Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2082046688> ?p ?o ?g. }
Showing items 1 to 59 of
59
with 100 items per page.
- W2082046688 endingPage "680" @default.
- W2082046688 startingPage "680" @default.
- W2082046688 abstract "In standard auctions, collusion among buyers eliminates bidding competition despite informational asymmetries. Collusion can, however, be imperfect when the situation involves externalities among buyers, that is, when a buyer is worse off if one rival wins the goon rather than if nobody gets it. For intermediate values of the externality and under various objective functions, the seller finds it optimal to design an auction that leads, in equilibrium, to a collusive outcome that is ex post inefficient for the group of buyers; an ex ante incentive-efficient collusion mechanism for the buyers is characterized in this situation." @default.
- W2082046688 created "2016-06-24" @default.
- W2082046688 creator A5008087835 @default.
- W2082046688 creator A5083933247 @default.
- W2082046688 date "1998-01-01" @default.
- W2082046688 modified "2023-10-18" @default.
- W2082046688 title "Collusion in Auctions with Externalities" @default.
- W2082046688 cites W2029050771 @default.
- W2082046688 cites W2065465163 @default.
- W2082046688 doi "https://doi.org/10.2307/2556089" @default.
- W2082046688 hasPublicationYear "1998" @default.
- W2082046688 type Work @default.
- W2082046688 sameAs 2082046688 @default.
- W2082046688 citedByCount "61" @default.
- W2082046688 countsByYear W20820466882012 @default.
- W2082046688 countsByYear W20820466882013 @default.
- W2082046688 countsByYear W20820466882014 @default.
- W2082046688 countsByYear W20820466882015 @default.
- W2082046688 countsByYear W20820466882016 @default.
- W2082046688 countsByYear W20820466882020 @default.
- W2082046688 countsByYear W20820466882021 @default.
- W2082046688 countsByYear W20820466882022 @default.
- W2082046688 countsByYear W20820466882023 @default.
- W2082046688 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
- W2082046688 hasAuthorship W2082046688A5008087835 @default.
- W2082046688 hasAuthorship W2082046688A5083933247 @default.
- W2082046688 hasConcept C16118543 @default.
- W2082046688 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
- W2082046688 hasConcept C163239763 @default.
- W2082046688 hasConcept C175444787 @default.
- W2082046688 hasConcept C2781198186 @default.
- W2082046688 hasConcept C40700 @default.
- W2082046688 hasConceptScore W2082046688C16118543 @default.
- W2082046688 hasConceptScore W2082046688C162324750 @default.
- W2082046688 hasConceptScore W2082046688C163239763 @default.
- W2082046688 hasConceptScore W2082046688C175444787 @default.
- W2082046688 hasConceptScore W2082046688C2781198186 @default.
- W2082046688 hasConceptScore W2082046688C40700 @default.
- W2082046688 hasIssue "4" @default.
- W2082046688 hasLocation W20820466881 @default.
- W2082046688 hasOpenAccess W2082046688 @default.
- W2082046688 hasPrimaryLocation W20820466881 @default.
- W2082046688 hasRelatedWork W1497270893 @default.
- W2082046688 hasRelatedWork W1529145327 @default.
- W2082046688 hasRelatedWork W1899189444 @default.
- W2082046688 hasRelatedWork W2056104546 @default.
- W2082046688 hasRelatedWork W2082046688 @default.
- W2082046688 hasRelatedWork W2143868055 @default.
- W2082046688 hasRelatedWork W2208742277 @default.
- W2082046688 hasRelatedWork W3121134390 @default.
- W2082046688 hasRelatedWork W3141781900 @default.
- W2082046688 hasRelatedWork W4321364898 @default.
- W2082046688 hasVolume "29" @default.
- W2082046688 isParatext "false" @default.
- W2082046688 isRetracted "false" @default.
- W2082046688 magId "2082046688" @default.
- W2082046688 workType "article" @default.