FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2023841410> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2023841410 endingPage "492" @default.
• W2023841410 startingPage "491" @default.
• W2023841410 abstract "Reviewed by: The Evident Connexion: Hume on Personal Identity by Galen Strawson Abe Roth Galen Strawson. The Evident Connexion: Hume on Personal Identity. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. xii + 165. Cloth, $35.00. Hume understands identity as “invariableness and uninterruptedness” through a supposed change in time, something true only of objects he calls steadfast. And Hume discerns nothing steadfast about the mind or self—nothing like a substance or soul underlying the changing and interrupted succession of perceptions we experience in ourselves. I nevertheless think of myself as the same person over time. A central concern of the Treatise discussion of personal identity is to give a psychological explanation of how we arrive at this belief in personal identity. The answer, very broadly, is that it is a fiction of the imagination produced by certain associative principles. Hume notoriously goes on to disavow this explanation in his Appendix to the Treatise. The reasons for his dissatisfaction, however, are obscure, and the several decades since Barry Stroud’s influential work have seen many competing interpretations of what Hume found troubling. Strawson joins the interpretive fray with this new book. Strawson is well known as an advocate (along with Wright, Kail, and others) of the “New Hume” or skeptical realist reading of Hume on causation, which holds that there is a real necessary connection between cause and effect, albeit one whose nature is unknown to us. The contrast with the standard reading of Hume as a causal regularity theorist is striking. In Part 1 of the book, Strawson reviews the case for the skeptical realist position. There is no attempt at a full recounting of the debate that would convince critics like Winkler and Millican; the point is to provide background for the discussion of personal identity. That interpretation is developed in Part 2. Hume is usually thought to hold that the mind is a mere bundle of perceptions, with no persisting substance or anything else that would genuinely connect and unify the perceptions. Strawson objects that this claim—like the assertion that there is no real connection between cause and effect—is dogmatically metaphysical. In attributing such claims to Hume, standard readings fail to appreciate his professed lack of knowledge on these matters (47). We do better to think that Hume believes or “takes it for granted” (5, 9) that there is more to the self than what is perceived, but that this something more is unknown to us. That said, Strawson’s Hume does think that the only “empirically warranted” way to conceive the mind is as a mere bundle (33, 47). The skeptical realist reading is challenged by a verificationist reading of Hume’s semantics, which rules out entertaining thoughts about (let alone believing in) the sorts of real connections between perceptions of the mind that would be afforded by an underlying substantial self. Strawson replies that Hume distinguishes between two sorts of content: one [End Page 491] that is positive and descriptive, empirically warranted and derived from impressions (6–7); and another that would allow Hume to “suppose in a general way, when doing philosophy, that the expression ‘something-more-than-experience’ can refer, and correspondingly, that something-more-than-experience exists” (7). But even if real connections can by Hume’s lights be possible objects of thought, that is far from thinking that Hume is committed to them or “takes [them] for granted,” as Strawson insists (5, 9). A more natural option for the skeptic like Hume would be agnosticism not only about the nature of these connections, but about their existence as well. Part 3 focuses on the Appendix worries. According to Strawson, Hume regards the psychological principles that explain our belief in personal identity as real, entering into causal relations. He speaks of Hume’s commitment to the “real existence and operation” of principles that unite our perceptions in thought (105). But psychological principles so understood cannot be reconciled with the only empirically legitimate conception of the mind as a mere bundle of perceptions (120). The idea, fundamental to Hume’s psychology, of the mind with faculties that exercise powers and enter into causal relations (56, 58, 102) falls away on the..." @default.
• W2023841410 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W2023841410 creator A5000475290 @default.
• W2023841410 date "2013-01-01" @default.
• W2023841410 modified "2023-10-17" @default.
• W2023841410 title "<i>The Evident Connexion: Hume on Personal Identity</i> by Galen Strawson (review)" @default.
• W2023841410 doi "https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2013.0048" @default.
• W2023841410 hasPublicationYear "2013" @default.
• W2023841410 type Work @default.
• W2023841410 sameAs 2023841410 @default.
• W2023841410 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W2023841410 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W2023841410 hasAuthorship W2023841410A5000475290 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConcept C107038049 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConcept C111472728 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConcept C11171543 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConcept C136815107 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConcept C138885662 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConcept C15744967 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConcept C166151441 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConcept C17235551 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConcept C182744844 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConcept C18296254 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConcept C2524010 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConcept C2777667586 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConcept C2778355321 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConcept C2780822299 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConcept C2780861071 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConcept C33923547 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConcept C41895202 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConcept C47188148 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConcept C52119013 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConcept C554936623 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConcept C95457728 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConceptScore W2023841410C107038049 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConceptScore W2023841410C111472728 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConceptScore W2023841410C11171543 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConceptScore W2023841410C136815107 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConceptScore W2023841410C138885662 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConceptScore W2023841410C15744967 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConceptScore W2023841410C166151441 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConceptScore W2023841410C17235551 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConceptScore W2023841410C182744844 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConceptScore W2023841410C18296254 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConceptScore W2023841410C2524010 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConceptScore W2023841410C2777667586 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConceptScore W2023841410C2778355321 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConceptScore W2023841410C2780822299 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConceptScore W2023841410C2780861071 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConceptScore W2023841410C33923547 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConceptScore W2023841410C41895202 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConceptScore W2023841410C47188148 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConceptScore W2023841410C52119013 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConceptScore W2023841410C554936623 @default.
• W2023841410 hasConceptScore W2023841410C95457728 @default.
• W2023841410 hasIssue "3" @default.
• W2023841410 hasLocation W20238414101 @default.
• W2023841410 hasOpenAccess W2023841410 @default.
• W2023841410 hasPrimaryLocation W20238414101 @default.
• W2023841410 hasRelatedWork W1506277267 @default.
• W2023841410 hasRelatedWork W2124560815 @default.
• W2023841410 hasRelatedWork W2754328141 @default.
• W2023841410 hasRelatedWork W2767581061 @default.
• W2023841410 hasRelatedWork W2905282697 @default.
• W2023841410 hasRelatedWork W2919747725 @default.
• W2023841410 hasRelatedWork W2953373532 @default.
• W2023841410 hasRelatedWork W4206529101 @default.
• W2023841410 hasRelatedWork W4376104480 @default.
• W2023841410 hasRelatedWork W3023086979 @default.
• W2023841410 hasVolume "51" @default.
• W2023841410 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2023841410 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W2023841410 magId "2023841410" @default.
• W2023841410 workType "article" @default.