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W2075150151 abstract "During the second half of the nineteenth century Latin American countries were engaged in a railroad expansion program that drastically altered the role of the state, modified the organization of social and economic institutions, and required massive inflows of foreign investment. Although scholars have analyzed some of these issues, little attention has been paid to the difficulties involved in the adaptation of large modern railroad corporations to the conditions characteristic of less-developed countries. The purpose of this article is to portray the experience of the largest American enterprise that operated in Mexico during the nineteenth century. This experience will also allow us to illustrate some important peculiarities of railroad development in Mexico with respect to other Latin American countries.The period from 1850 to 1880 is generally considered to be the first stage of railroad construction in Latin America1; however, Mexico lacked the material as well as the political conditions either to finance railroad expansion or to attract foreign investment during these years. As a result, the construction of railroads began relatively late in Mexico, and Mexican entrepreneurs did not play a leading role in this industry.2 Mexico also differed from other Latin American countries in other respects: repeated default on loan payments and the rupture of diplomatic relations with most European powers in 1867 kept Mexico isolated from the international financial community up until the 1880s; by the time Mexico created conditions for the foreign financing of railroads, the competition for resources in the international capital markets had tightened, forcing the Mexican state to grant monetary subsidies instead of profit guarantees; and Mexico enjoyed a unique geographic location, sharing a large border with the United States, the fastest growing economy of the world.In short, timing, political issues, and geographic location determined the sources of capital available for railroad ventures in Mexico. Thus while most Latin American countries relied on British resources to build and finance their railroad networks, Mexico enjoyed access to two capital markets for railroad construction: Great Britain and the United States. British companies built the main railroad lines in central Mexico, while U.S. interests played a leading role in the expansion of railroads in northern Mexico, from the American border to Mexico City. On the other hand, the nature of British and U.S. enterprises also differed. Most British railroads in Mexico and other Latin American countries were built and managed by freestanding companies, that is, companies that “did not grow out of the domestic operations of existing enterprises that had headquarters in Britain.”3 As for American investment in Mexican railroads, timing and geographical proximity to the United States also influenced the type of organization that was created to support the construction of railroads.4 The rail lines that connected Mexico with the United States were typically a spillover of lines built by American railroad corporations that sought an expansion beyond their national boundaries.5 Although formally independent, these railroad companies were organized, owned, and initially managed (directly or through interlocking directorates) by U.S. railroad enterprises, and were often regarded as part of the latter’s expansion schemes.The existing literature on foreign railroads in Latin America addresses issues related to ownership, profitability, and state participation. Yet few studies have shown how economic and institutional constraints posed obstacles to the adaptation and efficient operation of large railroad enterprises in less-developed countries. By neglecting this issue, it has been implicitly assumed that the economic benefits of railroads depended on the quality of their construction, management, and tariff policy. Accordingly, all the possible flaws would originate within the firm, as if the economy in which the railroad operated was an absolutely responsive environment that did not offer the slightest resistance to the innovation. In contrast to this view, I argue that economic and institutional constraints had an adverse impact on the operation and economic impact of railroads in nineteenth-century Mexico. My concern relates to the more general issue of foreign investment and technology transfer into developing countries in which adaptation to different cultural, social, and economic conditions is key to entrepreneurial success.My principal argument is that Mexico’s economic backwardness and inadequate institutional framework constrained the efficient performance of the most important railroad company in the country. This article seeks to identify some of the difficulties inherent in the adaptation of a large railroad enterprise in Mexico by examining how the Mexican Central Railroad (hereafter MCR) responded to some economic and institutional constraints that hindered its successful operation and development. MCR was founded in 1880 by an American railroad corporation, the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad (hereafter ATSF), as the first large American spillover investment in Mexico. The company incorporated the latest technical as well as organizational innovations available at the time in the American railroad sector. Thus the difficulties MCR faced in Mexico show that the transfer of railroad technology was a very complex process that involved much more than the import of locomotives and rails. In order to adapt to the Mexican setting, the company had to develop strategies that required large financial resources and strong managerial capabilities, and to ensure that their polices were flexible enough to adjust to the peculiar features of the Mexican market.Due to its size and its place within the Mexican economy, MCR was the dominant and most significant part of the railroad industry; however, it would be incorrect to consider it as the typical railroad enterprise in Mexico. While British concerns were freestanding companies from the beginning, U.S.-based firms were initially controlled by railroad corporations operating in the United States. Whereas path dependence was not an issue in the first case, it played a crucial role in the definition of growth and managerial strategies of U.S.-owned companies. Several U.S.-owned companies in Mexico managed to retain some characteristic features of American railroads, even though this practice was mitigated by the growing presence of British interests in their ownership.6 Furthermore, MCR was linked to one of the leading railroad enterprises in the United States, one that played an important role in the American business revolution and in the transition toward big modern corporations. Even when MCR became a freestanding company, it remained under the control of U.S. investors until 1907. For these reasons, it would be more accurate to suggest that this article deals with the railroad enterprise that better represents the peculiarities of the Mexican experience within the Latin American context.Mexican Central Railroad began as a large railroad company, which in less than ten years (1880–1889) built a 1,200 miles-long-line from Mexico City to El Paso and another line that connected Mexico City to the Gulf of Mexico at the port of Tampico. These projects were essentially “developmental” investments7; the rail lines were constructed in underdeveloped areas that were sparsely populated and followed a path that was well known in the American west. After a challenging decade during which construction slackened, MCR resumed a rapid pace of growth by either constructing more lines or buying out smaller companies. Despite an uneven performance and rather poor marginal returns, in the face of competitive pressures MCR launched an aggressive program of territorial expansion designed to monopolize some of the main routes of traffic. By 1905 MCR owned or controlled about 3,500 miles of rail lines, more than a quarter of the Mexican railroad system, and handled 33 percent of the freight business of the country. It became the largest corporation and the biggest employer ever in Mexico. It held this position until 1907, when the Mexican government bought a majority share of its stocks and saved the company from bankruptcy.This article addresses the following questions: What factors influenced MCR’s strategies during its development as a private enterprise? Was path dependence inevitable because the company inherited a system-building strategy from its owner in the United States? Do the company’s strategies reflect its creative efforts to adapt to the Mexican economy? I use two different theoretical approaches to explore these issues. Alfred Chandler’s contribution to the study of organizations and the emergence of modern big business enterprise is useful to explain the growth strategy followed by ATSF and other large railroad corporations within the United States, as well as MCR’s growth pattern in Mexico. According to Chandler, system building within the American railroad industry was designed to manage increasing flows of traffic in an efficient manner. Since the economic, social, and political conditions in Mexico differed greatly from those in the United States, I use Douglass North’s work on new institutional theory to illustrate how and to what extent these conditions influenced MCR’s performance and growth schemes.This article is divided into four sections. The first part describes two patterns of development followed by railroad enterprises in Mexico and the United States during the late nineteenth century. The second section identifies the obstacles posed by an environment of economic and institutional backwardness to the adaptation of big railroad enterprises in Mexico. The third and fourth parts analyze the case of MCR. Section three focuses on various growth strategies adopted by the company in its attempts to adapt itself to the Mexican setting; section four discusses the correlation between the company’s strategies and changes in the firm’s ownership. The epilogue includes some concluding remarks and comments on the final outcome of MCR’s story.Once a railroad line has been constructed, the crucial issue (and the key to its success) is obtaining freight for its trains.8 Railway companies usually establish connections with complementary transportation (highway, fluvial, maritime) networks and other railroad companies, and the transactions are carried out through the market.9 The use of alternative forms of surface transportation and cooperation with other railroad companies are ideal solutions in the context of an efficient market because companies are able to obtain freight without incurring additional construction, administrative, or maintenance costs. However, the lack of cooperation with other railway companies or allied transportation services, and an inefficient legal or institutional framework can impede the functioning of market-based solutions.10Under particular circumstances, businesses internalize certain operations that are normally carried out through the market.11 For example, during their formative years, many railroad companies resorted to a soft or first degree form of internalization through the construction of branch lines. These lines replaced the small grid of local roads which would normally have supported the railway network by giving it depth and density at the local level. When the road grid was unable to meet the demands of railway companies branch lines seemed to be the perfect substitute; they supplied the trains with cargo at a low cost. Some scholars have referred to this form of expansion as a territorial policy,12 which eventually led to the growth of dense railway networks within well-defined territorial boundaries. It combined a capacity for supplying freight through the internalization of operations with opportunities for cooperation with other businesses and surface transportation services. This strategy allowed companies to achieve “in-depth growth.”Sometimes railroad companies employed a severe or second degree form of internalization. This strategy was usually used when market operations were blocked by the absence of alternative transportation services or failure to cooperate with other railway companies because the costs of market transactions were greater than the costs of internalization. The latter implied the construction of large railway systems, frequently invading other companies’ territory and buying out potential competitors.13 It allowed railroad companies to achieve economies of scale while substantially reducing the high transaction costs involved in the operation within an inefficient market.14 It was this second degree of internalization that eventually led to the strategy of system building or the development of an interterritorial, self-sufficient railway network.15In the United States and Mexico, the genesis of railroad enterprises that adopted this expansion policy often shared some basic features, although to varying degrees. Some of them were characterized by extensive lines laid in remote areas. Because the construction of these lines preceded their demand, the company’s chances of obtaining freight through market mechanisms were severely restricted; the absence of supporting surface transportation services and links with other railroad companies aggravated the situation. Furthermore, because construction preceded demand, companies often depended on some form of government subsidy in order to balance social and private rates of return. The competition for government subsidies impaired cooperation among railroad companies.In contrast to the soft internalization through the construction of branches, system building required drastic internalization of market operations that increased the company’s operating costs. It also meant laying extensive rail lines beyond the original territory by either penetrating sparsely populated areas or invading other companies’ domains. Beside the initial construction costs, system building involved considerable operational and maintenance expenses and usually offered very low marginal profits. It appears that companies promoted interterritorial expansion as a defensive measure in order to survive in a highly competitive environment.16Companies that engaged in system building also encouraged, to varying degrees, the soft form of internalization by laying branch lines. Thus relatively dense feeder systems were constructed in the eastern United States and central Mexico at the same time that isolated branches linked trunk lines with mining or agricultural zones. Large American companies used both strategies of growth—they penetrated the core zones with a dense grid, and subsequently expanded their operations outside their original territory. However, system building proved to be so costly that companies often had no funds to construct a dense network of branch lines. When this was the case, system building became a company’s sole option, resulting in a temporary or definitive suspension of the construction of a feeder grid. The extent to which this happened depended on the company’s financial capacity, on the strength of competitive pressures, and on the market potential of the territory involved. Thus system building frequently resulted in growth in overall extension, which more or less sacrificed depth of penetration.In discussing the evolution of the American railroad industry, Alfred Chandler explains the reasons why, after a certain point, U.S. railroad companies internalized operations and expanded their rail lines outside their original territory. This occurred when the increasing volume of business they carried made the old mechanisms of cooperation and market transactions costly and inefficient. Under the new circumstances, cooperation with other railroad companies was not enough to ensure that traffic would move rapidly, regularly, and efficiently through the railroad system as a whole. In response to the new challenges of a more complex and rapidly growing economy, some railroad enterprises, especially those that eventually became the largest in the United States, adopted the strategy of system building. They grew at the expense of smaller companies, invading other railroads’ territory and pursuing the constitution of self-sufficient systems.17At two different points between 1880 and 1907, MCR, the largest U.S.-owned railroad enterprise in Mexico, adopted system building as its growth strategy. There are at least two possible explanations for this: First, MCR inherited system building along with the technical and organizational traits that characterized the American corporation that created it. In other words, path dependence forced MCR to adopt a growth strategy without taking into consideration the peculiarities of the Mexican setting. Second, system building was an adaptive response to the context in which the company had to operate. The critical feature of this context was not an overwhelming increase in “the volume of economic activities,” as in the United States,18 but rather the persistence of inefficient markets and high transaction costs.19 These conditions compelled the company to internalize transactions previously carried out through market mechanisms, that is, to grow. Thus the impulse toward hierarchical organization stemmed more from the need to reduce costs involved in market transactions than from a need to efficiently coordinate flows within a complex economy.According to Hirschman’s classic formulation, railroads, the principal form of social overhead capital in the nineteenth century, should have had “a supporting rather than a leading role in the process of economic development.”20 Railroads would have been in a better position to contribute to economic growth if they had been built to overcome a scarcity that blocked economic activity rather than trying to stimulate economic activity through excess capacity. Mexico, like other developing countries, imported railroad technology in the belief that technological innovation per se was responsible for the success of developed economies; “ironically, however, they were substituting a policy of development by excess for what had been development by shortage in the developed country.”21 This pattern had far-reaching implications for the Mexican economy in general, and railroad construction in particular.Railroad enterprises in Mexico confronted many of the difficulties that characterized the introduction of modern business in developing countries. Some of the obstacles stemmed from a deficient legal framework and the limited enforcement capabilities of the state. This is evident from the frequent conflicts between private companies and local authorities. The way officials applied customs laws frequently hindered cross-border traffic affecting the interconnection of the U.S. and Mexican portions of the rail lines. The inefficiency of the legal system interfered with the administration of “impartial justice without delay,” bogging down projects and rail operations in a sea of disputes and often indecipherable jurisdictions.22 Most private enterprises in nineteenth-century Mexico faced similar difficulties that arose from a deficient institutional framework and the inability of the state to effectively enforce laws.23 My concern here, however, is to explain the particular obstacles that affected railroad companies as businesses dedicated to the transportation of goods and people.24The main obstacles faced by railroad companies were poor infrastructure and lack of cooperation with other railroad companies and complementary surface transportation services. These hurdles diminished the efficiency of market solutions to the problem of supplying the trains with cargo, and this forced some of the railroad companies to reorient their business strategies. The absence of efficient, regular, and regulated surface transportation services was one of the greatest impediments. In Mexico there were no navigable rivers, and the highway system constructed during the colonial period had suffered from many years of destruction, deterioration, and abandonment which often led to a regression: from the highway to the path; from the cart to the mule.25 Although the war of independence has been blamed for the destruction of colonial roads, it seems that their deterioration had begun even earlier. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Alexander von Humboldt described the principal trade route in New Spain: “the road from Veracruz is often no more than a wide and torturous path and we could hardly find another one as arduous in all of America …”26 Five decades later, the conditions of this road, the most important international trade route in the country, remained precarious as an official 1857 report illustrates: “The works on this section (Mexico–Puebla) have been reduced to only the most indispensable for keeping it passable, to the degree possible with the tools available … In spite of what has been done, the roadway is not totally finished, but it is being used, which is enough to ensure that communication between this capital and Veracruz is not blocked during the rainy season.”27In the fifty years after independence in 1821, civil strife, foreign invasions, and precarious public finances were the principal causes of the destruction and abandonment of Mexican roads.28 Toward the last third of the nineteenth century, only the central region of the country and the zone that separates the capital from the main ports had a minimal supply of highways. The vast northern territory, as well as the southeast and the Yucatán peninsula (in other words, almost two thirds of the national territory) were barely connected to the political, economic, and administrative center of Mexico.29 By the mid-1870s, the country had fewer than 6,000 miles of roads, only half of which were passable by carts.30 Furthermore, once the state engaged in the promotion of railroads, public resources and efforts were so concentrated on railroad development that investment in road construction was nearly halted.31 The highway system barely grew at all during the Porfirian regime (1876–1911) from 2,000 to 2,500 miles. This is a poor achievement both in absolute terms and in comparison to other economies of similar characteristics, as Spain and Italy. In those countries, railroad expansion was accompanied by government-sponsored efforts to build roads and highways that led to the construction of more than 12,000 miles between 1850 and 1890.32 Needless to say, this highway endowment served territories that were, respectively, four and six times smaller than Mexico’s.In addition to the problem of the dimensions of the highway system, structural flaws existed. Most roads were seasonal and subject to multiple contingencies, such as road tolls, municipal fees, banditry, and state and municipal transit regulations.33 More than half the “roads” were merely bridle paths, and another quarter regressed to that state during the rainy season. These precarious conditions of the highway system may have limited its utility as a supplier for railroad companies, but this did not obstruct the development of links between the two means of surface transportation; however, institutional obstacles widened the gap and reduced the possibility of cooperation between them. Transportation by muleteers and wagons was neither standardized nor subject to public regulation. Similarly, there was a lack of an established tariff system and general conditions for the transportation of goods beyond what the interested parties defined in each case. The local traffic that was to feed the railroads was irregular and frequently followed non-permanent routes; many of the “carriers” were merely peasants doing a temporary job. The links between the railroad and such a highway system entailed risks, difficulties, and costs that were doubtfully compensated for by a scarce and irregular supply of freight. To improve connections, railroad companies should have kept many stations open permanently, but this would have increased maintenance and administrative costs. There is a convincing proof that MCR considered such expenditure inefficient: at the beginning of the twentieth century, the company had traffic agents in only 47 percent of the stations in its system, which was the most extensive and important in the country.34 In the remaining 238 stations, MCR was unable to receive freight (unless an agent was expressly called), which gives a fairly good idea of the extent to which railroad traffic may have been fed by alternative carriers.The second obstacle that deterred a market solution to the problems of supplying the railroad with cargo stemmed from the diverse circumstances blocking cooperation among the railroad companies themselves. During its first decades in existence, the Mexican railroad system was characterized by a technological and regulatory heterogeneity that seriously impeded cooperation, in a context where the struggle over scarce and concentrated traffic reinforced competitive pressures. Until 1902, when the gauge of the principal lines began to be standardized (a process still incomplete at the start of the Mexican Revolution in 1910), about 60 percent of the rail grid had standard-sized rail lines, and the other 40 percent were narrow. MCR used standard gauge, while its primary competitor, the Mexican National Railroad, used narrow gauge.35 This technical problem was not satisfactorily resolved in spite of the fact that, as Chandler points out, the physical connection between the railroads was the easiest thing to achieve. Far more complicated was to create “standard operating procedures that would allow the flow of traffic and passengers through various connected lines.”36 An overall standardizing of railroad operations would entail uniform classifications and tariffs, complementary schedules, direct routes, and clear regulations as to the provision of services; in brief, a general regulatory framework that, if not uniform, would at least be compatible among the different companies.In countries where the railroad was introduced early, the availability of complementary transportation and greater technical and institutional conditions conducive to cooperation among the railroad companies delayed the formation of large, self-sufficient systems.37 In those cases, the shift toward system building took place in response to competitive pressures and difficulties in efficiently coordinating increased traffic flows, which combined to block cooperation among the railroad companies and forced them toward internalization. After an era of inter-company cooperation and competition, market transactions (through agreements, freight exchange, joint use of rail lines, etc.) became inefficient in the view of the large railroad corporations’ managers. By the mid-1880s, it seemed preferable to incur the costs of building an inter-territorial system than to expend resources in negotiating a traffic agreement, which “is always uncertain and unsatisfactory, wanting in that permanent character necessary to secure our interests and dependent upon continuance of harmonious relations between roads whose interests might at any moment come into antagonism.”38 Additionally, enforcement was difficult, “since the law sees these contracts with displeasure, as harmful to the public interest.”39 Nevertheless, the change of emphasis that led to the construction of systems did not interrupt efforts at cooperation. The process of standardization of the railroad system that began in the United States in the 1850s, reached, at the beginning of the twentieth century, a point at which “the various lines made up an intimately connected transportation system in which traffic moves almost as freely as if it were under the absolute control of one director.”40In Mexico, in contrast, the institutional conditions for coordination and cooperation among railroad companies developed late and unevenly. Government measures to promote or at least regulate cooperation hardly existed. For example, the original concession charters failed to anticipate the issue of joint shipments and cargo exchanges.41 Until 1898 there was an absolute disparity in the areas of tariffs and classifications. The publication of a uniform tariff in that year did not overcome the problem, because each company retained the faculty to establish its own tariff scale and classification of freight. Only in 1899 the first general law on railroads was promulgated, and even then most of the issues involved in inter-company cooperation were barely addressed, if not flatly neglected.42 In fact, the law contemplated only two aspects of this question, namely, the use of direct tariffs for through traffic, and, in an ambiguous way, the way liability was to be held by either carrier.43 This same law legalized de facto traffic agreements among companies a posteriori. Although the public and the government overrated their importance, traffic-pooling agreements among railroad companies remained scarce and limited in their scope. The only important and relatively long-lasting agreement, signed by the five largest carriers, was restricted to European freight directed to a few competitive points, and even this accord was repeatedly broken due to disagreements among the parties involved.44The two obstacles of poor infrastructure and poor conditions for cooperation blocked the railroad’s potential impact on the Mexican economy. The difficulty in linking it with the existing road system restricted the railroad’s sphere of influence to a few miles around the tracks,45 limited the volume of available freight, and contributed to the concentration of business in a small number of stations, with a resulting imbalance in the management of the lines." @default.
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W2075150151 title "Economic Backwardness and Firm Strategy: An American Railroad Corporation in Nineteenth-Century Mexico" @default.
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