FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2018752105> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2018752105 endingPage "262" @default.
• W2018752105 startingPage "256" @default.
• W2018752105 abstract "State Building and Taxation in Latin America Heidi Jane M. Smith Mobilizing Resources in Latin America: The Political Economy of Tax Reform in Chile and Argentina. By Omar Sánchez. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Pp. xi + 245. $85.00 cloth. ISBN: 9780230114463. Taxation and Society in Twentieth-Century Argentina. By José Antonio Sánchez Román. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Pp. xiv + 245. $90.00 cloth. ISBN: 9780230341265. State-Building and Tax Regimes in Central America. By Aaron Schneider. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Pp. xvi + 243. $90.00 cloth. ISBN: 9781107019096. Taxing and spending are two main functions of a modern government, and citizens’ opinions on how they are taxed matter for creating an effective state apparatus. This is particularly true in Latin America, where states are considered to be weak and tax-to-GDP ratios are relatively low. While many scholars have studied the link between state formation and society through the lenses of fiscal sociology and tax policy, mainly in continental Europe and the United States, social scientists are only now beginning to evaluate this phenomenon in developing countries by using an institutionalist approach.1 Latin America has one of the world’s lowest tax rates per capita, and many people outright do not pay their share. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) reports that tax revenues, excluding social contributions, were on average about 17 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) compared to over 30 percent in more developed economies.2 The IDB notes that tax revenues from capital income and direct taxation (including income tax) are also low. In many countries, capital income is hardly taxed at all, and deductions are very high with many loopholes encouraging elites to evade paying.3 In Latin America the problems are exacerbated where highly regressive tax systems exist side by side with highly unequal income distribution. [End Page 256] Notably, there are very large discrepancies in tax burdens across countries and within states (at the subnational level). They range from the low burdens of countries endowed with nonrenewable resources like Mexico and Venezuela (about 10 percent of GDP), to high levels in countries like Brazil (36 percent of GDP).4 Brazil’s tax-to-GDP ratio is close to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) average, but in some countries, such as Peru, Guatemala, and Haiti, government revenue is much lower, ranging between 10 and 20 percent of GDP. This reflects the inability of the government to bring more dynamic sectors of the economy into the tax net. State-society relations matter for how taxation systems are established within a country. To explore this ground, three scholars recently have published inquiries about the nature of civil society’s fiscal interaction with the state by evaluating how Latin American tax systems were built. Coming to the question from the disciplinary perspectives of history and political science rather than the well-worn paths of sociology and economics, the works adopt an institutionalist approach. They include an in-depth single case study, a classic two-country comparison, and a multicountry study. While the first two treat the more developed countries of the Southern Cone, the third examines less-developed Central America. Mobilizing Resources in Latin America: The Political Economy of Tax Reform in Chile and Argentina, by Omar Sánchez, suggests that while Argentina has failed to produce an appropriate social contract upon which to build fiscal legitimacy, Chile has been successful not only in collecting taxes but also in achieving impressive economic growth and macroeconomic stability sustained for decades. For Sánchez, the typical economic and rational-choice theories used to evaluate tax policy through the lenses of efficiency and effectiveness do not necessarily help us understand why a particular country pursues a specific set of fiscal policies. He evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of institutions by studying the political environment, policy operations, and group interactions that create a particular tax policy. He finds that Argentina constantly changed the rules of the tax game. Middling tax enforcement mechanisms at the national level, weak party systems, and the near absence of organized civil society hindered tax compliance. As a result, an effective state-society pact was never..." @default.
• W2018752105 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W2018752105 creator A5045371109 @default.
• W2018752105 date "2014-01-01" @default.
• W2018752105 modified "2023-09-28" @default.
• W2018752105 title "State Building and Taxation in Latin America" @default.
• W2018752105 cites W2329029318 @default.
• W2018752105 cites W378733670 @default.
• W2018752105 cites W419764871 @default.
• W2018752105 cites W601999071 @default.
• W2018752105 doi "https://doi.org/10.1353/lar.2014.0048" @default.
• W2018752105 hasPublicationYear "2014" @default.
• W2018752105 type Work @default.
• W2018752105 sameAs 2018752105 @default.
• W2018752105 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W2018752105 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W2018752105 hasAuthorship W2018752105A5045371109 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C10138342 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C11413529 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C114350782 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C121964417 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C127598652 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C136264566 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C144024400 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C149923435 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C158886217 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C195487862 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C2776805697 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C2908647359 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C41008148 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C47768531 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C48103436 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C50522688 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C551662922 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C6303427 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C10138342 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C11413529 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C114350782 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C121964417 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C127598652 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C136264566 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C144024400 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C149923435 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C158886217 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C162324750 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C17744445 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C195487862 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C199539241 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C2776805697 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C2908647359 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C41008148 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C47768531 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C48103436 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C50522688 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C551662922 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C6303427 @default.
• W2018752105 hasConceptScore W2018752105C94625758 @default.
• W2018752105 hasIssue "3" @default.
• W2018752105 hasLocation W20187521051 @default.
• W2018752105 hasOpenAccess W2018752105 @default.
• W2018752105 hasPrimaryLocation W20187521051 @default.
• W2018752105 hasRelatedWork W1498431259 @default.
• W2018752105 hasRelatedWork W1557999385 @default.
• W2018752105 hasRelatedWork W2120386513 @default.
• W2018752105 hasRelatedWork W2261336449 @default.
• W2018752105 hasRelatedWork W2325792472 @default.
• W2018752105 hasRelatedWork W2326759340 @default.
• W2018752105 hasRelatedWork W2558896113 @default.
• W2018752105 hasRelatedWork W2801051693 @default.
• W2018752105 hasRelatedWork W4289450272 @default.
• W2018752105 hasRelatedWork W4362470151 @default.
• W2018752105 hasVolume "49" @default.
• W2018752105 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2018752105 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W2018752105 magId "2018752105" @default.
• W2018752105 workType "article" @default.