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• W2032906448 abstract "Imagine that you are walking down the street when you see an old acquaintance coming towards you. You are able to recognize her face, recall the last time you saw her, and retrieve memories about how you came to know each other. You even recall hearing gossip that she had been less than truthful with a colleague. All of this happens in the blink of an eye, and yet, on closer inspection, you might wonder how it is that you actually identified her. Her hair has changed color and style, she is wearing different clothes, and her face has aged somewhat. In addition, the gossip about her trustworthiness might make you question the veracity of the persona you remember. What is the basis of your intuition that this is indeed the same person? Identifying another person as persisting over time is a complex problem. Intuitively, it seems that we are usually successful—we recognize our loved ones, colleagues, acquaintances, and can do so over major changes in physical attributes and context. There is, however, evidence that the system fails frequently (Young, 1998), and in some contexts, these errors can have dramatic social costs. For example, a failure of person identification—misidentification—occurring in a criminal case can result in a major miscarriage of justice (Lampinen, Neuschatz, & Cling, 2012). Across cultures, fundamental aspects of society depend critically on the ability to keep track of an individual (Brook, 2014). The significance of human identity tracking requires us to gain an understanding of the way the identification systems work—what enhances person tracking and what impairs it, and how apparently different types of tracking might interact into a coherent system for making inferences about the persistence of personal identity. In this issue of Topics in Cognitive Science (topiCS), we bring together papers across cognitive science to combine experimental and philosophical approaches that analyze, debate, and test fundamental aspects of the tracking and identification of human individuals—agents or persons. This is the first major attempt to bring together different approaches to human identity-tracking in cognitive science. For human society to function, agents need to be able to track their own identity and the identities of others, using both individual and group levels of representation. This can be demonstrated by practices in a variety of domains, from the most basic social tasks to the most metaphysically puzzling ones. The interdisciplinary foundation of cognitive science is ideally suited to address the task of explaining the identification of human agents. Here, we aim to bridge the gaps between the approaches, promoting greater communication and clearer conceptualization of the main issues. The basic action of developing a conversation depends critically on the ability to reciprocally track one's conversational partner as the same cooperative agent over the conversation. This conversational tracking requires both integration of a variety of visual and auditory signals (Calvert, Brammer, & Iversen, 1998) and cooperative work toward conversational relevance (Sagi & Rips, 2014; Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995). Similarly, we need to track persons over longer time-frames, with intervening gaps, to re-identify the same person on different occasions (Bullot, 2014). We may also use these tracking abilities when we analyze information about an individual portrayed via external symbolic representations and technology—the voice over the phone, the identifying information present in social network databases (Nissenbaum, 2010), and accumulating facts via e-mails, letters, texts, and so on. Incorporating this information into our representation of the individual allows us to track that person's identity and keep it “up to date,” which is critical for our identification and interaction with that individual at a later stage. Identification is a necessary requisite of the capacity to attribute responsibility for an action and social relations to a person (Heider, 1958). Such identification-based attribution ranges from reminiscence processes elicited by facial recognition (described in our starting example) to understanding social relations such as communal sharing (keeping track of people as equivalent members of the same social category), authority rankings (keeping tracking of social hierarchies), and equality matching (keeping track of the imbalances among people)—see Fiske (1992). In sum, human identity-tracking is at the core of human cognition and sociality. It underpins the ability to recognize individuals (Bruce & Young, 1986), to attribute proper names (Valentine, Brennen, & Brédart, 1996), to predict and understand the actions and mental states of others (Bloom, 2004; Dennett, 1987), to assess trustworthiness (Sterelny, 2012), to understand behaviors and emotions expressed at the occasion of births and deaths (McMahan, 2002), to correctly allocate rewards (or punishments) and coordinate welfare services (Sorell & Draper, 2012), to attribute rights and responsibility (Woolfolk, Doris, & Darley, 2006), and to keep track of social relations (Fiske, 1992). Despite the importance of human identity-tracking in our social and cognitive functioning, we still lack an integrative framework within which to study the breadth of the processes that underpin this capacity. To date, cognitive and social scientists have used a disparate family of concepts related to tracking across time to denote the ability to form and update perceptual representations of, and identification judgments about, individuals,1 and kinds. This includes concepts of identification, individuation, recognition, and of the ability to keep track or trace a target over time. The challenge is that an integrative theory that unifies contemporary research on the different behaviors denoted by these concepts needs to (a) ensure that the basic or fundamental processes are indeed related, and (b) delineate the relationships between different aspects of these processes. For example, perceptual tracking of moving objects studies focus on the cognitive processes that allow us to monitor and trace movements of a subset of identical moving objects (e.g., Horowitz et al., 2007; Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988). Building on these efforts, recent studies have examined the effect of apparent animacy cues ascribed to non-animate objects on tracking performance (e.g., Gao, McCarthy, & Scholl, 2010). These studies explore the processes that form one aspect of the foundation of our capacity to keep track of other individuals. In other fields, studies and theories outline the cognitive bases of how we process and recognize faces (Calder, Rhodes, Johnson, & Haxby, 2011), and how we track and attribute mental states (e.g., Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). More broadly, tracking is used in the computer and social sciences relating to surveillance and in marketing relating to preferences and internet behavior (Nissenbaum, 2010). The ability to identify individual persons is at the core of all these different instances of the term tracking. How do these different types of tracking relate? Bullot (2009, 2011, 2014, 2014) has argued that perceptual tracking is only one type of the many types of human behavior in which tracking processes operate. Specifically, because tracking processes are pervasive in both person identification and social cognition in general, Bullot (2014) suggests that cognitive scientists can aim to develop mechanistic explanations of person identification behaviors, which can be based on decomposing the identification behavior (e.g., recognizing a person or recalling and reasoning about a person's history) into a set of tracking mechanisms (either mental or social mechanisms). Although several mechanistic theories of face recognition have been proposed, we lack an integrative mechanistic theory that can explain a broader range of behaviors associated with human identity-tracking. This collection of papers is an effort to move toward a more integrated cross-disciplinary framework for investigations of the tracking and identification of human individuals (agents, persons). One of the challenges to proposing such an integrative theory of tracking is in relating the different concepts used in different fields, and in making the articles on the topic accessible to readers from other fields. Here, we set the challenge to our contributors of writing an accessible article that either presented an argument or empirical study relating to the study of human identity-tracking. The resulting collection encompasses empirical studies in cognitive neuropsychiatry (Langdon, Connaughton, & Coltheart, 2014), developmental psychology (Gelman, Noles, & Stilwell, 2014), psycholinguistics (Sagi & Rips, 2014), experimental philosophy (Newman, Bartels, & Smith, 2014), and integrative naturalistic philosophy (Brook, 2014; Bullot, 2014; Murez & Smortchkova, 2014). In each case, the authors present their evidence in the context of how we keep track of individuals, and the processes related to this individuation. The peer-reviewing process for this topic emphasized that concepts such as individuals, identity, and person often trigger controversies and conceptual confusions. The conceptual analysis of key terms could be a topiCS in itself. Brook (2014) argues that the use of the term “identity” to refer to the persistence of a person across time is misleading as it has been used to mean different things across different fields (e.g., one's own sense of identity, our collective cultural identity). Instead, using an approach developed in philosophy, he uses “personal persistence” to define the referent or target that one tracks when one tracks a person over time. Brook's article draws on the notion that it is psychological persistence that we recognize when tracking a known individual, the most powerful of which is memory “from the inside.” Brook argues that one's decisions regarding personal persistence have to be derived from the tracking of the target's psychological identity, and only look for other indicative factors, such as causal continuity, when this psychological tracking fails (e.g., in dementia). One classic neuropsychological phenomenon in which the ability to keep track of individuals could be argued to break down is the Fregoli delusion. Langdon et al. (2014) present a meta-analysis of cases of Fregoli delusion in the literature and derive a theoretical framework for understanding this phenomenon. Fregoli delusion typifies a failure of normal capacities to recognize familiar people, where the delusional belief is that a person currently present is a familiar person (not present) in disguise. Patients have intact perceptual discrimination of bodily differences between the familiar and unfamiliar people but nonetheless maintain that a familiar psychological identity persists in an unfamiliar person. Symptomatically appearing to be the opposite of Capgras delusion (the belief that a familiar person is an impostor), the Fregoli error in identification also carries an intrinsic error of human identity-tracking—if the person was tracked correctly (as existing somewhere else at that time), s/he could not possibly be present in the patient's company. In their paper, Sagy and Rips (2014) claim that tracking individuals can also be studied by examining the interpretation of language and, more particularly, singular and indexical terms like pronouns. We constantly make inferences about which individual is referred to by pronouns (he, she) when we interpret the meaning of sentences. Sagy and Rips suggest that we use the same causal methods for deciding whether or not an individual is the same over time as we do for deciding the meaning of pronouns. For example, in the sentence Albert invited Ron to dinner. He spent hours cleaning the house, they suggest that we identify the referent of “he” in the second sentence as Albert (and not Ron) because of the way we reason causally (as opposed to performing a routine syntactic computation). In their paper, they present the logic behind this argument before giving the results of an experiment designed to test the claim that causal connectedness can determine the interpretation of pronouns. The central tenet of this contribution is that causal reasoning underpins our interpretation of linguistic terms that refer to identity, and more broadly underpins our tracking of identity of persons across time and events. Bullot (2014) also draws on causal reasoning as an important contributor to tracking. In his paper, Bullot brings models of how we recognize people together with a causal-history model of identification. The central premise is that our recognition of an individual over time cannot rely solely on perceptual information; a full theory of tracking requires an account of how people learn information about the causal history of the individual. In this way, theories of person identification must be broader than prominent mechanistic models of face recognition suggest. Gelman et al. (2014) test the notion that the ability to track human agents and their possessions develops early and is a powerful modulator of behavior. They discuss the degree to which tracking of objects is morally permissible (which relates to the ownership of these objects) to draw links between tracking agents and the effect of ownership on tracking of objects. Gelman et al. tested 3-year-old children and adults in a task in which objects were either tagged with ownership information or were merely labeled. Although adults track the identity of objects under all conditions, children track identity more when they had been taught ownership information, suggesting our special attention to agents extends to inanimate objects and reflects a fundamental process of human cognition. Continuing with the theme of exploring relationships between the representation of objects and people, Murez and Smortchkova (2014) ask whether we represent agents differently from other objects. The authors draw on both philosophical and psychological literature to argue that we have “files” that have the specific function of tracking agents, within which we have “person files” that allow us to keep track of people and think about particular individuals in a singular (non-descriptive) way. In contrast to Brook's (2014) emphasis on the psychological persistence as being the most important factor in continuity of identity, Newman et al. (2014) suggest that we place more importance on physical “stuff” for tracking continuity of people than of objects, including other animals and plants. This claim is based on the original physical form being somehow imbued with the “essence” of that person, something that is lost in an exact replica. Newman et al. present experiments exploring how judgments of continuity differ for a person, an artwork, or other objects. They argue that because people judge artwork differently from other objects in terms of physical continuity (e.g., an exact replica of a painting is worth much less than the original), one-of-a-kind art is, in a sense, an extension of the person who created it. Exploring identity judgments and continuity of artwork can then enhance our understanding of tracking identity more generally—particularly with regard to the apparent similarity between tracking persons and tracking artwork. This topiCS draws together papers from a range of approaches to raise major issues about the way we keep track of human agents. The result is an intriguing collection of empirical and theoretical perspectives on what it means to identify an individual, how we might map the continuity of information over time as belonging to that same individual, and an illustration of the breadth of concepts to be addressed when we consider how we keep track of each other. The broad themes to come out of this are as follows: (a) sensitivity to the causal history of an individual plays a central role in our capacity to track human agents; (b) keeping track of personal persistence may also be important for tracking other objects such as possessions and artistic artifacts; (c) keeping track of a target involves multiple perceptual and conceptual abilities that enable the capacity to identify individuals and kinds as persisting over time; and (d) the behavior of tracking of human agents are supported by (“scaffolded by” or “embodied in”) a variety of social and technological mechanisms." @default.
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• W2032906448 title "Keeping Track: The Tracking and Identification of Human Agents (Editorial Preface)" @default.
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