FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2076168892> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2076168892 endingPage "269" @default.
• W2076168892 startingPage "264" @default.
• W2076168892 abstract "Reviewed by: From Mao to Market Marion E. Jones (bio) Andrew H. Wedeman . From Mao to Market. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xiii, 277 pp. $60.00, ISBN 0-521-80960-6. Andrew H. Wedeman's book makes the case for the preeminent importance of price reform and institutional conditions in China's rapid growth through the transition period and the relative completeness of the Chinese economic transition process. He does this by arguing that local protectionism was not merely an unintended consequence of Deng Xiaoping's reforms—and not just a minor inconvenience—but rather a struggle of epic proportions for control over commodity production between household farms, individual speculators, and producers [End Page 264] and the local, provincial, and central governments. Indeed it was this sedition that ushered in the market economy and defeated command prices. Thus, local protectionism was key to propelling the Chinese economy past the pitfalls of incremental reform that have entrapped so many countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, because it prevented the rise of early winners and their halting of the transition process due to the protection of their vested interests, as so eloquently described by Stiglitz, through rent seeking, endemic corruption, and influence peddling.1 There are some key differences in the make-up of the Chinese economy under the planned economy that made this possible. Most important of these was Maoist self-reliance, which meant that during the reform process, at the provincial, county, and even township (commune) levels, there were firms ready to compete in the reawakened markets for agricultural produce, sideline products, handicrafts, and even manufactured goods. The Dengist preconditions that made this autarky possible were interregional trade and interdependence instead of excessive local self-sufficiency; partial de-monopolization of internal commerce, producing interregional markets; fiscal and property-rights changes that turned local governments into economic actors; and, finally, dual-track pricing, which produced numerous rent-seeking opportunities for local governments as economic actors. Additionally, export protectionism was a function of the post-1985 shift in the price scissors against agriculture and raw materials, once again in favor of industrial outputs, pitting local economic actors on the wrong side of the price scissors against those on the right side. In this climate of ready-made competition, we see a balancing of top-down forces—policy instruments—and bottom-up forces—grassroots actions—helping to propel reform forward. This gave rise to a more populist reform process, where the general population had a much greater vested interest in both reform and production than in many other transitional economies. I would argue that this greater buy-in was crucial—a point that Wedeman skirts around. Wedeman stresses the crucial role of rent-seeking behavior by procurement agents in price manipulation. For example, theft by distribution agents would have been simple embezzlement without any significant impact on price, while attempts to monetize rent on the black market by manufacturing agents would only have had limited impact on output prices. It is therefore rent seeking by procurement agents that led to the rapid changes in input prices, as they monetized their rent by setting up their own local production facilities and selling the finished product on the open/black market, or by directly diverting the inputs onto the open/black market for commodities themselves, thereby capturing rents that would normally flow to the center. This caused the entire edifice of planned procurement and marketing to collapse, and left manufacturing and distribution agents no choice but to engage in a bidding war for the raw materials at their source (cf. p. 80). [End Page 265] As agriculture was at the root of this reform process, and agricultural price reform in the vanguard, it is most refreshing to see such a central place given to four key commodity price wars as an illustration of the see-saw between top-down and bottom-up forces in pushing forward both economic reform and economic growth—and arguably functioning very much like market adjustments toward equilibrium with first undershooting and then overshooting in the markets. Wedeman poses two central questions. The first is Why did China escape dysfunctional partial reform despite a political equilibrium that..." @default.
• W2076168892 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W2076168892 creator A5041602328 @default.
• W2076168892 date "2005-01-01" @default.
• W2076168892 modified "2023-10-17" @default.
• W2076168892 title "From Mao to Market (review)" @default.
• W2076168892 cites W2032899120 @default.
• W2076168892 doi "https://doi.org/10.1353/cri.2005.0139" @default.
• W2076168892 hasPublicationYear "2005" @default.
• W2076168892 type Work @default.
• W2076168892 sameAs 2076168892 @default.
• W2076168892 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W2076168892 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W2076168892 hasAuthorship W2076168892A5041602328 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConcept C124952713 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConcept C136264566 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConcept C138921699 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConcept C139719470 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConcept C142362112 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConcept C191935318 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConcept C22241219 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConcept C2779439359 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConcept C2780027415 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConcept C2780668109 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConcept C34447519 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConcept C47941915 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConceptScore W2076168892C124952713 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConceptScore W2076168892C136264566 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConceptScore W2076168892C138921699 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConceptScore W2076168892C139719470 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConceptScore W2076168892C142362112 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConceptScore W2076168892C162324750 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConceptScore W2076168892C17744445 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConceptScore W2076168892C191935318 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConceptScore W2076168892C199539241 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConceptScore W2076168892C22241219 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConceptScore W2076168892C2779439359 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConceptScore W2076168892C2780027415 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConceptScore W2076168892C2780668109 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConceptScore W2076168892C34447519 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConceptScore W2076168892C47941915 @default.
• W2076168892 hasConceptScore W2076168892C94625758 @default.
• W2076168892 hasIssue "1" @default.
• W2076168892 hasLocation W20761688921 @default.
• W2076168892 hasOpenAccess W2076168892 @default.
• W2076168892 hasPrimaryLocation W20761688921 @default.
• W2076168892 hasRelatedWork W1983634058 @default.
• W2076168892 hasRelatedWork W1992873006 @default.
• W2076168892 hasRelatedWork W2007331363 @default.
• W2076168892 hasRelatedWork W2007647389 @default.
• W2076168892 hasRelatedWork W2055822416 @default.
• W2076168892 hasRelatedWork W2329519085 @default.
• W2076168892 hasRelatedWork W2359712782 @default.
• W2076168892 hasRelatedWork W2973714838 @default.
• W2076168892 hasRelatedWork W4288067380 @default.
• W2076168892 hasRelatedWork W4298936479 @default.
• W2076168892 hasVolume "12" @default.
• W2076168892 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2076168892 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W2076168892 magId "2076168892" @default.
• W2076168892 workType "article" @default.