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• W2095054908 abstract "account, by itself, gives no guidance about how to answer this question.'0 There are several disanalogies between Kaplan's notion of character and Fodor's proposed account of narrow contentdisanalogies that suggest that Fodor's project is much more ambitious, and much more speculative. First, Kaplan's notion of context is not designed to include everything external to the individual, and the character of an utterance is not something determined by the purely internal properties of the speaker. As a result, characters are not required to have the counterfactual power that narrow contents must have. That the pronoun I has the character it has is a fact about a social practice-the practice of speaking English. The functions from context to content that Kaplan calls characters are not intended to tell us speakers would be saying if they were speaking some other language. Kaplan's notion need not tell us this since the aim of his theory is not to isolate the purely internal component of determines the content of speech acts, but simply to explain how some languages in fact work. The practice of speech is more efficient if speakers can exploit information about the environmentinformation available to all the participants in a conversation-in communicating. So languages make this possible by including rules that make is said a function of that kind of information. That a language contains such rules (rather than, say, just lots of unsystematic ambiguity) is a substantive hypothesis, though in this case an obviously correct one. That our minds contain much more general systematic procedures for determining content as a function of context in a more general sense is a much more ambitious and speculative hypothesis. Second, because Kaplan's theory is a theory of speech rather than a theory of thought we can identify, more or less independently of theory, the objects that the theory is interpreting: the objects that have character and content. A speech act can be described in terms of its content (O'Leary said that salt is soluble in water), but it also may be described in more neutral ways (O'Leary uttered the sentence, or the sounds, Salt is soluble in water) But in the case of thought it is much less clear it is that has a particular conThis content downloaded from 157.55.39.45 on Thu, 01 Sep 2016 06:01:20 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 298 / Robert Stalnaker tent, or narrow content. As with a speech act, we can describe a particular belief in terms of its content (O'Leary believes that salt is soluble in water), but in this case there is no easily identifiable mental state, describable independently of its content, that constitutes that person's having that belief. Of course a psychological theory might turn up such a mental state or object. It might be that it is to believe that salt is soluble in water is to be storing in a certain location a mental sentence that says that salt is soluble in water. If this were true, then we could identify the thing that has the content independently of the content that it has. But it also might be that states of belief are more holistic. Suppose a total belief state were a complex cluster of dispositions to behave in various ways under various conditions. One might be able to use particular belief contents such as the belief that salt is soluble in water to describe such a state without it being possible to match up those contents with particular dispositions in the cluster. On this kind of account, the question what makes it true (given the facts about the external context) that O'Leary believes that salt is soluble in water? will be answered by describing how O'Leary is disposed to behave under various conditions. But the same behavioral dispositions that constitute O'Leary's total belief state will also make it true that he believes various other nonequivalent propositions. Compare: the question what makes it true (given the facts about the external context) that O'Leary is three miles from a burning barn? will be answered by describing O'Leary's location. But this same location will also make it true that O'Leary has various other nonequivalent relational properties (being more than two thousand miles from Los Angeles, being closer to Istanbul than to New Delhi, etc.). Even if we could find a narrow, purely internal characterization of the belief state as a whole, it wouldn't follow that we could find narrow analogues of the (relational) facts about the belief state that are expressed by ordinary attributions of" @default.
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• W2095054908 date "1989-01-01" @default.
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• W2095054908 title "On What's In the Head" @default.
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• W2095054908 doi "https://doi.org/10.2307/2214271" @default.
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