FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2130508045> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2130508045 endingPage "118" @default.
• W2130508045 startingPage "111" @default.
• W2130508045 abstract "Given the usual assumptions, the traditional Pigouvian results are unassailable. Applied to externalities, the result is that a tax upon the generator of the externality alone is all that is required for obtaining optimal resource allocation.l This obtains whether participants operate independently or merge. 2 Buchanan 3 and Davis and Whinston 4 question this assertion in situations of monopoly and oligopoly; however, for the case of a large number of participants (consumers and producers) the Pigouvian results hold. As is well understood, however, the usual Pigouvian model does not explicitly analyze behavior beyond the imposition of the tax nor does it incorporate the reciprocal nature of externalities) Therefore, the unassailability of the results rests upo n a set of restrictive, neoclassical assumptions. As developed below the important assumptions include the following: first, that the externality is unidirectional; and second, that there exists a static set of production options. Furthermore, even if the Pigouvian tradition implicitly accepts the existence of new production options, it must assume that all possible abatement production options be separable, in order that the single tax upon the generator be optimal. I argue in this note that if these assumptions do not obtain, an alternative formulation exists which dominates the traditional Pigouvian solution. The argument proceeds as follows. Section I reiterates the simple model of the Pigouvian prescriptions developed by Baumol. 6 Taking the major insight of Coase's: discussion to be that every externality is essentially reciprocal in nature, I assume in Section II that the elimination of that externality (when it is bad) should also be reciprocal in nature. This reciprocity is made explicit by introducing a social abatement function into Baumol's Pigouvian model. Using this extended welfare model, I demonstrate that joint, interrelated responses (abatement costs) by pollutor and pollutee will be optimal and would require an 'alternative Pigouvian tax' be imposed upon both parties rather than 'the generator of the externality alone.' I indicate that this alternative will be Pareto superior to the standard Pigouvian" @default.
• W2130508045 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W2130508045 creator A5069610283 @default.
• W2130508045 date "1982-06-01" @default.
• W2130508045 modified "2023-10-18" @default.
• W2130508045 title "A note on externalities and the placement of property rights: An alternative formulation to the standard pigouvian results" @default.
• W2130508045 cites W1526826117 @default.
• W2130508045 cites W1564592008 @default.
• W2130508045 cites W1971688653 @default.
• W2130508045 cites W1972711406 @default.
• W2130508045 cites W2088001924 @default.
• W2130508045 cites W2331341152 @default.
• W2130508045 cites W4246223421 @default.
• W2130508045 doi "https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(82)90017-5" @default.
• W2130508045 hasPublicationYear "1982" @default.
• W2130508045 type Work @default.
• W2130508045 sameAs 2130508045 @default.
• W2130508045 citedByCount "11" @default.
• W2130508045 countsByYear W21305080452012 @default.
• W2130508045 countsByYear W21305080452013 @default.
• W2130508045 countsByYear W21305080452017 @default.
• W2130508045 countsByYear W21305080452020 @default.
• W2130508045 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W2130508045 hasAuthorship W2130508045A5069610283 @default.
• W2130508045 hasConcept C111472728 @default.
• W2130508045 hasConcept C138885662 @default.
• W2130508045 hasConcept C144237770 @default.
• W2130508045 hasConcept C16118543 @default.
• W2130508045 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W2130508045 hasConcept C175444787 @default.
• W2130508045 hasConcept C189950617 @default.
• W2130508045 hasConcept C86511162 @default.
• W2130508045 hasConceptScore W2130508045C111472728 @default.
• W2130508045 hasConceptScore W2130508045C138885662 @default.
• W2130508045 hasConceptScore W2130508045C144237770 @default.
• W2130508045 hasConceptScore W2130508045C16118543 @default.
• W2130508045 hasConceptScore W2130508045C162324750 @default.
• W2130508045 hasConceptScore W2130508045C175444787 @default.
• W2130508045 hasConceptScore W2130508045C189950617 @default.
• W2130508045 hasConceptScore W2130508045C86511162 @default.
• W2130508045 hasIssue "1" @default.
• W2130508045 hasLocation W21305080451 @default.
• W2130508045 hasOpenAccess W2130508045 @default.
• W2130508045 hasPrimaryLocation W21305080451 @default.
• W2130508045 hasRelatedWork W1599271201 @default.
• W2130508045 hasRelatedWork W2054400675 @default.
• W2130508045 hasRelatedWork W2263685221 @default.
• W2130508045 hasRelatedWork W2353375618 @default.
• W2130508045 hasRelatedWork W2359671357 @default.
• W2130508045 hasRelatedWork W2363067551 @default.
• W2130508045 hasRelatedWork W2379213643 @default.
• W2130508045 hasRelatedWork W2617607248 @default.
• W2130508045 hasRelatedWork W3123171849 @default.
• W2130508045 hasRelatedWork W3125376649 @default.
• W2130508045 hasVolume "2" @default.
• W2130508045 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2130508045 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W2130508045 magId "2130508045" @default.
• W2130508045 workType "article" @default.