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• W2095672007 abstract "Traditionally share price returns and their variance have been explained by factors linked to the operations of the company such as systematic risk, corporate size and P/E ratios or by factors related to the influence of the macro-economic environment. In these models, the institutional environment in terms of concentration and nature of voting rights, bank debt dependence and corporate and legal mechanisms to change control have rarely been included. In this paper we have a dual objective. We first highlight the large discrepancies among corporate governance environments. We conclude that there is a need for a theoretically well-grounded measure of corporate control applicable to all systems and we define such a measure. Secondly, the impact of ownership structure on the share price performance and corporate risk is empirically analysed for companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. Within Europe, the UK corporate landscape is particularly interesting because of its widely-held nature and the liquidity of the market for controlling rights. Our results point to the fact that voting power, as measured by Z-indices, is tightly correlated to both share price performance and risk. The negative relation between the largest Z-index and corporate share price performance is explained by the fact that the voting power held by executive directors measures the degree of insider entrenchment which has a negative impact on performance. This negative relation is compensated when outside shareholders (e.g. industrial companies, individuals or families) own substantial voting power and may actively monitor the firm. This is because with a counterbalancing pole of control, the largest shareholder is forced to compromise and maximize firm’s profits rather than his or her own utility function. The risk regressions show that entrenched insider as well as large shareholders my seek higher levels of systematic risk. It may be that these shareholders prefer risky high growth strategies which are providing higher levels of private benefits for these types of shareholders at the expense of small shareholders. We also conclude that the classic Herfindahl indices inaccurately measure control, which is reflected in the weaker relationship with performance. FORTHCOMING IN : Social Responsibility: Corporate Governance Issues, series Research in International Business and Finance (Vol. 17), J. Batten and T. Fetherston (eds.), Oxford: JAI Press (Elsevier Science ltd.), 2003, 123-149 * Corresponding author: Department of Finance and CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands, Email : Luc.Renneboog@kub.nl, Phone: ++31-13466.82.10 a School of Business Administration, University of Liege; b International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.; c Department of Finance, Tilburg University; d Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht." @default.
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• W2095672007 date "2003-01-01" @default.
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• W2095672007 title "Corporate control concentration measurement and firm performance" @default.
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