firms: these are too many data to be meaningfully understood by policy analysts or policy makers. We have to simplify the economy somehow. We need to somehow lump the firms into a reasonable number of meaningful groups. There are many ways of grouping firms. Grouping firms into industries is one way to do so. Firms in the same industry are likely to be affected similarly bydemand conditions and often by local supply conditions in labor markets and supplier markets. Grouping firms into clusters of related industries and their suppliers may be useful. Clusters are likely to be similarly affected by demand conditions. The competitiveness of firms in the cluster likely affects other firms in the cluster. On the other hand, firms in one cluster that sell goods to one another may not have similar uses of labor. Therefore, clusters may be less useful in designing local labor supply policies. For some purposes, it is useful to instead group economic activity by occupations. As Ann Markusen has argued in numerous places, including her chapter with Schrock in this book, analyzing local economic activity in terms of an area's occupational strengths and weaknesses is often useful. Occupational strengths and weakness suggest which industries an area might want to target. These occupational strengths and weaknesses also suggest areas of emphasis of local workforce policies. For other purposes, we might group firms by whether they are small firms that need support services of various kinds. This is the whole point of business incubators that group firms in one place so that they can be provided with various logistical supports and sometimes business advice supports. These business incubator policies are praised in this book in the chapter by Finkle, Garmise, and Nourick. For other purposes, we might group firms by whether they are small, older manufacturers that might usefully benefit from business consulting advice on the newest best practices in technology, workplace organization, and marketing. This is, of course, what manufacturing extension services try to do. In this book, the importance of such manufacturing extension services is highlighted most in the chapter by Luria and Rogers. The point is that clusters have no unique virtues for policy purposes as a way of simplifying our understanding of local economies. A really flexible economic development policy will group firms, jobs, and workers in multiple ways to reflect the multiple types of needs that might be addressed by urban economic development policies. As in most recent writings on economic development, this book has many chapters that discuss clusters to some extent (chapters by McGahey, Vey, Kempner, Kazis and Seltzer, and the appendix by the American Assembly). None goes so far as to advocate using clusters to guide the magnitudes of business subsidies. Yet the concept is felt to be somehow useful, even though that usefulness is unclear. What I am suggesting is that the unique usefulness of the cluster concept is exaggerated. Useful unifying ideas for policy. One useful idea is that what happens to labor demand in a metropolitan area has large consequences for employment rates and wage rates throughout the metropolitan area. By labor demand, I mean the quantity of labor demand for different skill levels and different types of labor. I also mean the wage rates offered by employers relative to educational and other credentials, which affects the quality of jobs that are offered. This idea is endorsed in this book, particularly in the chapters by Pastor and Benner and Wolman et al. These authors find, as has been found numerous times in the research literature (see, e.g.," @default.
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W2018651024 title "The Revitalization of Older Industrial Cities: A Review Essay of<i>Retooling for Growth</i>" @default.
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