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• W2090546137 abstract "If one is to believe our more ingenuous economists and moral gurus, then the game of Prisoner's Dilemma closely, albeit simplistically, models decisions with which we are constantly confronted in our everyday lives. Many times we must choose between strategy C (for Cooperate) and D (for Defect). When two protagonists both choose C, both receive joy; when both elect D they both suffer; but when there is one cooperator and one defector, the cooperator suffers greatly (for being the “sucker”) and the defector receives much joy (displaying a triumphant grimace).For example, consider two politicians each of whom possesses scandalous information concerning the other. If they both keep quiet and cooperatively breathe not a word, they can be reasonably assured of continued high office, worth, say, 3 points each. Mutual defection, both revealing their informations to the press, would result in both retiring from public life and joining the boards of multinational companies, worth, let us say, I point to each. To defect while your opponent cooperates, you should promise confidentiality and then call the National Enquirer. Not only do you survive politically, you can probably expect rapid promotion (5 points). Your erstwhile colleague is in such disgrace that not even a business opening is likely (0 points). We can conveniently diagram these values in the payoff matrix below: YOUR OPPONENT Cooperate Defect Cooperate (3,3) (0,5) YOU Defect (5,0) (1,1)According to Game Theory, strategy D dominates and you should defect. Life, however, goes on and your disgruntled victim is unlikely ever to believe you again. If this game is to be replayed many times over, it is not so clear that Defection is the correct strategy.Robert Axelrod [1984] proposed a tournament. Strategies may be encapsulated in programs designed to choose C or D according to various factors including the history of the tournament. Programs would survive or become extinct depending on how many points they amassed. Perhaps it is reassuring to know that pure selfishness (always Defect) did not triumph.The more successful players were those playing a “Tit-for-Tat” strategy; Cooperate on the first encounter with a new opponent; thereafter copy the opponent's action. A most readable account of this work is by Hofstadter [1983], [1985].Prisoner's Dilemma as described above is a 2-person game. We describe preliminary work on an extension of the above ideas involving a many-person generalization of the game. Results of a tournament among programs written by members of the author's introductory FORTRAN class will be discussed. Many students addressed the problem of finding an appropriate way to generalize the successful “Tit-for-Tat” strategies to the many-player game. Organizing the tournament involved writing an interesting FORTRAN-program-writing program.Those intending to attend this presentation should be prepared to take a quiz." @default.
• W2090546137 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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• W2090546137 date "1987-01-01" @default.
• W2090546137 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W2090546137 title "Surviving the many-person dilemna (abstract only)" @default.
• W2090546137 cites W2062663664 @default.
• W2090546137 doi "https://doi.org/10.1145/322917.323102" @default.
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