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• W2050388538 abstract "January/February 2006 Historically Speaking 35 gave rise. Politically, the silly season ended on 9/11. Militarily, it ended when the invasion of Iraq produced not a decisive, economical victory but a quagmire that has painfully exposed the limits of American power. Will war's future resemble the past? Yes, that's self-evident. You don't need to rely on Colin Gray for that truth: pick up a newspaper and read the headlines . Gray may go too far in suggesting that the character ofwar is not especially interesting, or even important. In a narrow sense, technique matters and can even determine the outcome of a particular conflict. But technique cuts both ways. Innovative methods of combined arms warfare enabled Germany to defeat Poland and to win the Battle of France—and set Hitler up for the massive miscalculation of Operation Barbarrosa. Information technology and precision weapons enabled the Bush administration to handily topple Saddam Hussein—but exaggerated confidence in the efficacy of shock and awe set the Americans up for the insurgency that followed. Andrew J. Bacevich teaches international relations at Boston University and is the author most recently ofThe New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (Oxford University Press, 2005). With Clausewitz to Eternity Colin S. Gray This mini-essay is content to consider some points raised by each commentator in turn. More often than not, I find that I wish to endorse and perhaps amplify the points that have been raised. Several items in Peter Paret's essay require comment. He signals the proclivity of Americans to view their enemies as mirror images of themselves. It is commonplace , and not only among Americans, to make the convenient assumption that all the world is really one in its strategic thinking. That translates as the comforting belief that all the world shares our ideas and values. This longstanding and pervasive cultural error is now well recognized for the mistake that it is. But recognition of a problem that may be a condition , and the consequential correction of perception and subsequent behavior, are by no means synonymous. I am much taken with Paret's astute observation that [i]n war the enemy is often misunderstood and yet may be defeated, and even a malfunctioning political and military leadership may succeed—though presumably success would come at an unnecessarily high cost. Quite so! Fortunately, one does not have to win elegantly or, in the American case, economically. One just has to win. The way that success is secured will have consequences for the postwar political context , so we cannot be indifferent to the skill with which we take down a half-understood enemy. Nonetheless, history tends to be tolerant of the imperfections of those who win ugly. In practice, all belligerents win or lose more or less ugly. Paret takes me to task for claiming too deep a division between theorists from the social sciences and historians. He points to the unity of detailed historical research and theory making in Clausewitz's writings. I suspect that the criticism is less well founded than he History tends to be tolerant ofthe imperfections of those who win ugly. In practice, all belligerents win or lose more or less ugly. believes, though I may well have overstated a scholarly divide for the purpose of emphasis. However, I am not inclined to surrender unconditionally and preemptively on this matter . Paret probably underrates the potency and influence of disciplinary bias. It has been my firsthand experience over many years that, unsurprisingly, historians tend to be far better at conducting historical research and interpreting the unique and the particular than they are at relating their findings to some grander narrative . Of course, there are exceptions. There always are. Also, I appreciate that all I am registering here is an impression, albeit one that I have not had cause to alter over a long period. Most scholars attracted to theory will find historical research somewhat confining. The historian 's healthy bias toward the unique and the contextual must provide valuable protection against conceptual overreach, windy generalizations , and the like. But the opportunity cost paid in understanding can be heavy. It is somewhat ironic that Paret disputes..." @default.
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• W2050388538 date "2006-01-01" @default.
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• W2050388538 title "With Clausewitz to Eternity" @default.
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• W2050388538 doi "https://doi.org/10.1353/hsp.2006.0090" @default.
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