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• W2079074341 abstract "Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes I thank the editors of India Review and an anonymous reviewer for valuable comments and suggestions. Early versions of this paper were presented at the Annual Conference on South Asia, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1996 and Association of Asian Studies, Annual Meeting in Boston, April 1999. Comments from John Echeverri-Gent, Ron Herring, Mary Katzenstein, Mathew Rudolphs, Baldev Raj Nayar, Lloyd Rudolph, Susanne Rudolph, Lawrence Saez, Anindya Saha, and Ashutosh Varshney greatly improved the final product. Discussions with Sanjaya Baru, N. Chandra Mohan, Indira Rajaraman, and Rohit Saran were useful. The data presented were collected in 1997–98 and 2001 during field research in Ahmedabad, Chennai, Mumbai, Calcutta, and Delhi. 1 Rob Jenkins, Democratic Politics and Economic Reform in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 172–207. 2 Initially, scholarship on economic reforms focused primarily at the national level. For important works in this genre see John Harriss, “The State in Retreat: Why Has India Experienced Such Half-Hearted Liberalization in the 1980s,” IDS Bulletin Vol. 18, No. 4 (October 1987), pp. 29–36; Atul Kohli, “Politics of Economic Liberalization in India,” World Development Vol. 17, No. 3 (March 1989), pp. 305–28; Pradeep Agrawal et al., eds., Economic Restructuring in East Asia and India: Perspectives and Policy Reform (London: Macmillian, 1995); Richard Cassen and Vijay Joshi, eds., The Future of Economic Reform (Oxford University Press, 1995); Amit Bhaduri and Deepak Nayyar, The Intelligent's Person's Guide to Liberalization (New Delhi: Penguin, 1996); Vijay Joshi and I. M. D. Little, India's Economic Reforms, 1991–2001 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996; revised ed.,1999); Isher Ahluwalia and I. M. D. Little, India's Economic Reforms and Development (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999); Jeffrey D. Sachs, A. Varshney, and Nirupam Bajpai, eds., India in the Era of Economic Reforms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Ashutosh Varshney, “Mass Politics or Elite Politics?: India's Economic Reforms in Comparative Perspective,” in Sachs et al., eds., India in the Era of Economic Reforms, pp. 222–60; Jorgen Pederson, “Explaining Economic Liberalization in India: State and Society Perspectives,” World Development Vol. 28, No. 2 (February 2000), pp. 265–82; Baldev Raj Nayar, “Political Structure and India's Economic Reforms of the 1990s,” Pacific Affairs Vol. 71, No. 3 (Fall 1998), pp. 335–58, and Globalization and Nationalism: the Changing Balance in India's Economic Policy, 1950–2000 (New Delhi: Sage, 2001); Stuart Corbridge and John Harriss, Reinventing India: Liberalization, Hindu Nationalism, and Popular Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2000); John Degnbol-Martinussen, Policies, Institutions, and Industrial Development: Coping With Liberalization and International Competition in India (New Delhi: Sage, 2001); and N. S. S. Narayana, Economic Policy and State Intervention: Selected papers of T. N. Srinivasan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001). 3 Although many scholars argue that slow movement and too little change characterizes India's reforms. See Joshi and Little, India's Economic Reform. Pranab Bardhan seems to concur (The Political Economy of Development in India, Expanded Edition (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998)). 4 Lawrence Saez, Federalism Without a Center: The Impact of Political and Economic Reform on India's Federal System (New Delhi: Sage, 2002), p. 135. 5 Aseema Sinha, “From State to Market—via the State Governments: Horizontal Competition after 1991 in India,” Paper presented at the Association of Asian Studies, Annual Meeting, Boston, March 11–14, 1999. 6 Jenkins, Democratic Politics and Economic Reform in India, pp. 119–71. 7 Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, “The Iconization of Chandrababu: Sharing Sovereignty in India's Federal Market Economy,” Economic and Political Weekly, May 5, 2001, p. 1546. 8 John Echeverri-Gent, “Politics in India's Decentered Polity,” in Alyssa Ayres and Philip Oldenburg, eds., India Briefing: Quickening the Pace of Change (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 19–53. An emergent body of scholarship has begun to look at subnational interventions and analyze the implications of liberalization for center–state relations. See Myron Weiner, “The Regionalization of Indian Politics and its Implications for Economic Reform,” in Sachs et al., eds., India in the Era of Economic Reforms, pp. 261–95; Montek Ahluwalia, “The Economic Performance of States in the Post-Reforms Period,” Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 35, No. 6 (2000); Raja J. Chelliah, “Liberalization, Economic Reforms, and Centre-State Relations,” and V. A. Pai Panandiker, “The Political Economy of Centre-State Relations in India,” in Ahluwalia and Little, eds., India's Economic Reforms and Development, pp. 344–74 and 375–94; Joydeep Mukherjee, “India's Long March to Capitalism,” India Review Vol. 1, No. 2 (April 2002), pp. 29–60; John Adams, “India's Economic Growth: How Fast? How Wide? How Deep?,” India Review Vol. 1, No. 2 (April 2002), pp. 1–28; S. Guhan, “Centre and States in the Reform Process,” in Richard Cassen and Vijay Joshi, eds., The Future of Economic Reform (Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 71–111; Nirupam Bajpai and Jeffrey D. Sachs, “The Progress of Policy Reform and Variations in Performance at the Sub-National Level in India,” Development Discussion Paper No. 730, November 1999 (Harvard Institute of International Development, Harvard University, 1999); M. Govinda Rao, “Fiscal Adjustment and the Role of State Governments in India,” in Satu Kahkonen and Anthony Lanyi, eds., Institutions, Incentives and Economic Reforms in India (New Delhi: Sage, 2000), pp. 194–211; and Laveesh Bhandari and Aarti Khare, “The Geography of Post-1991 Indian Economy,” Global Business Review Vol. 3, No. 2 (July–December 2002), pp. 321–40. 9 Pradeep Chhibber and Samuel Eldersveld, “Local Elites and Popular Support for Economic Reform in India and China,” Comparative Political Studies Vol. 33 (April 2000), pp. 350–73. 10 Jenkins, Democratic Politics, 1999 focuses on Rajasthan, Mahrashtra, Karnataka, and West Bengal; Sinha, From States to Markets, 1999, focuses on Gujarat, West Bengal, and Tamil Nadu; Kennedy on Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu (Loraine Kennedy, “Contrasting Responses to Economic Liberalization in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu,” in Rob Jenkins, ed., Regional Reflections: Comparing Politics Across India's States (Delhi: Oxford University Press, forthcoming)); and Paul on Karnataka (Samuel Paul, “Do States have an Enabling Environment for Industrial Growth? Some Evidence from Karnataka,” Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 35, No. 43–44 (2000), pp. 3861–69). Also see the special issue devoted to economic reforms in Andhra Pradesh, Economic and Political Weekly, March 22–28/April 4, 2003. 11 Theoretically, Jenkins, Democratic Politics arguments would be compatible with this approach. 12 There is no doubt that fiscal pressures on the regional states accompanying the withdrawal of many central state functions are also responsible. 13 The advantages of colonial location have also affected these post-independent patterns. Bombay, Bengal, and Madras presidency areas positively affected the development of states such as Maharashtra, Gujarat, West Bengal, and Tamil Nadu. 14 The central state, in response, has sought to renew its regulatory authority especially in the domain of fiscal regulation. For reasons of space, I will not be able to elaborate on this aspect in this article. 15 This resonates with two different ways of conceptualizing policy or institutional change. One approach focuses on the change of preferences and the other on how institutions provide changing incentives to actors. The first approach, following Riker, may be characterized as “preference-induced equilibrium” or equilibrium of tastes and the other as “structure-induced equilibrium.” The latter focuses on “organizational conditions, formal arrangements, institutional practices, and their channeling effects on the revelation and aggregation of individual preferences.” See Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions,” in Herbert Weisberg, ed., Political Science: The Science of Politics (New York: Agathon, 1986), p. 52. 16 See John Zysman, “How Institutions Create Historically Rooted Trajectories of Growth,” Industrial and Corporate Change Vol. 3 (1994), pp. 243–83; Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Ellen M. Immergut, Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in Western Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Peter A. Hall and Rosemary Taylor, “Political Science and Three New Institutionalisms,” in Karol Soltan, Eric M. Uslaner, and Virginia Haufler, eds., Institutions and Social Order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998); Kathy Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 2 (1999), pp. 369–404; and Evan S. Lieberman, “Causal Inference in Historical Institutional Analysis: A Specification of Periodization Strategies,” Comparative Political Studies Vol. 34, No. 9 (November 2001), pp. 1011–35. 17 Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 26. 18 These arguments resonate with recent findings on post-socialist transitions, which show that despite the structural changes of transitions in post-communist states, the communist institutions and earlier regimes continue to shape the path and process of transition. See Consuelo Cruz and Ann Seleny, “Reform and Counter-reform: The Path to Market in Hungary and Cuba,” Comparative Politics Vol. 34, No. 2 (January 2002), pp. 211–31; Ann M. Gryzamala-Busse, Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East-Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 19 The constitution of India demarcates three lists of powers: Center, State, and Concurrent (shared). While industry and industry-related subjects are in the center's list, agriculture, education, and regulation of infrastructure are state subjects. 20 Formal rules of the game must be analyzed in conjunction with actual practices; here the picture is more mixed or at least cyclical. See Paul Brass, “Pluralism, Regionalism, and Decentralizing Tendencies in Contemporary Indian Politics,” in A. Jeyaratnam Wilson and D. Dalton, eds., The States of South Asia: Problems of National Integration: Essays in Honour of W. H. Morris-Jones (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1982); and Aseema Sinha, The Regional Roots of Developmental Politics in India: A Divided Leviathan (Indiana University Press, forthcoming). 21 In contrast to China and some Latin American countries, where decentralization accompanied market reforms as part of the policy design. 22 Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, Various Years. 23 Vikas Kasliwal, Director, S. Kumars (private textile company) in proceedings of a conference, “Western Regional Cooperation: A Necessity and Opportunity,” November 24–25, 1995, p. 15 (emphasis added). 24 In India, provinces have control over more inelastic taxes, while the central government derives its taxes from elastic sources. This limits the buoyancy of the states’ tax-base. 25 The above data are drawn from Report of the Eleventh Finance Commission (New Delhi: Government of India, 2000). Data from the Reserve Bank of India is consistent with these results. See Reserve Bank of India, State Finances: A Study of Budgets of 1999–2000 (New Delhi: RBI, 2000). 26 Ahluwalia, “The Economic Performance of States.” 27 See Pradeep Chhibber and Ken Kollman, The Formation of National Party Systems: Federalism and Party Competition in Britain, Canada, India, and the United States (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, forthcoming) for a comparative analysis of party system change and decentralization. 28 See Anindya Saha's ongoing dissertation that explains this change, The Strategic Logic of Institutional Change: Party System Transformation in India, dissertation in progress, Cornell University. 29 TDP from Andhra Pradesh, TMC from Tamil Nadu, DMK from Tamil Nadu, and AGP from Assam. 30 Echeverri-Gent, “Politics in India's Decentered Polity,” p. 31. 31 Article 74 (2) of the Indian Constitution bars an enquiry into the question of whether any or what advice was tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President. 32 Rudolph and Rudolph coin this term in “The Iconization of Chandrababu.” 33 At least four national conferences or conclaves were held in the 1980s: at Vijaywada, Srinagar (October 1983), Calcutta (1984), and Delhi (April 25, 1987) where CMs from opposition parties attended and attempted to coordinate their strategy for greater regional autonomy against a dominant center and a dominant party. These meetings intensified during 1987–89. In 1987 seven CMs participated in the conference held at Delhi. This was followed by more focused meetings in May 1987, September 1987, December 1987, and January 1988. See “Non-Congress (I) Chief Ministers Meeting Today,” The Hindu, April 25, 1987, p. 9; and “Six Chief Ministers Endorse Joint Front on Agreed Plan,” Hindustan Times, April 26, 1987, pp. 1, 8. 34 “Naidu to Meet PM, Sinha on Finance Panel Report,” Times of India (internet edition), August 20, 2000. 35 The central government has created an “Incentive Fund” from which “fiscal performance based grants will be made for those states that achieve a reduction of the revenue deficit” (Government of India, The States’ Fiscal Reforms Facility (2000–01 to 2004–05), Ministry of Finance, 2000). 36 “Probe into Indian Food Aid Scam,” Financial Times, August 23, 2002. 37 In India, central government's tax revenue as a percentage of the GDP increased from 9.0% in 1980 to 10.8% in 1997, while China's tax revenue in 1997 as a percentage of its GDP was as low as 4.9% (World Bank, World Development Report, 1999–2000, p. 256). 38 Editorial, The Hindu, June 7, 1996. 39 Suresh Babu, “Competition and Competitiveness among States,” Economic and Political Weekly, March 30, 2002, pp. 1281–84. 40 Chief Minister Jayalalitha quoted in “Tamil Nadu: the Path to Becoming India's Leading State,” Working Papers (CID, Harvard University, 2002) (emphasis added). 41 For example, Gujarat targeted Gujaratis settled in East Africa, in Calcutta, and in Bombay, encouraging them to invest back in their “home” state. 42 The central “backward area program” identified backward districts in coordination with the relevant state governments; the state governments, in many cases, used that money in more advanced districts of their state. 43 This argument is elaborated in Sinha, The Regional Roots of Developmental Politics in India. 44 Manubhai Shah, “Dynamic Phase of Industrial Economy,” Vital Speeches and Documents of the Day (May 1, 1961), No. XII, pp. 313–14. Capitalization has been standardized in this quote. 45 Cited in Babulal Fadia, State Politics in India, Volume I (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1984), p. 129. 46 Cited in A. H. Hanson, The Process of Planning (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 313. 47 Interview, Madras, August 1997. 48 Interview with retired IAS official who said “All these policy changes happened in the 1960s and 1970s largely on account of political pressures from the state rather than a policy initiative of the central ministries.” Interview, December 1997. 49 Government of India, Evaluation Report on Concessional Finance and Other Incentives in Industrially Backward Areas (New Delhi: Planning Commission, 1981), p. ii (emphasis added). 50 One important issue is whether vertical competition in the dirigiste period was zero-sum or positive-sum. The political consequences of such developmental competition are beyond the scope of this paper, but it may be speculated that some of this competition was channeled through the Congress party and thus did not spill into the public domain. Marcus Franda's important study of competition and conflict within the Congress party deserves mention here: Marcus F. Franda, West Bengal and the Federalizing Process in India (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968). Competition from opposition-ruled states did become acrimonious as in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal but without challenging the nation-state (except in the late 1940s in Tamil Nadu). Why it was so remains an important puzzle that deserves further examination, but one which I do not address in this article. 51 Government of Gujarat, Gujarat 2000 A.D and Beyond (Gandhinagar: Government of Gujarat, 1995), p. 1. 52 A tax levied to goods traveling across a state's borders. 53 A point about data collection on policy outputs is in order here. Usually, policy analysis focuses at the national level and fails to collect policy information at the subnational levels. This followed the oft-repeated assertion that state's role in industrial policy was inconsequential; one of its unintended consequences was to confirm that claim by default. Moreover, regional policymakers have a stake in obfuscating regional-level information as it allows them to continuously claim central discrimination. 54 Single-window agencies are state agencies that include numerous industry departments and give multiple clearances under one roof. 55 Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Act, 1960; Gujarat Industrial Development Act, 1962; Memorandum and Articles of Association of WBIDC, 1967. 56 Interviews with state government officials in Bombay and Ahmedabad, March and April 1997. 57 Each of these programs was a regional-level program. 58 See P. Jacob, “First Among Equals,” Business Standard, March 19, 1997. 59 R. Parthasarathy, “The Best States to Invest In: A Business Today-Gallup-MBA Survey,” Business Today, 1998, p. 85. Gujarat's rank became fourth in 2003 after widespread riots in 2002; Roshini Jayakar, “Confidence Dip,” and “Hottest States for Business: Fourth BT-Gallup Survey,” Business Today, September 28, 2003. 60 India Today, January 11, 1997, p. 77. 61 Government of West Bengal, Industrial Policy, 1994. 62 “CITU Critical of LF Government,” The Statesman (Calcutta edition), September 27, 1994, p. 4. 63 “CITU Critical of LF Government,” The Statesman (Calcutta edition), September 27, 1994, p. 4. 64 Jayalalitha announced a new initiative in industrial policy on July 4, 1991 almost at the same time as the center. The center's new policies were first announced on July 1 with twin devaluations and industrial policy reforms on July 24, 1991. See “Liberal Industrial Policy in Phases,” The Hindu, July 2, and “New Industrial Policy To Be Presented in the Parliament Today-CWC(I) Ratifies Government's Economic Policy,” The Hindu, July 24, 1991. 65 “Help Create Jobs—Chief Minister Tells Industry,” The Hindu, April 14, 1994, p. 1. 66 Tamil Nadu Industrial Policy, 1996 (Chennai: Government of Tamil Nadu, 1996). 67 “Speech to the CII-Southern Committee Meeting,” The Hindu, August 28, 1996. 68 Quoted in “The Ten Best States for Business,” Business India, June 6–14, 1994. 69 “Mayawati Promises Industry Friendly U.P.,” The Statesman, May 14, 1997, p. 11. 70 See Patrick Heller, The Labor of Development: Workers and Transformation of Capitalism in Kerala, India (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). 71 Government of Kerala, Industrial Policy, 1991. 72 Circular from the Home department No. 70285/SSA 3/91 cited in R. Venkatesan, Problems in the Implementation of Economic Reforms at the State Level (New Delhi: National Council of Applied Economic Research 1994), p. 27. 73 Kennedy, Contrasting Responses to Liberalization. 74 Center of Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE), Monthly Review of Investment Projects, February 1999, p. 100. Also see “Vision 2020,” Industrial Policy of Andhra Pradesh; and C. Chitti Pantulu, “Naidu to Rope in Management Wizards for Vision 2020,” Financial Express, June 1, 1997. Many other regional states within India and even the center have come out with their own “Vision 2020” documents, following Andhra Pradesh's example, a strong evidence of policy diffusion. Importantly, the Vision 2020 idea and the exact phrase originated in Malaysia and was the brainchild of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, then prime minister of Malaysia. I thank Alyssa Ayres for pointing this out. Vision 2020 in Malaysia referred to the fact that Malaysia would aim to be a developed country; 2020 refers to a perfect optometric vision. 75 Pramod Pagedar, “Maharashtra Tops in Investment Despite CMIE—Government,” Economic Times, August 5, 1996, p, 3. 76 The CMIE stuck to its statistics arguing that it does not include those projects that have been completed, shelved or shifted out of the state as part of ongoing investment and accordingly Maharashtra's rank was as stated: fourth in 1995–96. See Pagedar, “Maharashtra Tops in Investment”; and Mahesh Vijapurkar, “No Longer the No.1,” The Hindu, September 2, 1996. Also see Mark Nicholson, “Maharashtra 1996: Other States Catch Up,” Financial Times, July 11, 1996. 77 Madhav Godbole, “Credit Rating of States: Need for a Fresh Look,” Economic and Political Weekly, March 14, 1998, pp. 566–68. Also see NPC Research Division, “Competitiveness Ranking of Indian States,” Productivity, Vol. 35, No. 2 (July–September 1994), pp. 366–68. 78 Interview, Madras, September 1997. After undergoing a name change, what was Mahindra Ford Ltd. is now Ford India. 79 Researchers also need to be aware of this and scrutinize state-level data much more carefully than before. 80 See “Fall in Maharashtra's Growth Performance,” The Hindu, August 19, 1997. A similar attention to numbers characterizes the competition between Gujarat, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka, the frontrunners in the numbers game. 81 Manohar Joshi, the then chief minister of Maharashtra, greeted the guests in a show, “Advantage Maharashtra,” sponsored by the business group Hindujas and the state government on February 22, 1997 in Mumbai. See “Manohar Joshi Takes as the CEO Mantle of Maharashtra Inc,” Economic Times, February 23, 1997. 82 Economic Times, October 2, 1997. 83 I observed regular interaction of journalists from the major newspapers with state agencies during my field research. 84 “Maharashtra Opens Website,” Economic Times, September 30, 1997. 85 Government websites of few sample states include the following, all of which give details of the state's industrial policy: Maharashtra, www.maharashtra.gov.in; Bihar, bihar.nic.in; West Bengal, www.westbengalgovt.org/site; Uttar Pradesh, www.upindia.org; Madhya Pradesh, www.mpgovt.nic.in. Two new states formed in 2000 have websites with their industrial policies prominently featured: Jharkhand, jharkhand.nic.in; and Chhattisgarh, chhattisgarh.nic.in. Uttaranchal, the third new state, is one of the few without a website. 86 “Maharashtra Government has to be Aggressive,” The Hindu, (Internet edition), January 14, 1999. 87 “Rapid Industrialization is Tamil Nadu's Goal,” The Hindu, February 12, 1994. Also see P. Chinnaswamy, “A Saga of Promises,” The Hindu, February 6, 1994 (emphasis added). 88 The term can be found in Ivo D. Duchacek, Daniel Latouche, and Garth Stevenson, eds., Perforated Sovereignties and International Relations: Trans-Sovereign Contacts of Subnational Governments (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988). 89 The inflow of remittances as in the case of Kerala would be one such example. 90 Deepak Raja, “Special Report: Industrialization in Gujarat: Enough of the Road for Financial Incentives?” Business India No. 74 (January 5–18, 1981), p. 57. 91 This policy initiative did result in a very important institutional innovation: the formation of iNDEXTb in Gujarat, which was to play a crucial and distinctive role in Gujarat's industrial development. 92 See Ronald Herring and N. Chandra Mohan, “Economic Crisis, Momentary Autonomy, and Policy Reform: Liberalization in India, 1991–1995,” in Amita Shastri and A. J. Wilson, eds., The Post-Colonial States of South Asia: Democracy, Development, and Identity (London: Curzon Press, 2001). 93 In response, the central government criticized the World Bank for bypassing the central state. Currently, the World Bank tries to keep the central government in the loop; the actual loan is disbursed through the central government. 94 Drawn from “Bolstering State Reform Programs for Faster Growth and Poverty Reduction in India,” lnweb18.worldbank.org/sar/sa.nsf/0/82de818e5021ac0e852568e30070682d. 95 The authority of the central government was completely bypassed by both the state government and Enron in negotiations over the Dhabol project. The center was not informed about the cancellation of the Dhabol project. Peeved, a central government official said, “Keeping the Center informed about the fate of the project is a not a matter of courtesy alone; the Center has provided a counter guarantee to the Dhabol power company covering all payment obligations of the Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB) including termination costs, interest accruals and any likely compensation for cancellation of the contract.” See “Centre Concerned,” The Hindu, September 30, 1995 (international ed.), p. 2. 96 “Tamil Nadu and Kerala Talk to Russia,” Economic Times, November 22, 1996. 97 “India-Andhra Pradesh, New Jersey Agreement Envisaged,” The Hindu, January 31, 1999; www.lexis-nexis.com. 98 The existence of a significant Tamil minority in Malaysia, Tamil Nadu's “sons of the soil,” also encourages such linkages. 99 Numerous agreements were signed between Malaysian national government and Tamil Nadu at this time. See FT Asia Intelligence Wire, January 9, 1999; www.lexis-nexis.com. 100 “India-Andhra Pradesh, New Jersey Agreement Envisaged,” The Hindu, January 31, 1999. www.lexis-nexis.com 101 John Williamson, “What Washington Means by Policy Reform,” in John Williamson, ed., Latin American Adjustment: How Much has Happened? (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990), pp. 5–38. 102 Interview, Gujarat government official, July 25, 2001. 103 The Industry Secretariat in Gujarat complained about the delay at the central level in a confidential memo to the Ministry of Industrial Development, GOI (Internal Memo: IEM/Progress Report, January 13, 1995). 104 Business Today, “The Best States to Invest In: A Business Today-Gallup-MBA Survey,” June 7–21, 1996, pp. 79–119, and “The Best States to Invest In,” December 22, 1997–Janaury 6, 1998, pp. 83–147. 105 Interview with a high-level official of the Asian Development Bank, May 25, 1997." @default.
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