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• W2119093007 abstract "Abstract Privatisation is widely promoted as a means of improving economic performance in developing countries. However, the policy remains controversial and the relative roles of ownership and other structural changes, such as competition and regulation, in promoting economic performance remain uncertain. This article reviews the main empirical evidence on the impact of privatisation on economic performance in developing economies. The evidence suggests that if privatisation is to improve performance over the longer term, it needs to be complemented by policies that promote competition and effective state regulation, and that privatisation works best in developing countries when it is integrated into a broader process of structural reform. Notes David Parker (corresponding author>, School of Management, Cranfield University, Cranfield, Bedfordshire, MK43 0AL and Centre on Regulation and Competition, IDPM, University of Manchester. Tel:(+ 44)1234 754378; fax(+ 44)1234 752136 e-mail: david.parker@cranfield.ac.uk. Colin Kirkpatrick, Centre on Regulation and Competition, IDPM, University of Manchester. The authors would like to thank three referees for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies. For much earlier studies, where the emphasis was on reviewing the comparative performance of public and private enterprises in developing countries, see Cook and Kirkpatrick [ Citation 1988 ] and Millward [ Citation 1988 ]. For example, Brune and Garrett [ Citation 2000 ] report that privatisation is promoted by good economic conditions; and D'Souza, Megginson and Nash [ Citation 2001 ] based on a sample of 118 firms from 29 countries, find stronger output gains from privatisation in countries with faster growing economies. Panel data includes both cross-sectional (in this case cross-country) and time series statistics. Panel data are analysed using either a random effects or fixed effects model. The random effects model assumes that the random error associated with each cross-section unit is uncorrelated with the other regressors. Where this is not appropriate, the fixed effects model is superior. A measure of debt to equity financing. Wallsten [ Citation 2000 ] finds that exclusivity agreements for telecoms in developing countries reduce performance but boost government receipts, suggesting that monopoly rents are shared between private shareholders and government. Indeed, Bortolloti et al. [2000: 19] note some accounting write-offs: ‘The governments of Argentina and Venezuela assumed debts of US$930 million and $471 million respectively, prior to the sale of their telephone companies. In Ghana, the government assumed $6.3 million in debts and unpaid taxes before divestiture’. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether the data have been adjusted to allow for the accounts restructuring. On water there are two tentative studies by Estache and Rossi [ Citation 2002 ] and Estache and Kouassi [ Citation 2002 ], but they are far from conclusive. Privatisation was found to have had a favourable impact on the performance of water utilities in Africa but not in Asia. http://rru.worldbank.org/Resources.asp?results = true&stopicids = 35 Shirley and Walsh [ Citation 2001 ] in their review of studies on private versus public enterprise also show that the benefits of privatisation are less pronounced where there are monopolies. A number of privatisations in Uganda [ Citation Tangri and Mwenda, 2001 ], Zambia [ Citation Craig, 2000 ], Bukina Faso [ Citation Sawadogo, 2000 ] and Cote D'Ivoire [ Citation Wilson, 1994 ], for example, have involved the transfer of assets to politicians, their families and their associates on preferential terms. Additional informationNotes on contributorsDavid Parker David Parker (corresponding author>, School of Management, Cranfield University, Cranfield, Bedfordshire, MK43 0AL and Centre on Regulation and Competition, IDPM, University of Manchester. Tel:(+ 44)1234 754378; fax(+ 44)1234 752136 e-mail: david.parker@cranfield.ac.uk. Colin Kirkpatrick, Centre on Regulation and Competition, IDPM, University of Manchester. The authors would like to thank three referees for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies." @default.
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• W2119093007 date "2005-05-01" @default.
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• W2119093007 title "Privatisation in Developing Countries: A Review of the Evidence and the Policy Lessons" @default.
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• W2119093007 doi "https://doi.org/10.1080/00220380500092499" @default.
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