FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2046512412> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2046512412 endingPage "201" @default.
• W2046512412 startingPage "183" @default.
• W2046512412 abstract "Russell's Theory of Meaning and Descriptions (1905-1920)* ALOYSIUS P. MARTINICH SINCE 1950, a literature has developed claiming that Russell's justification for his analysis of definite descriptions contains an equivocation. The three most distinguished advocates of this view are W. V. O. Quine,x P. F. Strawson,2 and A. R. White. Recently , R. K. Perkins, Jr. has challenged the claim by attacking in particular Alan R. White's contention that a certain argument in My Philosophical Development provides an opportunity for giving a neat and precise proof of this conclusion.... ~ Perkins himself claims that Russell's argument does not involve the alleged confusion of sense and reference, and that the belief that it does is a mistake resulting from the failure to grasp the purport of Russell's special notion of naming.''4 Perkins establishes this point by providing a univocal sense for the several occurrences of mean in Russell's argument and justifies doing so by appealing to the context in which his argument originally appears, that is, in Principia Mathematica (hereafter, Principia). Perkins explicitly disclaims judging the soundness of Russell's doctrine of meaning but holds that Russell's argument is valid, a conclusion he draws, I take it, from the fact that he has refuted the standard objection to it. Part I of this paper contains an analysis of the form of Russell's argument as it appears both in Principia and My Philosophical Development. Part II examines White's case that Russell's argument contains an equivocation on the meaning of mean. Part III contains Perkins' criticism of White and his own interpretation of Russell's argument and theory of meaning. Part IV criticizes Perkins' interpretation of Russell's theory of meaning and presents an accurate account of the theory Russell held between 1905 and 1920. Part V explains how this nullifies not only Perkins' interpretation but White's also. Part VI exposes the confusions upon which Russell's argument founders. I. The argument White focuses on from My Philosophical Development is: The central point of the theory of descriptions was that a phrase may contribute to the meaning of a sentence without having any meaning at all in isolation. Of this, in the * I want to thank Edwin Allaire, Avrum Stroll, David Cole and LesLiePrice Martinich for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. The preparation of the paper was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation to the University of California, San Diego. t Russell's Ontological Development, in Bertrand Russell: Philosophero[ the Century, ed. R. Sehoenman (London: Allen &Unwin, 1967),p. 310. z On Referring, in Essays in ConceptualAnalysis, ed. Antony Flew (London: Macmillan, 1956), p. 31. a Alan R. White, The 'Meaning' of Russell's Theory of Descriptions, Analysis, XX (1959), 8. 4 R. K. Perkins, Jr,, On Russell's Alleged Confusion of Sense and Reference, Analysis, XXX/I (1971), 45. [183] 184 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY case of descriptions, there is precise proof: (a) If the author of Waverley meant anything other than Scott Scott is the author of Waverley would be false, which it is not. (b) If the author of Waverley meant Scott, Scott is the author of Waverley would be a tautology, which it is not. (c) Therefore, the author of Waverley means neither Scott nor anything else--i.e., the author of Waverley means nothing. Q.E.D.5 (Following White and Perkins, I have inserted (a) and (b) into the text for expository purposes and have added (c) for the same reason.) This argument is essentially a clearer statement of the one originally presented in Principia: Thus all phrases (other than propositions) containing the word the (in the singular) are incomplete symbols: they have a meaning in use, but not in isolation. For the author of Waverley cannot mean the same as Scott, or Scott is the author of Waverley would mean the same as Scott is Scott, which it plainly does not; nor can the author of Waverley mean anything other than scott, or Scott is the author of Waverley would be false. Hence the author of Waverley means nothing.~ Although the version in My Philosophical Development clarifies the argument's..." @default.
• W2046512412 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W2046512412 creator A5045113270 @default.
• W2046512412 date "1976-01-01" @default.
• W2046512412 modified "2023-10-17" @default.
• W2046512412 title "Russell's Theory of Meaning and Descriptions (1905-1920)" @default.
• W2046512412 cites W1507265854 @default.
• W2046512412 cites W1965462762 @default.
• W2046512412 cites W2015754690 @default.
• W2046512412 cites W2035260372 @default.
• W2046512412 cites W2035921609 @default.
• W2046512412 cites W2064445530 @default.
• W2046512412 cites W2316363783 @default.
• W2046512412 cites W2325714485 @default.
• W2046512412 cites W2505960753 @default.
• W2046512412 cites W621429121 @default.
• W2046512412 cites W8715909 @default.
• W2046512412 doi "https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2008.0614" @default.
• W2046512412 hasPublicationYear "1976" @default.
• W2046512412 type Work @default.
• W2046512412 sameAs 2046512412 @default.
• W2046512412 citedByCount "2" @default.
• W2046512412 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W2046512412 hasAuthorship W2046512412A5045113270 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConcept C111472728 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConcept C138885662 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConcept C17859611 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConcept C185592680 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConcept C27206212 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConcept C2776211767 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConcept C2777179996 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConcept C2780876879 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConcept C2781374135 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConcept C55493867 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConcept C9270016 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConcept C98184364 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConceptScore W2046512412C111472728 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConceptScore W2046512412C138885662 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConceptScore W2046512412C17744445 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConceptScore W2046512412C17859611 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConceptScore W2046512412C185592680 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConceptScore W2046512412C199539241 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConceptScore W2046512412C27206212 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConceptScore W2046512412C2776211767 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConceptScore W2046512412C2777179996 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConceptScore W2046512412C2780876879 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConceptScore W2046512412C2781374135 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConceptScore W2046512412C55493867 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConceptScore W2046512412C9270016 @default.
• W2046512412 hasConceptScore W2046512412C98184364 @default.
• W2046512412 hasIssue "2" @default.
• W2046512412 hasLocation W20465124121 @default.
• W2046512412 hasOpenAccess W2046512412 @default.
• W2046512412 hasPrimaryLocation W20465124121 @default.
• W2046512412 hasRelatedWork W1580943668 @default.
• W2046512412 hasRelatedWork W2017985195 @default.
• W2046512412 hasRelatedWork W2046512412 @default.
• W2046512412 hasRelatedWork W2089801293 @default.
• W2046512412 hasRelatedWork W2157502692 @default.
• W2046512412 hasRelatedWork W2500450086 @default.
• W2046512412 hasRelatedWork W2514608820 @default.
• W2046512412 hasRelatedWork W2605548374 @default.
• W2046512412 hasRelatedWork W2810983536 @default.
• W2046512412 hasRelatedWork W979581665 @default.
• W2046512412 hasVolume "14" @default.
• W2046512412 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2046512412 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W2046512412 magId "2046512412" @default.
• W2046512412 workType "article" @default.