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• W2092784906 abstract "The designer of institutions for making environmental decisions faces two related questions: how to make the best use of expert opinion, while preserving democratic principles; and whether and how the dimensions of environmental controversies can be separated from the legal and ethical issues they entrain. This is the right time and place to discuss these questions. The flow of highly technical issues to Congress, the agencies, and the courts increases. And the academy has involved itself, not without misgivings, in some of the most contentious environmental debates. We hear in detail later in this symposium about the effects of acid rain, the risks of low-level radiation, and the hazards of human exposure to cotton dust and lead. As I shall make clear shortly, the technical applications of statistics and probability to environmental problems are not unrelated to the issues of separability and expertise that I now address. The political theory that justifies our administrative state only indirectly confronts questions of institutional design for environmental decision making. That omission is to be expected. The New Deal enthusiasts who redesigned and revitalized American administrative government were largely concerned with economics, not with technology and science. But the economic regulations they wrote set a pattern for the technological future. Not unnaturally, in the atmosphere of a depression they believed was caused by political misjudgments, New Deal reformers supposed that expert solutions of the detailed problems of improving social welfare are preferable to decision making by political appointees. The result is a system in which federal agencies oversee industrial activities and assign the associated technical problems to experts, implicitly or explicitly assuming these problems are separable from the larger legal and ethical considerations traditionally reserved for appointed or elected officials. It is an important part of the tale that the New Deal model did not define the experts' role. It was assumed that the definitions of agency responsibilities, normally included in every organic statute, were sufficient to enable effective oversight by Congress and the courts (see Appendix, Note 1). In an era in which Congress has asked administrators to control the full spectrum of side effects of industrial activities, agencies must delve into matters far beyond their nominal statutory concerns, and no one seriously believes that the New Deal assumption holds. The modern debate over the proper role of experts in technological decisions reflects a general realization that the respective responsibilities of expert analysts and decision makers, and the boundaries of institutional authority, remain undefined and that implicitly and explicitly, definitions are now being worked out. Had they anticipated the results, the social theorists of the Roosevelt era might well have hesitated in so strongly emphasizing the benefits of expertise. The consequences were not slow in coming. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the first major federal agency established as a direct result of discovery, was created in 1946. In the same year Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)-the overarching statute that defines and channels the regulatory process. The APA was formally a compromise between New Deal reformers and conservative opponents of administrative government. But in fact it legitimized the growth of the administrative state and signaled the triumph of proponents of the universal application of expertise. There could have been no more stringent test of the New Deal model than the one it got as the AEC developed its hybrid military and commercial programs. The commission combined scientific, engineering, and managerial skills of the highest order. Yet its arcane subject, the national security implications of its actions, and the internal tensions of the postwar era led to a decisionmaking process dominated by highly committed engineers and scientists and closed to effective review by outsiders. No one can say now whether the nuclear power program will benefit or harm the country over the long term. But the political, technical, and economic burdens on that program created by the expertladen decision making of the AEC might well have given the designers of the New Deal pause. The administrative process created in the 1930's came under fire as the environmental movement of the 1960's and 1970's began to achieve its legislative goals. Within that movement, technological development seemed threatening, openness of decision making was seen as an overriding necessity, and dependence on expertise was attacked as elitist in form and dangerous in substance. The environmental movement demanded new patterns of decision making. It succeeded in reopening the questions of how to strike the balance between the need for expert advice and the demands of participatory government, whether separability of technical and legal issues can be achieved, and, more generally, by whom technological decisions should be made. Support for the New Deal model has eroded, but efforts persist to establish a formalized expert role within a more open decision process. There are proposals to establish Science Courts as prelegislative advisory bodies, to create environmental courts, and to make similar innovations in the executive branch. Three arguments are central to these proposals. First, it is claimed that it is possible to label certain issues as scientific and assign them to the appropriate nonpolitical *Joel Yellin is Senior Research Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139." @default.
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• W2092784906 date "1983-11-01" @default.
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• W2092784906 title "Who Shall Make Environmental Decisions?" @default.
• W2092784906 doi "https://doi.org/10.1080/00031305.1983.10483148" @default.
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