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• W203178107 abstract "Introduction After the three and a half years-long war, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and millions of people displaced, the architects of the 1995 Dayton Agreement engineered a consociational political arrangement for Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BiH) (3). This arrangement aimed at democratic peace through sectarian power sharing and elections. The policy included territorial self-government and the incorporation of all the warring parties in the electoral system. The plan was based on scholarly recommendations, which presumed that the power of the ballot box was eventually to negate the attraction of ethnic violence, temper the ethno-nationalist parties and allow for an appreciation of voices marginalized by extreme nationalism (Lijphart 1969; Lijphart 1977; Lijphart et al. 1993). However, as the findings of this study show, the Bosnian consociational system has produced mixed results. The salience of non-nationalist parties has increased over time. Yet, consociationalism has tended to encourage and solidify ethnic parties and cleavages at the expense of non-nationalist parties. Consociational policies have shown success in Northern Ireland and Belgium but have often failed in Lebanon and several African countries. Despite these ambivalent outcomes, only scant replicable research has assessed the voting behavior in consociational societies, particularly over extended periods of time (Bakke and Wibbels 2006; Hartzell et al. 2001; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). This lacuna is puzzling for several reasons. The Dayton Accords have been widely praised as most ideal-typical (Belloni 2004) and a classic example of consociational settlement (Bose 2002, 216). Yet, it remains unclear what explains post-conflict voting in a society bound by consociationalism. Do nationalistic issues that had fueled conflicts still matter in elections? What is the long-term effect of consociational electoral engineering in societies with significant ethnic cleavages? The objective of this study is to examine nationalist voting in consociational societies, using the case of BiH. After presenting the Bosnian consociational model, this article considers determinants of nationalist voting and provides a theory of negative and indirect electoral effects of consociationalism. The theory is disaggregated into a twofold hypothesis, which is based on the predicted voting behaviour of each of the main ethnic groups, relative to their position in the consociational arrangement. The subsequent typology of post-conflict political parties provides the definitional crux of this research. The original typology identifies BiH's non-nationalist and non-exclusionary parties. The ensuing regression analysis and in-depth study of the 1996-2010 election period across Bosnian cantons and federal entities show a movement toward non-nationalist parties, as well as a divisive differentiation between ethnic groups. This article finds that the rigid consociational structures may help sustain peace but solidify the underlying tensions that led to the conflict. Revisiting Consociational Electoral Engineering Desired vs. unanticipated effects Consociational power sharing coupled with the power of elections is a popular policy prescription for post-conflict societies where segmental cleavages deeply divide them. Since the absence of meaningful opportunities for all segments to express their political interests may lead the unrepresented groups to violent and undemocratic actions (Whitefield 2002), Arend Lijphart suggested the consociational solution. The model assumes that the incorporation of all the parties into a decentralized form of self-government orients the vested interests of different actors towards stability, while the introduction of elections signals a move towards democratic peace (Nagle and Clancy 2010; O'Leary and McGarry 2012; Wolff 2011). The expected emergence of multiple political cleavages is to subdue the divisive ethnic cleavage through a multiparty system (Carothers 2006; Dalton 1988). …" @default.
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• W203178107 date "2013-01-01" @default.
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• W203178107 title "Consociational Electoral Engineering Revisited: Findings from Bosnia and Herzegovina" @default.
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