FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2034291809> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2034291809 endingPage "464" @default.
• W2034291809 startingPage "449" @default.
• W2034291809 abstract "AbstractThis article provides new evidence on the linkages between various forms of market regulation and joblessness and its components, unemployment and inactivity. One crucial contribution of this article is the analysis of the interdependence across Product Market Regulation (PMR) and labour markets regulation (Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)). With the help of a dynamic fixed effect model with an interaction term, we estimate the marginal impact of EPL and PMR at different levels of the other interacted variable. To cope with problems related to the inclusion of time-invariant institutional variables in fixed effect models, we present results of regressions based on a new procedure, specifically designed to treat slowly changing variables. We build time-series data to account for the annual evolution of EPL, and use new data for unemployment insurance net replacement rates. Among other results, we find evidence of a positive (negative) effect of EPL (PMR) on employment performance as well as of substitution, rather than complementarity, between the two forms of regulation. AcknowledgementsThis research was supported by funds from the ESEMK European project (FP6 STREP1). The authors wish to thank Thomas Plümper and Vera Tröger for making their FEVD code available, as well as A. Clark, L. Faggio, Y. L’Horty for their helpful remarks. We gratefully acknowledge the access to the FRDB Social Reforms Database. We are also grateful for the comments provided by participants in research seminars at CEPN and PSE as well as by participants in the IZA-FRDB Workshop ‘Measurement of labour Market Institutions’, EEA, AFSE, EALE and SASE annual conferences.Notes1 See, for instance, Nickell (Citation1997), Siebert (Citation1997), Blau and Kahn (Citation1999) and Bertola et al. (Citation2002).2 See Bertola et al. (Citation2007), for a recent article focusing on employment.3 See Bertola et al. (Citation2007), for the effects of institutions on employment for various subgroups of the population.4 The FRDB Social Reforms Database has been developed by the FRDB (http://www.frdb.org).5 Only few empirical contributions address the issue of the employment consequences of financial constraints. This is partially due to lack of satisfactory empirical measures of financial market imperfections. Nickell and Nicolitsas (Citation1999) address this issue by studying the effects of interest rate increase on a panel of UK firms: the authors show that credit constraints yield negative effects on employment.6 Soskice and Iversen (Citation2000) show that large unions have an incentive to moderate sectoral money wages, and thereby expected real wages, if the central bank is nonaccommodating. The result is an increase in the real money supply, and hence higher employment. However, Lippi (Citation2003) shows that if wage setters are nonatomistic, more conservatism may either increase or decrease equilibrium unemployment, depending on the the number and size of trade unions.7 Note that the real interest rate is not included because it turned out to be nonsignificant in all estimations.8 Monte Carlo experiments suggest that the Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition (FEVD) estimator is the least biased estimator when time-variant and time-invariant variables are correlated with the unit effects.9 Results can be obtained from the authors.10 Estimations with GLS and PCSE estimators are available upon request. Regressions’ results are consistent over the different estimation techniques.11 However, one should interpret this result with caution due to the lack of a control variable controlling for structural features of financial markets.12 This result is not specific to the FEVD estimation." @default.
• W2034291809 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W2034291809 creator A5018002899 @default.
• W2034291809 creator A5068669723 @default.
• W2034291809 creator A5072146697 @default.
• W2034291809 date "2010-07-16" @default.
• W2034291809 modified "2023-10-18" @default.
• W2034291809 title "The effect of employment protection and product market regulation on labour market performance: substitution or complementarity?" @default.
• W2034291809 cites W101141370 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W1968446015 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W1973035452 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W2025339885 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W2034301206 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W2056720463 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W2066333316 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W2068850527 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W2073138077 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W2076634691 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W2085752922 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W2097733424 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W2109437806 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W2118086305 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W2138854129 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W2148812531 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W2151123796 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W2158073844 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W2165618159 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W3022790766 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W3022819947 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W3121721370 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W3123277101 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W3123464667 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W3123951494 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W3124585890 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W3124983317 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W3125732952 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W3126071897 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W4214846523 @default.
• W2034291809 cites W4302075533 @default.
• W2034291809 doi "https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840903317367" @default.
• W2034291809 hasPublicationYear "2010" @default.
• W2034291809 type Work @default.
• W2034291809 sameAs 2034291809 @default.
• W2034291809 citedByCount "45" @default.
• W2034291809 countsByYear W20342918092012 @default.
• W2034291809 countsByYear W20342918092013 @default.
• W2034291809 countsByYear W20342918092014 @default.
• W2034291809 countsByYear W20342918092015 @default.
• W2034291809 countsByYear W20342918092016 @default.
• W2034291809 countsByYear W20342918092017 @default.
• W2034291809 countsByYear W20342918092018 @default.
• W2034291809 countsByYear W20342918092019 @default.
• W2034291809 countsByYear W20342918092020 @default.
• W2034291809 countsByYear W20342918092021 @default.
• W2034291809 countsByYear W20342918092022 @default.
• W2034291809 countsByYear W20342918092023 @default.
• W2034291809 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W2034291809 hasAuthorship W2034291809A5018002899 @default.
• W2034291809 hasAuthorship W2034291809A5068669723 @default.
• W2034291809 hasAuthorship W2034291809A5072146697 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConcept C123336316 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConcept C139719470 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConcept C145236788 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConcept C149782125 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConcept C175444787 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConcept C202269582 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConcept C2776255816 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConcept C2777351106 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConcept C2778126366 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConcept C29122968 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConcept C2993248174 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConcept C34447519 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConcept C54355233 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConcept C6422946 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConcept C86803240 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConceptScore W2034291809C123336316 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConceptScore W2034291809C139719470 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConceptScore W2034291809C145236788 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConceptScore W2034291809C149782125 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConceptScore W2034291809C162324750 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConceptScore W2034291809C175444787 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConceptScore W2034291809C17744445 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConceptScore W2034291809C199539241 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConceptScore W2034291809C202269582 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConceptScore W2034291809C2776255816 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConceptScore W2034291809C2777351106 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConceptScore W2034291809C2778126366 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConceptScore W2034291809C29122968 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConceptScore W2034291809C2993248174 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConceptScore W2034291809C34447519 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConceptScore W2034291809C54355233 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConceptScore W2034291809C6422946 @default.
• W2034291809 hasConceptScore W2034291809C86803240 @default.
• W2034291809 hasIssue "4" @default.
• W2034291809 hasLocation W20342918091 @default.

• next