FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2097188294> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2097188294 startingPage "1" @default.
• W2097188294 abstract "ABSTRACT This research tests whether there is any impact on voluntary earnings disclosures released after the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. In terms of bias and information content, findings suggest that forecasts tend to significantly differ during a post Sarbanes-Oxley environment. With increasing numbers of publicly-held firms implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley rules, these findings have practical implications on users of forecast information. INTRODUCTION Prior research in the study of voluntary earnings disclosures finds that managers release information that is unbiased relative to subsequently revealed earnings and that tends to contain more bad news than good news [Baginski et al.(1994), and Frankel (1995)]. Such releases are also found to contain information content [Patell (1976), Waymire (1984), and Pownell and Waymire (1989)]. Although forecast release is costly, credible disclosure will occur if sufficient incentives exist. These incentives include bringing investor/manager expectations in line [Ajinkya and Gift (1984)], removing the need for expensive sources of additional information [Diamond (1985)], reducing the cost of capital to the firm [Diamond and Verrechia (1987)], and reducing potential lawsuits [Lees (1981)]. One area that is just beginning to be researched is the ramificati on of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on such issues as audit opinions, income smoothing and impact of earnings forecasts. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) find that tighter accounting standards provide more relevant information to the capital market. The implication of this finding could be that tighter standards, as evidenced through Sarbanes-Oxley, result in less earnings management, and therefore, less bias and greater information content of earnings disclosures in a post Sarbanes-Oxley environment. In addressing this research question, I rely upon literature that indicates different incentive structures that may lead to earnings management. DeAngelo (1986) shows that managers have incentives during management buyouts to manage earnings downward in attempts to reduce buyout compensation. Collins and DeAngelo (1990) show that earnings management occurs during proxy contests, and market reaction to earnings during these contests is different. DeAngelo (1990) finds that managers have incentives during merger activities to manage earnings upward so as to convey to current stockholders that the potential merger will not adversely affect their investment. Perry and Williams (1994) find that management of accounting earnings occurs in the year preceding going private buyouts. Stunda (1996) finds that managers exert greater upward earnings management during mergers and acquisitions, while Stunda (2000) finds that managers tend to manage earnings upward during periods of management changes. This study assesses whether or not there are any significant differences in management forecast credibility in a post Sarbanes-Oxley [post] environment versus a pre Sarbanes-Oxley ['pre] environment. In accomplishing this, the presence of earnings forecast management is tested by using bias measures along with the market reaction to the forecasts. The study focus is on firms that have issued earnings forecasts during the period 2003-2005. Results are compared to the same firms that have released earnings forecasts during the period 1997-2001. In addition, firms that had any confounding issues during these periods (i.e., management changes, mergers, acquisitions, etc.) were eliminated from the sample. Based upon statistical analysis, conclusions are drawn that identify whether Sarbanes-Oxley becomes a factor that influences management earnings forecasts. This would have implications for voluntary disclosures in general, and specifically would indicate if such voluntary disclosures are more or less biased in a post Sarbanes-Oxley environment. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT Hypothesis About Bias of Management Forecast If the same degree of earnings management (whether positive or negative) exists in both the forecast of earnings and actual earnings, the expectation is that there would be no difference in forecast error. …" @default.
• W2097188294 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W2097188294 creator A5005054808 @default.
• W2097188294 date "2008-01-01" @default.
• W2097188294 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W2097188294 title "The Effects of Sarbanes-Oxley on Earnings Forecasts" @default.
• W2097188294 cites W1481426102 @default.
• W2097188294 cites W1541012238 @default.
• W2097188294 cites W1569512328 @default.
• W2097188294 cites W1570291510 @default.
• W2097188294 cites W1580876129 @default.
• W2097188294 cites W1583549250 @default.
• W2097188294 cites W1966308775 @default.
• W2097188294 cites W1991046643 @default.
• W2097188294 cites W2004243262 @default.
• W2097188294 cites W2011084095 @default.
• W2097188294 cites W2017059355 @default.
• W2097188294 cites W2021987479 @default.
• W2097188294 cites W2024292286 @default.
• W2097188294 cites W2044133943 @default.
• W2097188294 cites W2050191304 @default.
• W2097188294 cites W2088556288 @default.
• W2097188294 cites W2144844788 @default.
• W2097188294 cites W2146756020 @default.
• W2097188294 cites W2170240568 @default.
• W2097188294 cites W2325426657 @default.
• W2097188294 cites W2797177778 @default.
• W2097188294 hasPublicationYear "2008" @default.
• W2097188294 type Work @default.
• W2097188294 sameAs 2097188294 @default.
• W2097188294 citedByCount "1" @default.
• W2097188294 countsByYear W20971882942015 @default.
• W2097188294 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W2097188294 hasAuthorship W2097188294A5005054808 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConcept C10138342 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConcept C121955636 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConcept C137725906 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConcept C139719470 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConcept C143910263 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConcept C144133560 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConcept C162118730 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConcept C175444787 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConcept C199521495 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConcept C204983608 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConcept C2779055846 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConcept C2779815580 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConcept C2781426361 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConcept C29122968 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConceptScore W2097188294C10138342 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConceptScore W2097188294C121955636 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConceptScore W2097188294C137725906 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConceptScore W2097188294C139719470 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConceptScore W2097188294C143910263 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConceptScore W2097188294C144133560 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConceptScore W2097188294C162118730 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConceptScore W2097188294C162324750 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConceptScore W2097188294C175444787 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConceptScore W2097188294C199521495 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConceptScore W2097188294C204983608 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConceptScore W2097188294C2779055846 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConceptScore W2097188294C2779815580 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConceptScore W2097188294C2781426361 @default.
• W2097188294 hasConceptScore W2097188294C29122968 @default.
• W2097188294 hasIssue "1" @default.
• W2097188294 hasLocation W20971882941 @default.
• W2097188294 hasOpenAccess W2097188294 @default.
• W2097188294 hasPrimaryLocation W20971882941 @default.
• W2097188294 hasRelatedWork W1509165016 @default.
• W2097188294 hasRelatedWork W1510805893 @default.
• W2097188294 hasRelatedWork W1544362589 @default.
• W2097188294 hasRelatedWork W1566617977 @default.
• W2097188294 hasRelatedWork W2027907265 @default.
• W2097188294 hasRelatedWork W2047101657 @default.
• W2097188294 hasRelatedWork W2121298400 @default.
• W2097188294 hasRelatedWork W2126933887 @default.
• W2097188294 hasRelatedWork W2129505367 @default.
• W2097188294 hasRelatedWork W2150201047 @default.
• W2097188294 hasRelatedWork W2158026958 @default.
• W2097188294 hasRelatedWork W2241405641 @default.
• W2097188294 hasRelatedWork W2255510326 @default.
• W2097188294 hasRelatedWork W2257316006 @default.
• W2097188294 hasRelatedWork W2296062518 @default.
• W2097188294 hasRelatedWork W3122214958 @default.
• W2097188294 hasRelatedWork W3123004495 @default.
• W2097188294 hasRelatedWork W324820717 @default.
• W2097188294 hasRelatedWork W328901685 @default.
• W2097188294 hasRelatedWork W65222707 @default.
• W2097188294 hasVolume "12" @default.
• W2097188294 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2097188294 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W2097188294 magId "2097188294" @default.
• W2097188294 workType "article" @default.