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• W2068345647 abstract "Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 I wish to thank Professor William Banks, director of the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT), Syracuse University, Ms. Shani Ross, Research Fellow at INSCT and Ms Bonnie Nusser for all of their useful comments, advice and observations. 2 Security Council resolution 1368, 12 Sept. 2001. See also the NAC press statement the day after 9/11. ‘Statement by the North Atlantic Council’, NATO Press Release (2001) 124, 12 Sept. 2001 <www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm>. 3 NATO was created to counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. It was designed to be a defensive alliance for the Euro-Atlantic zone. 4 On human security see for example United Nations Development Program, New Dimensions of Human Security (New York: OUP 1994): Gary King and Christopher L. Murray, ‘Rethinking Human Security’, Political Science Quarterly 116/4 (2001–2002) pp.585–610. 5 Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, ‘Exodus within Borders: The Uprooted Who Never Left Home’, Foreign Affairs 77/4 (1998) p.14; Kofi Annan, ‘Two Concepts of Sovereignty,’ The Economist, 18 Sept. 1999; Ronald Paris, ‘Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism’, International Security 22/ 2 (1997) pp.54–89. 6 ‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions’ <http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/Bonn-agreement.pdf]>The 2006 Afghanistan Compact makes clear this point, as in the Preamble the Compact states that Afghanistan and the international community are determined to strengthen their partnership not only because it would improve the lives of ordinary Afghans but also because it would contribute to national, regional and global peace and security. ‘The Afghanistan Compact’, The London Conference on Afghanistan, 31 Jan. 31 – 1 Feb., 2006. </www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/afghanistan_compact.pdf>. 7 Nick B. Mills, Karzai: The Failing American Intervention and the Struggle for Afghanistan (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley 2007); Stephen M. Walt, ‘Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping US Foreign Policy,’ International Security 26/3 (2001–2002) p.62. Thomas Barfield recounts being in Peshawar in the early 1990s where he met the Afghan shadow minister for agriculture. The man gave Barfield a card that stated ‘Jihad Engineering – We Specialize in Reconstruction’. Barfield claims that these mujahidin fighters believed that with the Soviet exit, the Najibullah regime would collapse and the US and the West would help Afghans rebuild their state. Thomas J. Barfield, ‘On Local Justice and Culture in Post-Taliban Afghanistan,’ Connecticut Journal of International Law 17/3 (2002) p.438. 8 This becomes very clear when reading Annex I to the Afghan Compact. ‘The Afghanistan Compact,’ The London Conference on Afghanistan (note 6). 9 Security Council resolution 1401 ‘Calls upon all Afghan parties to cooperate with UNAMA in the implementation of its mandate and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its staff throughout the country.’ The Council also requested ‘the International Security Assistance Force, in implementing its mandate in accordance with resolution 1386 (2001), to continue to work in close consultation with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative.’ Security Council resolution 1401, 28 March 2002. 10 Since 2001, the Security Council has expanded UNAMA’s authority so that it acts as the meeting point for the international assistance program, as well as working to strengthen cooperation between the ISAF and the Afghan government (Security Council resolution 1806 (2008)). UNAMA also supported the election processes (Security Council resolution 1910 (2010)). For more on UNAMA duties see, Security Council resolution 1386, 20Dec. 2001; Security Council resolution 1413, 23 May 2002; Security Council resolution 1444, 27 Nov. 2002; Security Council resolution 1510, 13 Oct. 2003; Security Council resolution 1563, 17 Sept. 2004; Security Council resolution 1623, 13 Sept. 2005; Security Council resolution 1707, 12 Sept. 2006; Security Council resolution 1776, 19 Sept. 2007; Security Council resolution 1833, 22 Sept. 2008; Security Council resolution 1890, 8 Oct. 2009; Security Council resolution 1917, 22 March 2010; Security Council resolution 1943, 10 Oct. 2010. 11 The ‘Summary Study’ concludes that as the arrangements for the establishment, implementation and deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) do not fall under Chapter VII ‘it follows from international law and the Charter that the United Nations cannot undertake to implement them by stationing units on the territory of a Member State without the consent of the Government concerned’. ‘Summary study of the experience derived from the establishment and operation of UNEF,’ Report of the Secretary-General, 9 Oct. 1958, para. 155, Doc. A/3943. 12 In the 1990s as the Balkans were imploding the Council controversially authorized military action – peace enforcement – against Serbia due to its inhuman actions in Kosovo. Christopher Greenwood, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 49/4 (2000) pp. 926–934; Javier Solana, ‘NATO’s Success in Kosovo’, Foreign Affairs 78/6 (1999) pp. 114–120; Louis Henkin, ‘Kosovo and the Law of ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, The American Journal of International Law 93/4 (1999) pp.824–8; Marrack Goulding, ‘The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping’, International Affairs 69/ 3 (1993) pp.451–64. 13 On how the US interpreted the concept of a ‘new world order’ see George H. W. Bush ‘Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,’ 29 Jan. 1991 <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2656&year=1991&month=01->. 14 Professor Antonio Donini, the former Director of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (1999–2002), sums up the change in the field of humanitarianism as follows: ‘In the past, humanitarian action was at the margins of international action: it occupied a small, narrow place in conflict situations providing security and protection to civilians in extremis, mostly in refugee situations outside areas of conflict. Now, humanitarian action and personnel are at the centre of the international community’s response to crisis and attract high media visibility.’ Antonio Donini, ‘Local Perceptions of Assistance in Afghanistan’, International Peacekeeping 14/1 (2007) p.160; Michael Barnett, ‘Humanitarianism Transformed’, Perspective on Politics 3/4 (2005) p.723; David Chandler, ‘The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped a New Humanitarian Agenda’, Human Rights Quarterly 23/3 (2001) pp.678–700. 15 Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism’ (note 5); Ronald Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: CUP 2004). 16 Goulding, ‘The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping’(note 12). 17 Edward Newman, ‘‘Transitional Justice”: The Impact of Transnational Norms and the UN’, International Peacekeeping 9/2 (2002) p.31. 18 Roger Mac Ginty describes the liberal peace thesis as ‘internationally-sponsored peace-support and reconstruction interventions … marked by its increasingly formulaic, top–down and ethnocentric nature’. Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Reconstructing Post-War Lebanon: a Challenge to the Liberal Peace?’ Conflict, Security & Development 7/3 (Oct. 2007) p.457. 19 Law 25/1 (1993) pp.113–22; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations Publication 1995); Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘Democracy: A Newly Recognized Imperative’, Global Governance 1/1 (1995) pp.3–11; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘Global Leadership after the Cold War,’ Foreign Affairs 75/2 (1996); Jeffrey Haynes, Democracy in the Developing World: Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001); Jeffrey Haynes, Third World Politics: A Concise Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1996); Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma 1991); Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books 1992). 20 Boutros-Ghali stated that the goal of the UN in this situation was to ‘forestall a re-emergence of cultural and national tensions which could spark renewed hostilities’. Boutros-Ghali, ‘Beyond Peacekeeping’(note 19) p. 120. 21 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (note 19); Michael Barnett, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O’Donnell and Laura Sitea, ‘Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?’ Global Governance 13/1 (Jan.–March (2007) pp.35–58; Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Duty to Prevent’, Foreign Affairs 83/1 (2004) pp.136–50. 22 Boutros-Ghali, ‘Beyond Peacekeeping’ (note 19)p.115 (italics in text). 23 The Economic Community of West African States took the lead in peacekeeping in Liberia and Sierra Leone; Haiti became an Organization of American States operation; and Australia took charge of the International Force for East Timor until the arrival of UN peacekeepers. Clement E. Adibe, ‘The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN Partnership’, Third World Quarterly18/3 (1997) pp.471–88; David Curran and Tom Woodhouse, ‘Cosmopolitan peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Sierra Leone: what can Africa contribute?’ International Affairs Vol. 83/ 6 (2007) pp.1055–70; Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, ‘East Timor and the New Humanitarian Intervention’, International Affairs77/ 4 (2001) pp.805–27; James Cotton, ‘‘Peacekeeping” in East Timor: An Australian Policy Departure’, Australian Journal of International Affairs53/3 (1999) pp.237–46. 24 Annan, ‘Two Concepts of Sovereignty’(note 5); Francis M. Deng et. al., Sovereignty as a Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1996). 25 Besides the report Responsibility to Protect, there was also the Brahimi Report that reformed the UN’s approach to peacekeeping. ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping,’ Doc. A/55/305–S/2000/809, 21 Aug. 2009; Sorpong Peou, ‘The UN, Peacekeeping, and Collective Human Security: From An Agenda for Peace to the Brahimi Report’, International Peacekeeping 9/ 2 (Summer 2002) pp.51–68; Nigel D. White, ‘Commentary on the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, (The Brahimi Report),’ Journal of Conflict and Security Law 6/ 1 (2001) pp.127–46; Gareth Evans, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come… and Gone?’ International Relations22 3 (2008) pp.283–98; Feinstein and Slaughter, ‘A Duty to Prevent’(note 21). 26 ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Dec. 2001 <www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf>. 27 The Council threatened Israel and the Arab states with such action in 1948 unless they stopped fighting. Looking at the various Security Council resolutions adopted throughout 1948, the Council increasingly became more determined to end the conflict in Israel-Palestine. Thus, in Security Council resolution 42 (5 March 1948) the there is an appeal to the various governments ‘to take all action to prevent or reduce such disorders as are now occurring in Palestine’. SecurityCouncil resolution 50 (28 May 1948) calls upon the governments and authorities to cease all acts of armed force for a month. In resolution 54 (15 July 1948), the Council orders the parties, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter, to ‘desist from any further military action’. Moreover, the Council stated that parties that will not cease fighting will be in breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39, which may lead the Council to initiate action under Chapter VII against the offending party. 28 The 1973 Yom Kippur War offer a good example of this. With the war launched by the Arab states on 6 Oct. 1973, the Security Council adopted resolution 338 (22 Oct. 22, 1973) calling for a ceasefire, by which point the Israelis had moved from defense to offense, with Gen. Sharon cutting off the Egyptian Third Army and placing the IDF approximately 100 kilometers from Cairo. The resolution gave the belligerents 12 hours to terminate all military activity (Israel and Egypt signed a ceasefire on 24 Oct. 1973). Three days later the Council authorized the formation of the United Nations Emergency Force to monitor the ceasefire– Security Council resolution 340 (25 Oct. 1973). 29 ‘In Larger Freedoms: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights to all’, Report of the Secretary-General, 25 March 2005, UN Doc. A/59/2005; A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibilities: Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (New York: United Nations 2004); Cohen and Deng, ‘Exodus within Borders’(note 5)pp.12–16. 30 Boutros-Ghali argued, ‘when the established rules of engagement for peacekeeping operations are no longer sufficient, UN forces may need authorization to demonstrate a resolve to use force. If this is not effective, the situation may call for wider rules of engagement so that UN peacekeepers may react to force and, in some cases, use force to forestall an escalation in violence.’ Boutros-Ghali, ‘Beyond Peacekeeping’(note 19) p.120. 31 Security Council resolution 1272 dealing with East Timor declares that the Council, in view of what had transpired since the referendum on 30 Aug. 1999, decided to act under Chapter VII of the Charter and establish ‘a United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice’. Security Council resolution 1272, 25 Oct. 1999. Security Council resolution 1244, which deals with Kosovo, declares that the Council decided ‘on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences…’ The Council authorized the Secretary-General ‘to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.’ Security Council resolution 1244, 10 June 1999. 32 Alexandros Yanis, ‘Kosovo Under International Administration’ Survival43/ 2 (Summer 2001) pp.31–48; Marc Weller, ‘Kosovo 's Final Status,’ International Affairs84/ 6 (2008) pp.1223–43; Katsumi Ishizuka, ‘Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Experience of UNMISET’, International Peacekeeping, 10/ 3 (Autumn 2003) pp.44–59; Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, ‘Liberal Peacebuilding in Timor Leste: The Emperor’s New Clothes’, International Peacekeeping 15 2 (April 2008) pp.185–200; Alan Ryan, ‘The Strong Lead-nation Model in an ad hoc Coalition of the Willing: Operation Stabilise in East Timor’, International Peacekeeping9/ 1 (Spring 2002) pp.23–44; Michael J. Matheson, ‘United Nations Governance in Postconflict Societies’, The American Journal of International Law 95/ 1 (Jan. 2001) pp.76–85. 33 The typology is developed from Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press 2010); Boutros-Ghali, ‘Beyond Peacekeeping’(note 19), pp.113–22; Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens, ‘Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies’, International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2008), pp. 1-21; Alex J. Bellamy, ‘The “Next Stage” in Peace Operations Theory?’ International Peacekeeping 11/ 1 (Spring 2004) pp.17–38; Barnett et al., ‘Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?’(note 21), pp.35–58; Andrew Cottey, ‘Beyond Humanitarian Intervention: the New Politics of Peacekeeping and Intervention’, Contemporary Politics14/ 4 (Dec. 2008) pp.429–46; Yasushi Akashi, ‘The Use of Force in a United Nations Peace-Keeping Operation: Lessons Learnt from the Safe Areas Mandate’, Fordham International Law Journal. 19/ 2 (1995) pp.312–23. 34 Security Council resolution 1386 encapsulated the peacekeeping and peace-enforcing elements of ISAF, which were empowered ‘to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment’. Security Council resolution 1386, 20 Dec. 2001. 35 Lakhdar Brahimi, ‘Afghanistan: Prospects for the Future’, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. 4/ 2 (Summer–Fall 2003) p.81. 36 Ellen Laipson, the former Vice-Chairman of the US National Intelligence Council, claims that security sector reform ‘is for states that aspire to move along the continuum to democracy; it should not be confused with military modernisation intended to improve combat effectiveness only’. Ellen Laipson, ‘Prospects for Middle East Security Sector Reform’, Survival49/ 2 (2007) p.100. 37 Owing to the lack of security in Afghanistan, there is a continuous need to redefine and reshape the security pillar, as seen at the NATO meeting in Lisbon (2010) where some members of the alliance wanted a definite date for the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan while others wanted the withdrawal to be dependent on conditions. 38 Peter Dahl Thruelsen, ‘The Taliban in Southern Afghanistan: A Localised Insurgency with a Local Objective’, Small Wars & Insurgencies21/ 2 (June 2010) p.261. 39 The 2002 Military Technical Agreement signed between the Afghan Interim Authority and ISAF states that ISAF’s responsibility in the area of security, law and order means providing Afghans with protection from insurgents, criminal enterprises and other threats. ISAF has helped establish an Afghan National Army (ANA) as well as playing a central role in the development of an Afghan National Police (ANP). ‘International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan (‘Interim Administration’): Military Technical Agreement’, International Legal Materials41/ 5 (Sept. 2002) pp.1032–7. 40 These programs were to work in conjunction with the construction of the national army, in addition to the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) program, which involved UNDP working with the Afghan government and UNAMA to deal with threats posed by illegal armed groups. The objectives of the program in 2005 were: (1) To improve security through disarming and disbanding illegal armed groups; and (2) To provide basic development support to communities freed from threats posed by illegal armed groups. Accomplishing these objectives will permit social and economic development. ‘Disbandment of illegal armed groups: project document’, Government of Afghanistan, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, United Nations Development Program, 31 July 2005 <[ www.undp.org/cpr/documents/ddr/pro_docs/Project_Doc_PRODOC_DIAG_Jan._2005_-_June_2006.pdf>. 41 This is a principal philosophy behind the DIAG program. ibid. 42 ‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions’ [The Bonn Accords] 5 Dec. 2001 <[http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/Bonn-agreement.pdf>. 43 Larry P. Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Reconstruction’, Journal of Democracy. 14/ 1 (Jan. 2003) pp.82–99; Larry P. Goodson, ‘Afghanistan in 2004: Electoral Progress and an Opium Boom,’ Asian Survey45/ 1 (Jan.–Feb. 2004) pp.88–97. 44 Larry Goodson, who spent time in Afghanistan in 2004, recognizes that there was much to do, but his review emphasizes the level of optimism that many people felt about the country, especially around the time of the elections. Goodson, ‘Afghanistan in 2004’ (note 43). 45 MajorGeneral Roger Lane, former Deputy Commander Operations ISAF VIII (2005–2006) and Emma Sky, a former advisor to the ISAF Commander (2005–2006), have stated that a PRT ‘is essentially a military structure’ but, owing to the complexity of stability operations, a civilian element has been added. Roger Lane and Emma Sky, ‘The Role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Stabilization’, The RUSI Journal151/ 3 (June/July 2006) p. 48. 46 Touko Piiparinen, ‘A Clash of Mindsets? An Insider’s Account of Provincial Reconstruction Teams’, International Peacekeeping 14/ 1 (2007) pp.143–57; Matthew Jackson and Stuart Gordon, ‘Rewiring Interventions? UK Provincial Reconstruction Teams and “Stabilization”’, International Peacekeeping14/ 5 (2007) pp.647–61; Nik Hynek and Jan Eichler, ‘The Czech Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan: Context, Experiences and Politics’, Defence Studies10/ 3 (Sept. 2010) pp.405–30; Kenneth Holland, ‘The Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team: The Arm of Development in Kandahar Province’, American Review of Canadian Studies. 40/ 2 (June 2010) p.278; George Dimitriu and Beatrice de Graaf, ‘The Dutch COIN Approach: Three Years in Uruzgan, 2006–2009’, Small Wars & Insurgency21/ 3 (Sept. 2010) pp.429–58. 47 ANDS is closely linked to UNAMA. ‘United Nations Development Assistance Framework: In Support of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 2010–2013’. <http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Publication/UNDAF%20English.pdf>, ‘Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 2008–2013: A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction’, [<www.embassyofafghanistan.org/documents/Afghanistan_National_Development_Strategy_eng.pdf>. 48 ‘Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 2008–2013’, ibid.’ 49 Andrew C. Kuchins, Thomas M. Sanderson and David A. Gordon argue that building a modern Silk Road – the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) – in which Afghanistan will be a linchpin due to its geography, ‘could promote security, prosperity, and connectivity within some of the most volatile, impoverished, and isolated nations on the planet’. Andrew C. Kuchins, Thomas M. Sanderson and David A. Gordon, ‘Afghanistan: Building the Missing Link in the Modern Silk Road’, Washington Quarterly 33/ 2 (2010) p.39. 50 Priscilla B. Hayner, ‘Fifteen Truth Commissions – 1974–1994: A Comparative Study’, Human Rights Quarterly16/4 (Nov. 1994) pp.597–655; Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York: Routledge 2010). 51 Barnett Rubin recounts he overheard a telephone conversation between Muhammad Yunus Qanuni, head of the Northern Alliance delegation in Bonn, and leaders of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan who insisted that the paragraph dealing with the prohibition of amnesty be removed from the agreement. Barnett R. Rubin, ‘Transitional Justice and Human Rights in Afghanistan’, International Affairs79/ 3 (2003) pp.570–1. On the importance of Brahimi in the Bonn negotiation, see Simon Chesterman, ‘Walking Softly in Afghanistan: the Future of UN State-Building’, Survival44/ 3 (2002) pp. 37–45. 52 Thomas J. Barfield, ‘On Local Justice and Culture in Post-Taliban Afghanistan’, Connecticut Journal of International Law17/ 3 (Summer 2002) p.442. 53 As Bonn was taking place, CIA units and US Special Forces were operating with Afghan warlords to track down, capture and kill senior Al-Qaeda activists and Taliban leaders. Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker, The Attack on bin Laden and Al-Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA’s Key Field Officer (New York: Three Rivers Press 2005); George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: The CIA during America’s Time of Crisis (New York: Harper Perennial 2008); Robin Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden: Task Force Dagger (New York: Random House 2003). 54 Thomas Barfield notes an ethnographic cliché in the region: ‘It is me against my brothers; it is my brothers and me against our cousins; and it is our cousins, my brothers and me against the world.’ Thomas J. Barfield, ‘Problems in Establishing Legitimacy in Afghanistan’, Iranian Studies. 37/ 2 (2004) p.266. 55 Louis Dupree, ‘Settlement and Migration Patterns in Afghanistan: A Tentative Statement’, Modern Asian Studies. 9/ 3 (1975) p.411. 56 Louis Dupree, ‘Afghanistan in 1983: And Still No Solution’, Asian Survey24/ 2 (Feb. 1983) p.233. 57 Oher examples are Yunis Khan’s Hezb-i-Islami Khalis (Party of Islam), which was Sunni as well as Ghilzai Pashtun; Addal-Rab al-Rasul Sayyaf led Ittihad-i-Islami Bara-i-Azadi Afghanistan (Islamic Unity), a Sunni Pashtun based movement. Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History (London: Perennial 2002) pp.213–216. 58 There is less evidence of what occurred in the Afghan refugee camps in Iran, which is why the issue is not addressed in this paper. 59 Eden Naby, ‘Islam within the Afghan Resistance’, Third World Quarterly10/ 2 (April 1988), pp. 787–805; Dupree, ‘Afghanistan in 1983’ (note 56)pp.229–39; Marvin G. Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1994); Mary Anne Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux 2003). 60 Ashraf Ghani, ‘Islam and State-Building in a Tribal Society: Afghanistan: 1880–1901’, Modern Asian Studies12/2 (1978) pp.269–84; Michael Bhatia, ‘The Future of the Mujahedeen: Legitimacy, Legacy and Demobilization in Post-Bonn Afghanistan’, International Peacekeeping. 14/ 1 (Jan. 2007) pp.90–107; Ahmed Rashid, ‘Afghanistan: Progress Since the Taliban’, Asian Affairs37/ 1 (March 2006) pp.31–5. 61 Graeme Smith, ‘What Kandahar’s Taliban Say’, in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field (New York: Columbia UP2009) p.199; Rodric Braithwaite, ‘Afghan Diary.’ Survival51/ 1 (Feb.–March 2009) pp.99–118. 62 Gen. Stanley McChrystal when he was the commander of ISAF accepted this concept. See Aryn Baker, ‘TIME’s Interview with General Stanley McChrystal’, TIME Magazine, 8 July 2009. 63 Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, ‘The Taliban troop with an East London cab driver in its ranks,’ The Guardian, 25 Nov. 2010; Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, ‘Five days inside a Taliban jail’, The Guardian, 26 Nov. 2010; Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, ‘Talking to the Taliban about life after occupation,’ The Guardian, 27 Nov. 2010. 64 Thomas Barfield, writing about justice in Afghanistan, notes that a common assumption in modern states is that when a crime occurs it is for the state to try the alleged criminals and punish them if they are found guilty. This, however, is not the case in Afghanistan, where local and community loyalties are more important than loyalty to the state. Barfield, ‘On Local Justice and Culture in Post-Taliban Afghanistan’(note 52) pp.438–41. 65 Barnett Rubin notes that Lakhdar Brahimi, who chaired the Bonn talks as Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Special Representative was more intent on the outcome and less on the representative aspect, as Brahimi maintained that history would ignore whether the meeting was unrepresentative and focus on the fact that it fashioned a process that led to a legitimate and representative government. Barnett R. Rubin, ‘Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan’, Journal of Democracy15/ 3 (July 2004) p.7. 66 Gary Berntsen’s book on the role that the CIA played in the initial invasion of Afghanistan makes this clear as Berntsen and his team worked with some groups and not others. Berntsen and Pezzullo, Jawbreaker, The Attack on bin Laden and Al-Qaeda (note 53). Seth G. Jones, ‘The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad’, International Security32/ 4 (2008) pp.7–40. 67 Jason Burke and Peter Beaumont, ‘West pays warlords to stay in line’, The Observer, 21 July 2002, <www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jul/21/afghanistan.peterbeaumont>.Another example of a local powerbroker rising to prominence following the invasion is Gul Agha Shirzai, the former Governor of Kandahar Province who had also served as Governor of Nangarhar Province. During the DDR program, Shirzai integrated his militia into the Afghan National Police, though in reality Shirzai was and remains a local powerbroker whose interests lie in protecting his own interests. Declan Walsh, ‘Strange victories in poppy province’, The Guardian, 5 Oct. 2006, <www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/oct/05/worlddispatch.afghanistan>; Jason Burke, ‘Even as the Afghan war rages, the talking starts’, The Guardian, 22 March 2009; Jason Burke, ‘The future of Afghanistan,’ The Guardian, 14 Aug. 2009, <www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/aug/14/afghanistan-election>. 68 Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Shadow Ownership and SSR in Afghanistan’, in Timothy Donais (ed.), Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform (Zurich: Lit 2008) pp.216–20; Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Bureaucratic Façade and Political Realities of Disarmament and Demobilisation in Afghanistan’, Conflict, Security & Development8/ 2 (2008) pp.169–92. 69 Antonio Giustozzi, ‘The Afghan National Army’, The RUSI Journal154/ 6 (Nov./Dec. 2009) p. 39. 70 Jon Boone, ‘Afghan President Hamid Karzai picks ex-warlord as election running mate’ The Guardian.co.uk, 4 May 2009, <www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/04/afghanistan-president-hamid-karzai-election>. 71 The duties of the arbakai are three-fold: implement decisions of the Jirga; maintain law and order; and protect and defend the borders and boundaries of the tribe and the community. Mohammad Osman Tariq, ‘Community-based Security and Justice: Arbakai in Afghanistan’, IDS Bulletin40/ 2 (2009) pp.20–7. 72 Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Leaked Afghanistan files reveal corruption and drug-dealing’, The Guardian, 27 July 2010; ‘Police Perception Survey, 2009: The Afghan Perspective’, Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) Surveys, Kabul, UNDP (Kabul 2009), <www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/PolicePerceptionSurvey09.pdf> 73 Article 16 of the Afghan Constitution recognizes Dari and Pashtu as the offic" @default.
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• W2068345647 title "‘Peacebuilding’ in Afghanistan: A Bridge Too Far?1" @default.
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