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• W2034349829 abstract "I learned a lot from reading Jesse Prinz’s ambitious and entertaining book, The Emotional Construction of Morals. I think he’d be pleased to know that I learned many interesting things that I would not ordinarily find in a book of academic philosophy. Also, even when I disagreed with him, almost all of my questions were anticipated and addressed as the book proceeded, which is a very satisfying experience as a reader and (in my opinion anyway) high praise in philosophy. I say ‘almost all’ of my questions because there are a few that remain. These centre around a puzzle about Prinz’s relativism, which is the focus of my comments. The puzzle is about why the kind of relativism we get from Prinz’s metaethics matters to normative ethics or moral practice. I think it does not (or at least not directly and not in the ways he thinks it does). Moreover, I think many things Prinz says – about the advantages of relativism, about practical moral questions, and about moral progress – should have led him also to conclude that relativism doesn’t matter. But he doesn’t draw this conclusion; hence I am puzzled rather than simply disagreeing. Before I get into the puzzle, it will be helpful to explain the kind of relativism Prinz defends. According to Prinz, the truth of judgements about wrongness depends on the values (and hence the sentiments) of the person who makes the judgement (180). So, when a person says ‘it is wrong to kick puppies’, this is true only if the speaker has moral values that proscribe kicking puppies. This is so, in part, because moral judgements are constituted by emotions (such as shame and disgust) that are caused by our sentiments, and sentiments represent the secondary quality of causing disapprobation in the person whose sentiments they are. When we make moral judgements we ‘convey our feelings and also aim to assert a fact’ (100), for example, the fact that the action we are judging to be wrong has the property of causing disapprobation in us. As long as people have different sentiments, whether or not an action has that dispositional property will vary depending on the speaker. Prinz spends a good bit of time convincing us that people do indeed have different moral sentiments (this is the claim that descriptive relativism is true defended in Chapter 5). If people have different moral sentiments, and if moral judgements assert facts about moral sentiments, then we can see how the truth of moral judgements will be relative to individual agents (175). An interesting feature of Prinz’s relativism, one that begins to reveal my puzzle, is that ought judgements are treated differently from judgements of wrongness. According to Prinz, ought judgements (as opposed to judgements" @default.
• W2034349829 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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• W2034349829 date "2009-09-23" @default.
• W2034349829 modified "2023-09-25" @default.
• W2034349829 title "The Practical Irrelevance of Relativism" @default.
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• W2034349829 doi "https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anp110" @default.
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