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• W2080209751 abstract "To be in the presence of something is not necessarily to see it. Everyone knows that. Even if an onlooker looks at me and sees me 'looking at' a particular wall with eyes wide open, she cannot be sure that I am seeing that wall. Apart from the possibility that I am distracted or inattentive, I may be focusing on the color of the wall or some particular graffiti on it so attentively that I may not be noticing that it is the color of a wall or that the graffiti is on a wall. Even if the wall causes my perception, it need not be the object of my perception, just as my retina or sunlight is not. Thus, I must have some say on what it is that I am seeing. That does not mean that I may not be mistaken about my own current perceptual content. Neither does it mean that to have a say is to be able to 'say' in descriptive words what one is seeing. All it means is that I cannot be clueless about it. I cannot be, to use Sydney Shoemaker's phrase, strongly self-blind (which is worse than being self-oblivious). Now, the myth of immaculate perception, in both of its (radically unlike) Nyaya and Buddhist versions, requires us to admit some such perceptual states that are so radically un-self-ascribable, or-to use Phillips' terminology-unapperceivable, that the subject is never able to say (in Siderits' words) concerning what she is perceiving during these states. This comes dangerously close to self-blindness. To admit, for other systemic reasons, that one is acquainted directly and prepredicatively with either a bare featureless fleeting particular (the Sautrdntika Buddhist claim) or a pure universal feature as yet cognitively un-pasted to a particular (the Nybya claim) is to consign a nook of our own minds to such self-blindness, and also to acknowledge that an awareness can take something as its object without recognizing it as anything whatsoever. Even to see a particular as a unique uncategorizable something is to see it as something, even to see a man as 'that man whom I can't recognize' is to bring him under the general concept of an unknown stranger currently in front of me, a negative demonstrative covering concept. That is why I think seeing is not possible without recognizing. (Seeing cannot even be caused by a bare particular since there aren't any in the world. That is what my realism tells me.) If it were, then we would have to be partially self-blind. But we are not. Recently two parallel controversies have erupted on the pages of this journal: one between myself and Stephen Phillips regarding the necessity of Indeterminate Perception within Nyaya epistemology, and the other between Monima Chadha and Mark Siderits on the issue of whether a realist needs perception of particulars without deployment of concepts. The first controversy is muddied with technical Nyaya assumptions-for example, about how many moments a perceptual cognitive state" @default.
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• W2080209751 date "2004-01-01" @default.
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• W2080209751 title "Seeing without Recognizing? More on Denuding Perceptual Content" @default.
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• W2080209751 doi "https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2004.0015" @default.
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