FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

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• W212654310 abstract "Biometric authentication based on facial image, fingerprint, palm print, iris, retina, or veins are becoming increasingly popular. However, compromised biometric templates, indeed, may lead to serious threats to identity and their inherent irrevocability makes this risk even more serious. Because of such serious privacy implications the need for privacypreserving biometric authentication protocols is of utmost importance. Recently, Yasuda et al. [1, 2] proposed two efficient privacy-preserving biometric authentication using packed homomorphic encryption based on ideal lattices and on ring learning with error. We review these protocols and analyse their security against malicious internal adversaries. Yasuda et al. [1, 2] have proposed two packed homomorphic encryption schemes based, respectively, on ideal lattices and on ring-LWE (ring-learning-with-errors). Let vE1p q be the type 1 packed encryption, and vE2p q the type 2 packed encryption. Let A and B be bitstrings of length N . Then, ctH “ CvE1pAq`C vE2pBq 2vE1pAqvE2pBq corresponds to an encryption of the Hamming distance between A and B, for suitable chosen constants C and C 1. In particular, vE1pAqvE2pBq provides an encryption of the inner product between A and B. Both protocols involve three entities (a client server C, a computation server CS and an authentication server AS) and are composed of three phases: – Setup Phase: AS generates the public key pk and the secret key sk for the SHE schemes, and distributes only pk to both C and CS. – Enrolment Phase: C generates a feature vector A from the client’s biometric readings, computes vE1pAq, and sends it with client’s ID to CS, who then stores vE1pAq and ID in its database DB. – Authentication Phase: C generates a feature vector B from the client’s fresh biometric readings, computes vE2pBq, and sends it with the client’s ID to CS. Then, CS retrieves the template vE1pAq corresponding to ID from DB, computes ctHand sends ctH to AS. Subsequently, AS decrypts ctH with the secret key sk to obtain the Hamming distance HDpA,Bq. Finally, AS returns the authentication result YES (resp. NO) to C if HDpA,Bq ď τ (resp., otherwise), where τ is a pre-defined threshold. We briefly describe the attack algorithms that could be employed when C (Algorithm 1) and CS (Algorithm 2) are malicious. Note that Algorithm 1 can also be employed by a compromised CS. In the attack algorithm descriptions, C A ÝN CS denotes C sends A to CS. Algorithm 1 Center search attack Input: B “ B1, , BN (fresh) Output: A “ A1, , AN (reference) for i “ 1 to N : do D Ð Ď B1, . . . , Ď Bi, Bi`1, . . . , BN C vE2pDq ÝÝÝÝN CS CS ctH ÝÝN AS" @default.
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• W212654310 date "2014-01-01" @default.
• W212654310 modified "2023-09-28" @default.
• W212654310 title "Attacks on Privacy-Preserving Biometric Authentication" @default.
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