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• W2105296061 abstract "Philosophers have overall studied intentional actions that agents attempt to perform in the world. However the pioneers of the logic of action, Belnap and Perloff, and their followers have tended to neglect the intentionality proper to human action. My primary goal is to formulate here a more general logic of action where intentional actions are primary as in contemporary philosophy of mind. In my view, any action that an agent performs involuntarily could in principle be intentional. Moreover any involuntary action of an agent is an effect of intentional actions of that agent. However, not all unintended effects of intentional actions are the contents of unintentional actions, but only those that are historically contingent and that the agent could have attempted to perform. So many events which happen to us in our life are not really actions. My logic of action contains a theory of attempt, success and action generation. Human agents are or at least feel free to act. Moreover their actions are not determined. As Belnap pointed out, we need branching time and historic modalities in the logic of action in order to account for indeterminism and the freedom of action. Propositions with the same truth conditions are identified in standard logic. However they are not the contents of the same attitudes of human agents. I will exploit the resources of a non classical predicative propositional logic which analyzes adequately the contents of attitudes. In order to explicate the nature of intentional actions one must deal with the beliefs, desires and intentions of agents. According to the current logical analysis of propositional attitudes based on Hintikka’s epistemic logic, human agents are either perfectly rational or completely irrational. I will criticize Hintikka’s approach and present a general logic of all cognitive and volitive propositional attitudes that accounts for the imperfect but minimal rationality of human agents. I will consider subjective as well as objective possibilities and explicate formally possession and satisfaction conditions of propositional attitudes. Contrary to Belnap, I will take into account the intentionality of human agents and explicate success as well as satisfaction conditions of attempts and the various forms of action generation. This chapter is a contribution to the logic of practical reason. I will formulate at the end many fundamental laws of rationality in thought and action." @default.
• W2105296061 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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• W2105296061 date "2014-01-01" @default.
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• W2105296061 title "Intentionality and Minimal Rationality in the Logic of Action" @default.
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• W2105296061 doi "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01754-9_15" @default.
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