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• W2079497633 abstract "Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. I thank Nikolas Gardner and Nicholas E. Sarantakes for their invaluable help in preparing this essay. 2. Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz Vom Kriege, 3 vols. (Berlin: Ferdinand Dümmler, 1832–34). Although several versions of On War have appeared over the years, the English-speaking world has largely coalesced behind this version: On War, Michael E. Howard and Peter Paret, eds. & trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 3. The rank of major general differed in the Royal Prussian Army and in the United States. In Prussia, it was the first general rank, equal to a one-star rank in the U.S. Army. 4. Clausewitz said that Scharnhorst was the “father and friend of my intellect and of my spirit.” Quoted in Hew Strachan, Clausewitz's On War (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2007), 40. 5. Part of the mistrust also stemmed from the fact that Clausewitz resigned his commission to join the Russian Army after Prussia acquiesced to Napoleon's demands to support his invasion of Russia in 1812. Returning to Prussia with the victorious Russian Army in 1813, he worked to turn the Prussian army and people against Napoleon. See Peter Paret, “Clausewitz,” in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 194–95. 6. Strachan, Clausewitz's On War, 69. 7. This section on the reception of On War draws from the introduction to Strachan's Clausewitz's On War. For an in-depth study that demonstrates the great influence of Clausewitz on Anglo-American military thinking, see Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 8. Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Presidio Press, 1982). In the book, Summers incorrectly described Clausewitz's trinity as the government, the military and the people, which is not what Clausewitz wrote. See note 13. Despite popularizing this incorrect formulation, which has been embraced as the “triangle,” Summers was key in persuading the U.S. Army to read On War. 9. Clausewitz, On War, book 1, chapter 1, 89. 10. Clausewitz used the word politik, which has been translated as either “policy” or “politics.” Although Clausewitz did not distinguish between the two, the choice of translation can alter one's understanding of what he meant. 11. Clausewitz, On War, book 1, chapter 1, 87. This phrase has been translated differently. See Christopher Bassford, “John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz,” War and History 1, no. 3 (November 1994). 12. Clausewitz, On War, book 1, chapter 1, 89. 13. As noted in note 8, some people list the three elements of the trinity as the government, the military, and the people. Although this formulation can provide a useful way to proceed analytically, it is not what Clausewitz wrote. Yet, given the usefulness of this misreading, many people today refer to the government-military-people grouping as the “triangle.” 14. Clausewitz, On War, book 1, chapter 1, 89. 15. Nikolas Gardner, “Resurrecting the ‘Icon’: The Enduring Relevance of Clausewitz's On War,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 3, no. 1 (Spring 2009), 1. 16. One scholar argues that Clausewitz had essentially completed On War by the time of his demise. See Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), xiii-xv, 2. 17. Strachan, Clausewitz's On War, 70–74. 18. One example of this is Clausewitz's attempt to determine what separates war in practice from war in theory. He determined that friction accounted for this difference. On paper, war proceeds as planned. On the battlefield, countless factors intervene to slow the pace of war. 19. According to the 2008 army posture statement, “‘Full-Spectrum Operations’ is the Army's core idea about how to conduct operations on land—its operational concept. Full-spectrum operations entail the application of combat power through simultaneous and continuous combinations of four elements: offense, defense, stability, and civil support.” “Full-Spectrum Operations in Army Capstone Doctrine” (February 26, 2008), http://www.army.mil/aps/08/information_papers/transform/Full_Spectrum_Operations.html. 20. Joint operations “is primarily concerned with the coordinated actions of the Armed Forces of the United States.” See Joint Publication 3-0, “Joint Operations, Change 2” (September 17, 2006), Incorporating Change 2, March 22, 2010, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_0.pdf. 21. Sir Michael Howard deemed the past an “inexhaustible storehouse of events” that could be used to “prove anything or its contrary.” Quoted in Antulio J. Echevarria II, “The Trouble with History,” Parameters (Summer 2005), 35(2), 78. 22. See Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). 23. See Carol Reardon, Soldiers and Scholars: The U.S. Army and the Uses of Military History, 1865–1920 (Lawrence: University Press Of Kansas, 1990). 24. See Bassford, Clausewitz in English, chapter 15. 25. Quoted in Strachan, Clausewitz's On War, 21. 26. Melton cites just one work about Clausewitz: Stuart Kinross, Clausewitz and America: Strategic Thought and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq (London: Routledge, 2008). 27. These new works include Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz's Puzzle: The Political Theory of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to on War (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2008); Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, eds. Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); and Strachan, Clausewitz's On War. 28. For the best analysis of the anti-Clausewitzian arguments and their shortcomings, see Christopher Bassford, “John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz,” War and History 1, no. 3 (November 1994). 29. He writes that Clausewitz was “the ideological father of the First World War.” See John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 22. 30. Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz (New York: Free Press, 1991). 31. He also wrote about the Tartars and other insurgent-like forces. See, for example, Clausewitz, On War, book 8, chapter 3. 32. Corbett attempted to do for naval war what Clausewitz did for ground war. See Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911). 33. Jon Sumida has recently argued that the key argument in On War is the one Clausewitz offers about the relationship between offense and defense. Sumida contends that one of the advantages Clausewitz believed the defense possessed was its ability to resort to “peoples war” even when too weak to win a conventional battle. See Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz. 34. On Guerrilla Warfare, Samuel B Griffith II, ed. & trans., 2nd revised ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000). On the other hand, some of Mao's ideas paralleled those of Clausewitz. See R. Lynn Rylander, “Mao as a Clausewitzian Strategist,” Military Review 61, no. 8 (August 1981): 13–21." @default.
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