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• W2107420527 abstract "Despite two decades of the Common Fishery Policy (CFP), the fishery politics of the European Union (EU) is considered a failure when it comes to securing fish-stocks. This paper explores reasons to this state of affairs by analysing the views and opinions among those subjected to regulations, namely professional fishermen (in Sweden). Since the capacity of any natural management regime to protect the resources depends on appropriators’ compliance, the prospects of sustainable natural management depends on improved understanding of when and why appropriators consent, and ultimately comply, with a regulative policy. So, when do fishermen comply with a fishery management regime? Instrumental views give a straightforward explanation; when the risk of being caught is considered high (and the potential economic profit of rule-breaking is low). More normative views point at various “qualities of government” such as procedural fairness, distributive justice, trust and legitimacy, but is much less specified in terms of actual explanations to appropriators’ actions. This paper adds a piece to the compliance puzzle by, relying on the model presented by Levi(1997), exploring the importance of 1) imbalanced burdens and 2) trust in authorities. Results confirm the importance of trust in authorities but contradict the idea that experiences of imbalance in burdens have a negative effect on legitimacy. Strikingly enough, fishermen who believe that other governments take greater concern in their fishing-fleets than the Swedish government, value the principles of Swedish fishery politics more. Daniel Berlin Ulrika Moller Department of Political Science, Department of Political Science, Goteborg University Goteborg University Box 711 Box 711 SE 405 30 Goteborg, Sweden SE 405 30 Goteborg, Sweden daniel.berlin@pol.gu.se ulrika.moller@pol.gu.se Sverker C. Jagers Department of Political Science, Goteborg University Box 711 SE 405 30 Goteborg, Sweden sverker.jagers@pol.gu.se Why Accept State Regulations? What make us accept and comply with regulations we are subjected to by the state? According to the instrumental approaches launched in the economic literature, it is mostly a matter of the sanctions that might follow if we chose not to. According to more normative approaches launched in political science and sociology this has also to do with a number of assessments we make concerning the process and outcome of policy: procedural fairness, distributive justice, trust and legitimacy. An implication of the normative approach is that with diverseness in implementation and exercise of policy, comes the risk of undermined legitimacy and a lower degree of compliance as a consequence. European fishery policy bears characteristics of diverseness in the sense that member-states may be more or less ambitious in implementing the Common Fishery Politics (CFP). According to the normative approach we should therefore expect the fishermen of EU member states to – once they have discovered the imbalances in burdens between fishermen of different nationalities – be less inclined both to trust the regime and to consider it as legitimate. The empirical findings presented in this paper, however, partly contradict these expectations. European Fishery: A Common Policy with Imbalanced Burdens Fish, as a global common, creates collective action problems on at least two levels. First, the short-term interest of each single fishing crew to maximize their catch runs contrary to the long term collective good of sustainable fishery and preserved fish-stocks. Second, while the collectively preferable strategy for all states would be to impose consistent regulations and supervision, each state has a short term interest to provide relatively soft conditions for their own fleet. The standard solution to escape these kinds of collective action problems is various forms of cooperation, such as setting up common rules and sanctions to prevent freeriding.1 If one considers the general cooperative structure of the European Union (EU) and the issue-specific cooperation in the Common Fishery Politics (CFP), one might therefore expect that over-exploitation is a minor problem in European fishing-waters. Especially since the CFP has been running for two decades – long enough to develop efficient supra-national institutional arrangements to reduce incentives for states and fishing-crews to free-ride. However, this is clearly not the case. The fishery politics of the European Union is severely criticized and judged a failure by several crucial actors such as the European Court of Auditors.2 One important shortcoming revealed by a study carried out by the EU Commission indicates that there is a high degree of misreporting of catches. Inspections in the Baltic Sea 2005/2006 show that 1 The risk of over-exploitation and degradation of common pool resources (CPR), such as fish stocks, has of course most famously been captured in Garrett Hardin’s metaphor “The Tragedy of the Commons” where “freedom in the commons brings ruin to all” (Hardin 1968:1244). 2 The European Court of Auditors. Sarskild rapport nr 7/2007. inspected vessels quite systematically report larger catches than non-inspected vessels.3 For Latvian vessels, the discrepancy was 8 percent, for Swedish vessels it was 21 percent, and for Polish vessels 48 percent. Assumingly, plain cheating is a core (although not necessarily the only) cause for this discrepancy in landings. Another highlighted incongruity in the CFP is that it involves imbalances of the burdens imposed on fishermen. Such disproportions are potentially risky since they are assumed to negatively impact the legitimacy of the regime as well as the trust in authoritiesat least among the offended groups.4 The theoretical foundations of this argument are further elaborated later in this paper, but it should be noted already at this stage that it is not the objective distribution of burdens that is in focus. Rather, the core of the matter is how fishermen perceive the balance and imbalance of burdens. The purpose of this paper is to test whether Swedish fishermen’s perceptions of their relative burdens within the CFP impact their trust in the national fishery authorities (Swedish Board of Fisheries, SBF) and the degree to which they consider the regulations legitimate. Judging from earlier research and official reports, there are at least two sources of perceived imbalance in burdens. Burden as governmental concern. The Common Fishery Policy (CFP) of the European Union involves a resource management element. The resource management aims at recovering and preserving the resource stocks through regulations such as catch limits, quotas, protected areas, restricted access zones, effort limits and gear restrictions. The shape and content of these regulations are the result of national governments negotiating with each other. Swedish fishermen have perceptions of in which degree the Swedish government takes the interests of the fishing industry into consideration in these negotiations. They evaluate how concerned their government is compared to how concerned other governments are for their fishing fleets. The positions and strategies of a government depend on a number of factors such as the relative importance of fisheries, the size of the fishing fleet and the strength of the fishery lobby.5 The principle of relative stability set frames for the distributions of fishing rights and quotas among the member countries. Still, the bargaining about the TAC levels as such can, in the minds of fishermen, indicate whether their government shows low or high concern for the fishing industry. Ever since the first days of the CFP, there have been substantial differences between countries when it comes to formulating the CFP and decides on regulations. In a study on the negotiations of the 2003 CFP reform, two main 3 “Evaluation report in catch registration in Baltic-sea member states” (January, 2007). 4 European Court of Auditors. Sarskild rapport 7/2007 5 Lequesne 2004, SLI 2006, Hasselberg 1997." @default.
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• W2107420527 title "Navigating Towards Effective Fishery Management: Exploring the Impact of Imbalanced Burdens on Regime Legitimacy" @default.
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