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• W2131021310 abstract "The subject of my article is the principle of characterization–the most controversial principle of Meinong’s Theory of Objects. The aim of this text is twofold. First of all, I would like to show that Russell’s well-known objection to Meinong’s Theory of Objects can be reformulated against a new modal interpretation of Meinongianism that is presented mostly by Graham Priest. Secondly, I would like to propose a strategy which gives uncontroversial restriction to the principle of characterization and which makes it possible to avoid Russell’s argument. The strategy is based on the distinction between object language and metalanguage, and it applies to modal Meinongianism as well as to other so-called Meinongian theories. Every so-called Meinongian theory has to face a well-known argument which was presented by Bertrand Russell in “On Denoting” (Russell, 1956).1 The aim of this critique was to point out that Meinong’s Theory of Objects is inconsistent, false, and worthless from a theoretical point of view. This is so–Russell argued–because one of the fundamental assumptions of this theory (the principle of characterization) leads to a consequence which is ridiculous from an ontological perspective. Although nowadays over a hundred years have passed since Russell first published his classic paper in 1905, and thereafter many philosophers have tried to reply to it, Russell’s criticism is still regarded as a serious challenge. Among the plentitude of theories inspired by Meinong’s views, Graham Priest’s theory (called “Noneism” or “modal Meinongianism”) is the newest one. Because of this one can expect it to deliver an interesting reply to Russell’s argument. Moreover, Priest assures us that, in fact, it does. In this 1 Thanks to Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, Graham Priest and Janine Reinert for their comments which helped to improve a previous version of the paper presented here. 64 Modal Meinongianism, Russell’s Paradox, and the Language/Metalanguage Distinction article I would like to put this claim to the test. Nonetheless, the conclusion of my paper is rather positive–Priest’s theory is immune to Russell’s critique and, in fact, older Meinongian theories are as well. This is so because the above-mentioned argument might be taken to be based on a methodological misunderstanding, and its reformulation in terms of Priest’s theory will help me to show why it is invalid. I believe that showing what is wrong with a Russell-style argument against Noneism will allow me to show that this argument was invalid in the first place, i.e. when it was used against Meinong’s original theory. In order to present my thesis I will start with a brief sketch of the main assumptions and claims of the original Theory of Objects and I will show how it was criticized by Bertrand Russell. Further, I will recall how various advocates of Meinong’s theory (especially Priest) have been trying to defend “non-existence” against Russell’s critique. At the end I will sketch a proposal for solving the puzzle of the principle of characterization. 1. Theory of Objects and the Principle of Characterization According to the main and well-known thesis of Meinong’s theory, “there are objects concerning which it is the case that there are no such objects” (Meinong, 1960). This controversial claim seems to be paradoxical, but in fact it expresses a simple idea according to which there are objects which we consider to be non-existent ones. Popular examples of such objects are:1) fictional objects such as Sherlock Holmes or Bilbo Baggins, 2) merely possible objects like a golden mountain, and 3) impossible ones like a round square. In some sense it is true to say that each of these objects does not exist. On the other hand, it seems that we truly ascribe some properties to them, e.g.: “Sherlock Holmes is a detective,” “The golden mountain is not green,” “The round square is round and square.” Because of that the so-called Meinongian claim is sometimes presented in a less paradoxical formulation, i.e. as a claim according to which there are nonexistent objects or that not every object exists. The Theory of Objects is based on three principles: 1) The Principle of Intentionality, according to which every intentional act has its object. This principle applies to all objects–no matter whether this object exists or does not. According to this principle it is argued that we can think, worship, or be afraid of, for example, George Bush as well as Sherlock Holmes or Bilbo Baggins. 2) The Principle of Independence states that the nature (Sosein) of an object is independent of its ontological status (Sein). In other words," @default.
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• W2131021310 date "2013-01-01" @default.
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• W2131021310 title "Modal Meinongianism, Russell’s Paradox, and the Language/Metalanguage Distinction" @default.
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• W2131021310 doi "https://doi.org/10.5840/pjphil20137211" @default.
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