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• W2039807029 abstract "View Large Image | Download PowerPoint SlideWhen does the self emerge? Not before 24 months of life, says Mahler [1xThe Psychological Birth of the Human Infant. Mahler, S., Pine, M.M.F., and Bergman, A. See all References[1]; it is virtual in the pre-symbolic stage, says Kohut [2xThe Restoration of the Self. Kohut, H. See all References[2]; not before 18 months, say cognitive scientists. How does the self emerge? In dualist confusion, says Mahler; in solipsistic isolation, says Freud; largely inaccessibly within the body, assume cognitive neuroscientists. None of these answers fits the evidence, argues Vasudevi Reddy in her book How Infants Know Minds[3xHow Infants Know Minds. Reddy, V. See all References[3], as she turns the classic models of the development of the self on their heads. “Why does the self emerge?” she asks instead, and proposes that the self emerges through the first engagements with others. Based on 20 years of behavioural observations, experiments, and frame-by-frame analyses of the kinds of play that have scarcely been addressed by cognitive scientists – coyness, humour, teasing in infants – Reddy presents compelling evidence that young infants have self-conscious experiences long before any ‘conceptualized self’ could enable their emergence. In this fascinating book, which builds on her earlier work [4xOn being the object of attention: implications for self-other consciousness. Reddy, V. Trends Cogn. Sci. 2003; 7: 397–402Abstract | Full Text | Full Text PDF | PubMed | Scopus (114)See all References[4], Reddy expands her account of the development of the dialogic infant mind.She proposes that the self is innately relational from the outset and, as such, she markedly revises contemporary developmental models of the self. She discusses in detail how the ‘second person’ relational approach embeds and embodies the minds of those entered into engagement. Direct engagement, as opposed to the stance of an observer taken in the cognitive sciences, dissolves the (neo-) Cartesian gap between human minds. This dualistic view regards the mind as a separate construct from the body and behaviour, and assumes that, unlike behaviour, the mind is hidden, and largely inaccessible. The experimental sciences describe behaviour as objectively as possible from the viewpoint of a third person, the experimenter. First-person introspective accounts have long been regarded as lacking objectivity and are treated with caution, whereas the second-person viewpoint has not been considered outside philosophy [5xSee all References[5]. What we know about infants in experimental psychology, therefore, emerges from observations made from a third-person perspective. In this situation a gap emerges between the observed behaviour and the mind of the observed, as well as between the mind of the observed and the mind of the observer. Developmental scientists propose that constructing ‘theories’ about others’ ‘theories’ helps us to know others’ minds. Because this skill emerges only after the second year of life, if that is the only way to know another, this should mean that young infants cannot effectively bridge the mind–mind gap. With a second-person approach, however, proposes Reddy, no rational mediation is necessary; there is no gap.Reddy meticulously presents evidence that young infants and newborns actively and reciprocally engage with others, and suggests that it is attention to the self that intrigues and motivates the baby to feel engaged. More than just being intrigued, however, infants display a wide range of complex behaviours to attract and regulate the attention of the adult in relation to themselves. They might ‘hide’ from attention by acting shy; they might show coyness from as early as the second month, and display teasing or ‘funny’ behaviour and vocalizations, ‘showing off’ to draw the other's attention to themselves. These experiences, she argues, are strategies that later evolve to regulate even more complex self-conscious or moral emotions such as embarrassment, shame and pride, starting from the middle of the second year or earlier. The problem – for developmental cognitive science – is that all these signs of very early affective–reflective, self-conscious experiences, which Reddy describes in her research, have been regarded as possible only after the development of ‘secondary emotions’. These have been believed to evolve over the first two years, as a consequence of the self-representational ability of the infant, not to precede it [6xSelf development and self-conscious emotions. Lewis, M. et al. Child Dev. 1989; 60: 146–156Crossref | PubMedSee all References[6]. Neither contemporary accounts of the development of the self, nor ‘theory of mind’ explanations of ‘beliefs about beliefs’ can explain the phenomena Reddy describes. A second-person account, Reddy suggests, can do so.Is there neuroscientific evidence to support Reddy's theory? We have no evidence of the activation of the mirror neuron system in the first half-year of life, and there must be more to direct self-conscious engagement than the mirror-neuron-based simulation theory can explain. However, Reddy's model converges with Northoff and Panksepp's proposal [7xThe trans-species concept of self and the subcortical-cortical midline system. Northoff, G. and Panksepp, J. Trends Cogn. Sci. 2008; 12: 259–264Abstract | Full Text | Full Text PDF | PubMed | Scopus (93)See all References[7] of a subcortical-cortical midline neural network foundation for the ‘core self’ in mammals, and goes beyond solipsistic models of the self. The emergence of the self in relation to the other in Reddy's model is reminiscent of Andy Clark's model of the extended mind [8xSupersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Clark, A. Crossref | Scopus (689)See all References[8], with the difference that the mind becomes functional with the structures of the external world in Clark's model, whereas Reddy proposes a ‘related mind’ that exists in relation to the other.Directly testing Reddy's proposal, Schilbach and colleagues found that the same neural system that subserves the core self in mammals contributes to personal, direct involvement in social interactions, as opposed to being a mere observer of them [9xBeing with virtual others: Neural correlates of social interaction. Schilbach, L. et al. Neuropsychologia. 2006; 44: 718–730Crossref | PubMed | Scopus (211)See all References[9]. This could be the neural basis for the relational self that Reddy proposes on the basis of her research in early development. Although there is no evidence that this system is functioning in early infancy, subcortical elements of the system develop in the human embryo and could account for how self-conscious emotions can arise long before the representation of the self develops.The theory Reddy puts forward is not only provocative; it comes with ample supportive evidence and successfully addresses the hoary philosophical puzzle of how the Cartesian gap is bridged. It integrates data on infant social competence with a radically revised view of development and provides a model of how young infants can read minds without having a theory of others’ minds, and without cognitive representations of the self and the other.Integration of data from cognitive and interactional frameworks into the new model is not however, unproblematic. The author admits she is examining a ‘noisy’ system. Experiencing the other's attention, a major motivational source of the related self in Reddy's model, is inseparable from the need to communicate, which is another basic, innate, human motive [10xThe self born in intersubjectivity: the psychology of an infant communicating. Trevarthen, C. : 121–173See all References[10]. Does the self emerge by experiencing the attention of the other, or via inter-subjective communication? Studies of the benefits of direct eye-contact (e.g. [11xThe eye-contact effect: mechanisms and development. Senju, A. and Johnson, M.H. Trends Cogn. Sci. 2008; 13: 127–134Abstract | Full Text | Full Text PDF | Scopus (201)See all References[11]) on memory, learning and attention tasks in neonates, young infants and adults strongly support the role of self-directed attention in mobilizing resources otherwise not available. Further, the neural systems linked to the self largely overlap with the reward system in the brain. The self, perceived as a special object, seems to elicit sustained activation of the reward system [12xIs our self based on reward? Self-relatedness recruits neural activity in the reward system. de Greck, M. et al. NeuroImage. 2008; 39: 2066–2075Crossref | PubMed | Scopus (48)See all References[12], thus Reddy is justified in proposing that experiencing another's attention must be a primary drive for communication.Should we still presume that the self exists and can be observed independently of human engagement? Reddy's model compels a major revision of our view of early development and lays the foundations for a different approach; the current third-person approach must be replaced or, at a minimum, complemented by a second-person cognitive science. Reddy's model has further significant implications for infant mental health. If the self is relational, and infants best develop through direct engagement, then the impact of abusive engagements and disengaged parental care, such as early neglect and maternal postpartum illnesses, on infants might be more pervasive than previously thought, fundamentally affecting the developing self. If so, not only is second-person cognitive science about to emerge, but also new interventions that address engagement with the other will need to supplement the current third-person-based cognitive and biological interventions." @default.
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• W2039807029 title "The emergence of the second-person cognitive science" @default.
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