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• W2035980911 abstract "Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1See, for example, Louis E. Loeb, Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise (Oxford University Press, Citation2002), especially §VI.3, pp. 187–93. 2Ibid., 207. 3Ibid., 207. 4I borrow this appellation from Loeb, ibid. (see 187–8). 5See Jonathan Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes (Clarendon, Citation1971), 329–30; Mark Collier, ‘Filling the Gaps: Hume and Connectionism on the Continued Existence of Unperceived Objects’, Hume Studies, 25 (Citation1999) 155–70, esp. p. 159; John Laird, Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature (Archon Books, Citation1967) 149–50; and John P. Wright, The Sceptical Realism of David Hume (University of Minnesota Press, Citation1983) 64. 6See, for example, Bennett, op. cit., 329, where he claims that Hume registers his dissatisfaction with the coherence-based explanation by means of a ‘blatantly unargued assertion.’ Collier endorses Bennett's reading (see Collier, op. cit., 159). 7But see H. H. Price, Hume's Theory of the External World (Clarendon, Citation1940) 50–9. There, Price maintains that, for Hume, constancy and coherence are ‘irreducibly different’ (p. 60), which suggests, of course, that we should reject the unified explanation hypothesis. Yet rather than pursuing this interpretation, Price ‘leav[es] Hume's exposition on one side’ (59) and seeks ‘a simpler theory which will cover [coherence and constancy] both’ (59). It is unfortunate, I think, that Price abandons Hume's exposition when he does, for, as I hope to show, he was pursuing just the right sort of interpretation. 8Loeb, op. cit., p. 179. 9For attempts to respond to questions about the role of causal inference in Hume's coherence-based explanation, see Paul Gomberg, ‘Coherence and Causal Inference in Hume's Treatise’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (Citation1976): 693–704; Loeb, op. cit., 180–7; Price, op. cit., 50–9; and Eric Steinberg, ‘Hume on Continued Existence and the Identity of Changing Things’, Hume Studies 7 (Citation1981): 105–20. 10Although it is not clear that he may do so (see Loeb, op. cit., 177–8, and pp. 184–5, n. 10), Hume uses the terms ‘object’ and ‘perception’ interchangeably, at least in Treatise I.iv.2. He is explicit about this, saying that I here account for the opinions and belief of the vulgar with regard to the existence of body; and therefore must entirely conform myself to their manner of thinking and of expressing themselves … Those very sensations, which enter by the eye or ear, are with them the true objects … In order, therefore, to accommodate myself to their notions, I shall at first suppose; that there is only a single existence, which I shall call indifferently object or perception … understanding by both of them what any common man means by a hat, or shoe, or stone, or any other impression, convey'd to him by his senses. Throughout this paper, I follow Hume in using the terms ‘object’ and ‘perception’ interchangeably. (The quotation is from David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd edn, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch (Oxford University Press, 1978), I.iv.2, p. 202. In the text, I refer to this work by a ‘T’ followed by the page number.) 11Granted, he does not answer it in the negative, either. For more on this, see fn. 14. 12For a similar interpretation of Hume's notion of coherence, see Price, op. cit., 50, 59–60. 13See Hume's discussion of the principle of individuation at T 200–1. He suggests there, in fact, not only that constancy is a relationship between two individual perceptions, but also that it must be such a relationship: ‘We cannot, in any propriety of speech, say, that an object is the same with itself, unless we mean, that the object existent at one time is the same with itself existent at another’ (T 201). Hume here refers to two and only two perceptions – one that exists at one time, and one that exists at another. 14To say that two individual perceptions are coherent is, for Hume, akin to saying that an argument from analogy is valid. We simply cannot apply the concept of validity to analogical arguments. Likewise, we cannot apply the concept of coherence to two individual perceptions. This is why Hume answers the question whether C coheres with D (or D with C) neither in the affirmative nor in the negative – we cannot apply the concept of coherence at all to two individual perceptions. 15Considerations like those presented in this paragraph seem to be at the heart of Price's claim that, for Hume, coherence and constancy are ‘irreducibly different’ (ibid., p. 60) and ‘mutually irreducible’ (ibid., 65). Yet, in spite of the fact that he reads Hume in this way, Price himself maintains that when we ‘reconsider these two characteristics for ourselves’ (ibid., 59), we will see that coherence and constancy are ‘sub-species of a common principle’ (ibid., 60) and hence that Hume was wrong to think that they are irreducibly different. The fact that Price believes that Hume is wrong about the relationship between coherence and constancy has led to confusion over the nature of Price's interpretation of Hume: Some read him – incorrectly, I think – as suggesting that Hume himself sees coherence and constancy as subspecies of a common principle. Clearly, however, it is only after Price decides that we should reconsider coherence and constancy ‘for ourselves’ (ibid., 59) that he claims that coherence and constancy are subspecies of a common principle. He does not maintain that Hume himself believes that coherence and constancy are so related. 16See Bennett, op. cit., 323; R. Jo Kornegay, ‘Hume on the Ordinary Distinction Between Objective and Subjective Impressions’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23 (Citation1993) 241–70, esp. p. 244; Loeb, op. cit., 178–9; Steinberg, op. cit., 114; and Barry Stroud, Hume (Routledge, Citation1977), 100. See, too, David Fate Norton, ‘Editor's Introduction’ in David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford University Press, Citation2000) 140. This sort of interpretation contributes to the unfortunate tendency, exhibited by Stroud (see op. cit., 100) and by Johnson (see Oliver A. Johnson, The Mind of David Hume (University of Illinois Press, Citation1995) 250–2), virtually to disregard Hume's discussion of coherence and to concentrate almost exclusively on his discussion of constancy. 17Each of these two perceptions, it seems, will itself involve some transition or alteration. In the case of the distinctive noise, there will be some change of pitch, for example, from its beginning to its end. In the case of the motion of the door, there will be some change of position, for example, from the beginning of the motion to its end. (This use of ‘perception’, although it might not capture Hume's considered conception of a perception, is in accordance with his use of the term during his discussion of coherence. Hume says that ‘I am accustom'd to hear such a sound, and see such an object in motion at the same time. I have not receiv'd in this particular instance both these perceptions’ (T 196). Hume here mentions two and only two perceptions – seeing a door in motion, and hearing a noise as of a door turning upon its hinges. Yet both hearing the distinctive noise and seeing a door in motion involve some transition or alteration, for we could not see the door in motion, for example, if we did not see it change its position. Thus, Hume seems to allow, at least for the purposes of his discussion of coherence, that a single perception can involve some transition or alteration.) 18We should perhaps add something that seems consistent with Hume's presentation, namely, that whenever we have previously perceived the distinctive noise, we have also seen the door in motion. Hume says, ‘I never have observ'd, that this noise cou'd proceed from any thing but the motion of a door …’ (T 196; emphasis added). Compare Gomberg, op. cit., who maintains that at T 196–7, ‘the constant conjunction in past experience is assumed’ (697). 19See fn. 17 for the claim that the perceptions that constitute ω, as well as those that constitute α through ϕ, will themselves involve some alteration. 21Commentators who seem perplexed by this passage include Bennett (see op. cit., 329–30). 20Loeb, op. cit., 188. 22Price seems to have something like this in mind when he claims that coherence and constancy ‘are in fact sub-species of a common principle’ (op. cit., 60). See ibid., 59–71. 23See, for example, T 199. 24As a matter of fact, however, sets of constant perceptions cannot cohere; for, since there is no alteration in constant perceptions – and hence no alteration in the perceptions that constitute a set of constant perceptions – the alteration in the perceptions that constitute one set of constant perceptions can never be sufficiently similar to the alteration in the perceptions that constitute another set of constant perceptions. Here again, it seems that we simply cannot apply the concept of coherence to two (or more) sets of constant perceptions. 25See, for example, Bennett, op. cit., 322–45; Johnson, op. cit., 250–64; and Stroud, op. cit., 100–17. Welcome exceptions to the tendency to disregard coherence include Loeb, op. cit. (see especially Chs V and VI), and Price, op. cit., 37–59. 26See also T 201–5. 27See T 200–1. 30This account, in spite of the fact that it sees four stages where Loeb's sees only three, is in essence identical to the one found in Loeb, op. cit., 141. 28See also T 205–6. 29Hume says that our coming to believe that objects continue to exist even when they are not perceived allows us to see those objects as ‘entirely the same’ (T 206) and ‘to justify this identity’ (T 208). 31Both the case of the porter and the case of the letter are supposed to be similar to the case of the door. In particular, it is supposed to be true in each case that from a set of perceptions that we customarily receive simultaneously, one perception is missing. Consider the example of the porter. In that case, we are accustomed to see the stairs when we see the porter ‘mounting in the air … to arrive at my chamber’ (T 196). In this case, however, I am missing the visual perception of the stairs. In the example of the letter, we are accustomed to see – or to ‘spreading out in my mind’ (T 196) – posts and ferries when we see that a letter has arrived from a friend who is ‘two hundred leagues distant’ (T 196). In this case, however, I am missing the visual perception of posts and ferries. (For objections to the letter example, see C. A. J. Coady, ‘Testimony and Observation’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 10 (Citation1973) 149–55.) 32Stroud, op. cit., 52. 33Gomberg, op. cit., 696. 34This gives us further reason to think that a causal inference is responsible for our belief that the door is now in motion. The supposition that there is no door threatens our causal maxim by threatening a certain inference, namely, the inference from the fact that we hear the distinctive noise to the claim that the door is now in motion. Yet if this inference is not performed on the basis of that maxim – that is, if it is not a causal inference – the supposition that there is no door cannot threaten our causal maxim by threatening this inference. 35Although Hume never says so explicitly, I assume throughout that reason is the faculty responsible for keeping us from a contradiction. (If by Hume's lights I am wrong about this, the reader should in what follows understand ‘reason’ to mean the same thing as ‘our efforts to avoid certain contradictions’.) 36This gloss is straightforward if ‘object’ and ‘perception’ are used interchangeably. Yet Hume notes that he will adopt this usage only at T 202, and the above quotation is to be found at T 198. It might be argued, then, that Hume has not yet conformed to the usage of the vulgar, and that here he means quite expressly that coherence is a relationship between objects. Nevertheless, the gloss is a fair one: if objects cohere in a sense similar to the one specified by (Coh), then perceptions of those objects will (tend to) cohere in exactly similar ways. For perceptions will (tend to) exhibit alterations that are exactly similar to those exhibited by the perceived objects. Hence, even if Hume is not yet adopting the usage of the vulgar, we may still maintain that sets of perceptions cohere. 37Why think that the fire example involves only beliefs of (F)'s sort? Recall that beliefs of (D)'s sort fill the interruptions between coherent sets of door perceptions (for example); and there is no interruption between coherent sets of fire perceptions that corresponds to the interruption between coherent sets of door perceptions. (Note that if there were such an interruption between coherent sets of fire perceptions, the Inertia Principle would have some work to do in this case.) Yet why is there no such interruption between coherent sets of fire perceptions? This is a difficult question. Perhaps there is no such interruption because it is in general true that when we receive a set of perceptions that involves an alteration in one kind of object, and when we have in the past received sets of perceptions that cohere with the present set, there is nothing distinctive that appears in each of the cohering sets, which suggests, perhaps, that none of the cohering sets closely enough resembles another to be connected or united with it in the imagination. Why would there be nothing distinctive in each of the cohering sets of fire perceptions? Perhaps because those sets are such that they often include the perception of the object's coming to be, as in the perception of the fire's being built, or the perception of the object's ceasing to be, as in the perception of the fire's dying out. We thus come to recognize that the members of a set of fire perceptions are peculiar to that set. In contrast, perhaps the following is true in general of coherent sets of perceptions that involve a connection between alterations in two kinds of object: there is an interruption between such sets because there is something distinctive that appears in each of them. For example, each cohering set of door perceptions includes a distinctive perception, namely, hearing the distinctive noise as of a door turning upon its hinges. Perhaps it is in virtue of this that a cohering set of door perceptions closely enough resembles another to be connected or united with it in the imagination. 38Also, there is in general absolutely no barrier, so far as Hume is concerned, to our saying that causal inference and reason are wholly responsible for beliefs of (F)'s sort. The habits that serve as the basis of causal inference are acquired by the regular succession of perceptions. Thus, given that the perceptions that we have had of o, which include perceptions received at times that correspond to t4, include an appropriately regular succession of perceptions of o, we can acquire a habit that can underwrite a causal inference that will, with the help of reason, cause us to believe that o exists at t4. 39Ibid., 694. 40Each of the commentaries that I mention in fn. 9 is limited in just this way. 41For helpful comments and criticisms, I thank Peter Millican, David Shoemaker, Cindy Stern and Weimin Sun." @default.
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