FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2082901484> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2082901484 endingPage "327" @default.
• W2082901484 startingPage "307" @default.
• W2082901484 abstract "Expressive Inquiry and Practical Reasoning Roberto Frega Pragmatism, Expressivism, and the Rational Roots of Moral Experience The aim of this article is to offer a contribution to our understanding of the place and function of reason in human agency, notably in that specific part of human agency that can be qualified as moral and whose main trait is that it presupposes some reference to normativity. In this perspective, through the concept of expressive inquiry I would like to propose a theory of how reason enters our moral practices. In line with the pragmatist tradition, I take this theory to be at the same time grounded in effective existing practices and as being a normative description of how agents should resort to reasoning in practical (and notably moral) affairs. My methodological starting point can be devised in what I call the epistemology of practice, a theory of knowledge and rationality whose main sources can be traced back to John Dewey's logical and epistemological writings.1 While having explicitly in mind a pragmatist paradigm of human rationality—as also the term inquiry should have made clear—in this article I attempt to extend the pragmatist paradigm, integrating it with more recent contributions to moral philosophy. In so doing, I do not intend to take part in the recent debate over pragmatism and perfectionism, although that last develops around a similar awareness of the necessity to [End Page 307] open classical pragmatism to different sources and traditions.2 I, rather, intend to follow a different path, which consists in developing a notion of moral rationality that is rooted in the Deweyan paradigm of rationality as inquiry and that at the same time takes into account those articulative and expressive dimensions that characterize the specifically moral form of inquiry. In this way, it will become easier to qualify the general notion of situation with respect to moral experience.3 In so doing, we will have reached a better position in order to extend the reach of the notion of inquiry from the general naturalistic dimension of problem solving in problematic situations to the dimension of critical self-reflection and self-transformation that is typical of many moral experiences. In order to develop such a conception, I will rely on two main concepts, which can be traced back both to the pragmatist epistemology of practice and to what, faute de mieux, I will call an expressivist theory of the moral agent.4 These themes, which are both present in each tradition, are identified by the notions of articulation—which denotes a process through which something that is indeterminate becomes determinate—and of transformation—which denotes an active form of relationship of thinking to experience. The concept of inquiry—and so that of expressive inquiry—implies that reasoning should be conceived as being grounded in a set of implicit beliefs, habits, and attitudes and that in problematic situations we need to articulate them in order to become aware of them and their consequences (our inferential commitments). To this extent, articulation and transformation are logically irreducible parts of any form of reasoning. But these notions are here considered according to the expressivist intuition that reflective activity is not merely aimed at representing to others beliefs that would be already given (in order to defend them) but, rather, that through their articulation we constantly revise and transform them as a consequence of their further determination. As a consequence, in expressing our moral standing, according to expressivism we do not merely represent to others our given and justified set of beliefs but, rather, engage actively in their transformation, so that moral reasoning always has an irreducible transformative dimension. Through reference to the category of expressive inquiry I intend to account for the epistemological implications of this irreducible intertwining of external problem solving with critical self-engagement (and self-transformation) of the agent.5 In defining expressive inquiry as a form of rational reasoning, the aim of this article is therefore theoretical: it [End Page 308] proposes to highlight some of the epistemological requirements of a theory of rationality as inquiry suited for dealing with moral experience. The outcome of this project will be twofold: on one side, the..." @default.
• W2082901484 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W2082901484 creator A5016056546 @default.
• W2082901484 date "2010-01-01" @default.
• W2082901484 modified "2023-10-14" @default.
• W2082901484 title "Expressive Inquiry and Practical Reasoning" @default.
• W2082901484 cites W1599073694 @default.
• W2082901484 cites W1990345202 @default.
• W2082901484 cites W2224989214 @default.
• W2082901484 cites W2312414992 @default.
• W2082901484 cites W2335131979 @default.
• W2082901484 cites W2462179241 @default.
• W2082901484 cites W2734372581 @default.
• W2082901484 cites W2782391423 @default.
• W2082901484 cites W2889134070 @default.
• W2082901484 cites W2955436312 @default.
• W2082901484 cites W3134416946 @default.
• W2082901484 cites W399889837 @default.
• W2082901484 cites W432793249 @default.
• W2082901484 cites W3141632202 @default.
• W2082901484 doi "https://doi.org/10.1353/jsp.0.0093" @default.
• W2082901484 hasPublicationYear "2010" @default.
• W2082901484 type Work @default.
• W2082901484 sameAs 2082901484 @default.
• W2082901484 citedByCount "5" @default.
• W2082901484 countsByYear W20829014842012 @default.
• W2082901484 countsByYear W20829014842013 @default.
• W2082901484 countsByYear W20829014842014 @default.
• W2082901484 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W2082901484 hasAuthorship W2082901484A5016056546 @default.
• W2082901484 hasConcept C108170787 @default.
• W2082901484 hasConcept C111472728 @default.
• W2082901484 hasConcept C138885662 @default.
• W2082901484 hasConcept C144024400 @default.
• W2082901484 hasConcept C158573231 @default.
• W2082901484 hasConcept C192906763 @default.
• W2082901484 hasConcept C201717286 @default.
• W2082901484 hasConcept C2780037505 @default.
• W2082901484 hasConcept C44725695 @default.
• W2082901484 hasConcept C9158031 @default.
• W2082901484 hasConceptScore W2082901484C108170787 @default.
• W2082901484 hasConceptScore W2082901484C111472728 @default.
• W2082901484 hasConceptScore W2082901484C138885662 @default.
• W2082901484 hasConceptScore W2082901484C144024400 @default.
• W2082901484 hasConceptScore W2082901484C158573231 @default.
• W2082901484 hasConceptScore W2082901484C192906763 @default.
• W2082901484 hasConceptScore W2082901484C201717286 @default.
• W2082901484 hasConceptScore W2082901484C2780037505 @default.
• W2082901484 hasConceptScore W2082901484C44725695 @default.
• W2082901484 hasConceptScore W2082901484C9158031 @default.
• W2082901484 hasIssue "4" @default.
• W2082901484 hasLocation W20829014841 @default.
• W2082901484 hasOpenAccess W2082901484 @default.
• W2082901484 hasPrimaryLocation W20829014841 @default.
• W2082901484 hasRelatedWork W2016087585 @default.
• W2082901484 hasRelatedWork W2278083598 @default.
• W2082901484 hasRelatedWork W2468969951 @default.
• W2082901484 hasRelatedWork W2750933367 @default.
• W2082901484 hasRelatedWork W2803203144 @default.
• W2082901484 hasRelatedWork W2924192448 @default.
• W2082901484 hasRelatedWork W2950225231 @default.
• W2082901484 hasRelatedWork W3132775211 @default.
• W2082901484 hasRelatedWork W3213078245 @default.
• W2082901484 hasRelatedWork W4200501657 @default.
• W2082901484 hasVolume "23" @default.
• W2082901484 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2082901484 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W2082901484 magId "2082901484" @default.
• W2082901484 workType "article" @default.