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• W2031108002 endingPage "e40218" @default.
• W2031108002 startingPage "e40218" @default.
• W2031108002 abstract "In realistic world individuals with high reputation are more likely to influence the collective behaviors. Due to the cost and error of information dissemination, however, it is unreasonable to assign each individual with a complete cognitive power, which means that not everyone can accurately realize others' reputation situation. Here we introduce the mechanism of inferring reputation into the selection of potential strategy sources to explore the evolution of cooperation. Before the game each player is assigned with a randomly distributed parameter p denoting his ability to infer the reputation of others. The parameter p of each individual is kept constant during the game. The value of p indicates that the neighbor possessing highest reputation is chosen with the probability p and randomly choosing an opponent is left with the probability 1-p. We find that this novel mechanism can be seen as an universally applicable promoter of cooperation, which works on various interaction networks and in different types of evolutionary game. Of particular interest is the fact that, in the early stages of evolutionary process, cooperators with high reputation who are easily regarded as the potential strategy donors can quickly lead to the formation of extremely robust clusters of cooperators that are impervious to defector attacks. These clusters eventually help cooperators reach their undisputed dominance, which transcends what can be warranted by the spatial reciprocity alone. Moreover, we provide complete phase diagrams to depict the impact of uncertainty in strategy adoptions and conclude that the effective interaction topology structure may be altered under such a mechanism. When the estimation of reputation is extended, we also show that the moderate value of evaluation factor enables cooperation to thrive best. We thus present a viable method of understanding the ubiquitous cooperative behaviors in nature and hope that it will inspire further studies to resolve social dilemmas." @default.
• W2031108002 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W2031108002 creator A5053501478 @default.
• W2031108002 creator A5065058975 @default.
• W2031108002 creator A5073948504 @default.
• W2031108002 creator A5081376803 @default.
• W2031108002 date "2012-07-09" @default.
• W2031108002 modified "2023-10-10" @default.
• W2031108002 title "Inferring Reputation Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Social Dilemma Games" @default.
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• W2031108002 doi "https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0040218" @default.
• W2031108002 hasPubMedCentralId "https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/3392274" @default.
• W2031108002 hasPubMedId "https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/22808120" @default.
• W2031108002 hasPublicationYear "2012" @default.
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