FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2034948105> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2034948105 startingPage "1579" @default.
• W2034948105 abstract "After some seventy years, most law academics have come to agree with Berle and Means' famous descriptive argument that decisionmaking power is denied to shareholders and is instead heavily concentrated in board of directors and upper management.1 As with most issues in law academia, normative discourse about this concentration of power consists mainly of debating whether this arrangement is economically efficient. That is, corporate is both descriptively inaccurate and normatively marginalized. Outside ivory tower, however, law continues to use concept both descriptively and normatively. The Delaware Supreme Court, for example, has invoked term in a number of prominent cases.2 The United States Supreme Court has treated some political spending as protected political speech on theory that such spending is product of the procedures of democracy.3 Many reformers who disagree with this rosy descriptive view call for increased shareholder power in order to make governance more democratic.4Dalia Tsuk Mitchell's contribution to this Symposium, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy,5 is an intellectual history of changing views of regulators, reformers and scholars as to meaning of corporate democracy. Tsuk Mitchell identifies three theories that reformers have invoked to justify increased shareholder participation in governance. These theories make varying assumptions about relationship between corporations' role in society (in Tsuk Mitchell's terminology, corporate power) and allocation of control rights between shareholders and management (corporate hierarchy). First, Tsuk Mitchell argues, Progressive Era reformers believed that reforming hierarchy to increase shareholder participation would enable shareholders to tame power for benefit of society.6 Second, Tsuk Mitchell contends that primary concern, from New Deal Era through 1970s, was protecting rights of individual shareholder against potential abuses of power by management.7 Third, neoclassical economists since 1970s have argued that shareholder participation empowers shareholders to shape their own economic (and political) destinies.8 In sum, she argues, focus of analysis has shifted from power in society to internal hierarchies to market.9Although I have a different view of Progressives' approach, I otherwise agree with Tsuk Mitchell's insightful intellectual history. In this Comment, I would like to expand upon normative implications of her account. After Progressive Era, as Tsuk Mitchell argues, was redefined as hierarchy rather than power.10 The focus on this problem, and ostensible solutions to it, played an important role in legitimating power by portraying it as result of a democratic process. Today, neoclassical economic model assumes that all outcomes are voluntary result of market mechanisms. I agree with Tsuk Mitchell's conclusion that law has come to see market as democracy's sustaining and legitimating force.11 Most law academics, however, have been relatively frank about their narrow focus on efficiency and their lack of interest in democracy as a normative value. To extent that nonacademic discourse about remains interested in democracy, academics' efficiency-minded analyses of governance have limited relevance. Policymakers and reformers must resist temptation to conflate democracy with either that old favorite, shareholder power, or current academic darling, market.In late 1800s and early 1900s, corporations problem was emerging potential of large businesses to affect social conditions such as prices and wages, primarily through formation of trusts. …" @default.
• W2034948105 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W2034948105 creator A5085370052 @default.
• W2034948105 date "2006-10-01" @default.
• W2034948105 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W2034948105 title "Comment: Corporate Governance andthe D-Word" @default.
• W2034948105 hasPublicationYear "2006" @default.
• W2034948105 type Work @default.
• W2034948105 sameAs 2034948105 @default.
• W2034948105 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W2034948105 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W2034948105 hasAuthorship W2034948105A5085370052 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConcept C120757647 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConcept C121332964 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConcept C144024400 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConcept C163258240 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConcept C185592680 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConcept C187736073 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConcept C190253527 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConcept C25253098 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConcept C2778272461 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConcept C2778725519 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConcept C39389867 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConcept C55493867 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConcept C555826173 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConcept C62520636 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConcept C98184364 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConceptScore W2034948105C120757647 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConceptScore W2034948105C121332964 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConceptScore W2034948105C144024400 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConceptScore W2034948105C162324750 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConceptScore W2034948105C163258240 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConceptScore W2034948105C17744445 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConceptScore W2034948105C185592680 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConceptScore W2034948105C187736073 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConceptScore W2034948105C190253527 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConceptScore W2034948105C199539241 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConceptScore W2034948105C25253098 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConceptScore W2034948105C2778272461 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConceptScore W2034948105C2778725519 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConceptScore W2034948105C39389867 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConceptScore W2034948105C55493867 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConceptScore W2034948105C555826173 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConceptScore W2034948105C62520636 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConceptScore W2034948105C94625758 @default.
• W2034948105 hasConceptScore W2034948105C98184364 @default.
• W2034948105 hasIssue "4" @default.
• W2034948105 hasLocation W20349481051 @default.
• W2034948105 hasOpenAccess W2034948105 @default.
• W2034948105 hasPrimaryLocation W20349481051 @default.
• W2034948105 hasRelatedWork W144539045 @default.
• W2034948105 hasRelatedWork W1492278469 @default.
• W2034948105 hasRelatedWork W1546102325 @default.
• W2034948105 hasRelatedWork W1595747867 @default.
• W2034948105 hasRelatedWork W1880426465 @default.
• W2034948105 hasRelatedWork W2060086958 @default.
• W2034948105 hasRelatedWork W2130774058 @default.
• W2034948105 hasRelatedWork W2520023613 @default.
• W2034948105 hasRelatedWork W2555940871 @default.
• W2034948105 hasRelatedWork W2913185874 @default.
• W2034948105 hasRelatedWork W2966255724 @default.
• W2034948105 hasRelatedWork W2986276837 @default.
• W2034948105 hasRelatedWork W3121819278 @default.
• W2034948105 hasRelatedWork W3122022236 @default.
• W2034948105 hasRelatedWork W3122258945 @default.
• W2034948105 hasRelatedWork W3123927150 @default.
• W2034948105 hasRelatedWork W3125461378 @default.
• W2034948105 hasRelatedWork W3125818960 @default.
• W2034948105 hasRelatedWork W3169654308 @default.
• W2034948105 hasRelatedWork W350135510 @default.
• W2034948105 hasVolume "63" @default.
• W2034948105 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2034948105 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W2034948105 magId "2034948105" @default.
• W2034948105 workType "article" @default.