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- W2038996900 abstract "The recent literature on hierarchies departs from the traditional literature on regulation by opening the Black Box of the regulatory body and separating it into at least two layers of control: Congress1 and the regulatory agency. Tirole (1986) and Tirole arid Laffont (1988) show that if the regulator is self-interested, the possibility of collusion between the regulator and the firm always decreases welfare because there are additional incentive compatibility constraints to be satisfied. In this paper I propose that the possibility of collusion between the regulator and the regulated can be beneficial. I argue that delegation to a self-int;erested agent who does not hesitate to accept bribes from the firm is essential to a solution of the regulatory holdup problem. Furthermore, I demonstrate that this solution is robust to the possibility of re-negotiation between the principal and the agent. This paper sheds light on the following problems of the internal organization of regulatory agencies. First, as others have pointed out, the law enforcement branches of federal regulatory agencies usually have limited budgets and insufficient staff to maintain vigorous enforcement. For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in the U.S. has so few staff that firms expect to be subject to one on-site inspection per century. Furthermore the enforcement officials are usually not political appointees over whom the U.S. Congress can exercise control. They tend to be career bureaucrats with life-long employment contracts and whose preferences are not necessarily aligned with those of Congress. The question is: Why doesn't Congress attempt to allocate more resources to and exercise more control over law enforcement? Second, the evidence is well-documented that possibilities exist for collusion between the regulator and the regulated. There are numerous examples of the so-called revolving doors, 2 whereby retired regulatory officials take lucrative jobs with firms formerly under their jurisdiction. For" @default.
- W2038996900 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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- W2038996900 date "1996-04-01" @default.
- W2038996900 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
- W2038996900 title "Commitment with Selfish Regulators" @default.
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- W2038996900 doi "https://doi.org/10.2307/135998" @default.
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