Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2132394474> ?p ?o ?g. }
Showing items 1 to 59 of
59
with 100 items per page.
- W2132394474 abstract "In uniform-price auctions of shares there exist collusive equilibria in which bidders capture the entire surplus from the auction as well as competitive equilibria in which the auctioneer captures the entire surplus from the auction. We provide experimental evidence that, in uniform-price auctions, non-binding pre-play communication facilitates convergence to collusive equilibrium outcomes. On the other hand, regardless of the opportunities for communication, in discriminatory-auction experiments subject strategies conform closely with the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies in which bidders' gains are equal to the smallest tick size in the bidding schedule. This evidence suggests that uniform-price auctions of Treasury securities may result in lower revenues than the currently employed discriminatory procedure." @default.
- W2132394474 created "2016-06-24" @default.
- W2132394474 creator A5018411459 @default.
- W2132394474 date "1996-01-01" @default.
- W2132394474 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
- W2132394474 title "Collusion in uniform price and discriminatory auctions of shares: experimental evidence" @default.
- W2132394474 hasPublicationYear "1996" @default.
- W2132394474 type Work @default.
- W2132394474 sameAs 2132394474 @default.
- W2132394474 citedByCount "0" @default.
- W2132394474 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
- W2132394474 hasAuthorship W2132394474A5018411459 @default.
- W2132394474 hasConcept C11276805 @default.
- W2132394474 hasConcept C144237770 @default.
- W2132394474 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
- W2132394474 hasConcept C163239763 @default.
- W2132394474 hasConcept C166957645 @default.
- W2132394474 hasConcept C175444787 @default.
- W2132394474 hasConcept C2780889827 @default.
- W2132394474 hasConcept C2781198186 @default.
- W2132394474 hasConcept C9233905 @default.
- W2132394474 hasConcept C95457728 @default.
- W2132394474 hasConceptScore W2132394474C11276805 @default.
- W2132394474 hasConceptScore W2132394474C144237770 @default.
- W2132394474 hasConceptScore W2132394474C162324750 @default.
- W2132394474 hasConceptScore W2132394474C163239763 @default.
- W2132394474 hasConceptScore W2132394474C166957645 @default.
- W2132394474 hasConceptScore W2132394474C175444787 @default.
- W2132394474 hasConceptScore W2132394474C2780889827 @default.
- W2132394474 hasConceptScore W2132394474C2781198186 @default.
- W2132394474 hasConceptScore W2132394474C9233905 @default.
- W2132394474 hasConceptScore W2132394474C95457728 @default.
- W2132394474 hasLocation W21323944741 @default.
- W2132394474 hasOpenAccess W2132394474 @default.
- W2132394474 hasPrimaryLocation W21323944741 @default.
- W2132394474 hasRelatedWork W1562618743 @default.
- W2132394474 hasRelatedWork W1580952499 @default.
- W2132394474 hasRelatedWork W1607040911 @default.
- W2132394474 hasRelatedWork W2036378980 @default.
- W2132394474 hasRelatedWork W2051167088 @default.
- W2132394474 hasRelatedWork W2099695087 @default.
- W2132394474 hasRelatedWork W2102466870 @default.
- W2132394474 hasRelatedWork W2127003504 @default.
- W2132394474 hasRelatedWork W2241626030 @default.
- W2132394474 hasRelatedWork W2343702252 @default.
- W2132394474 hasRelatedWork W2810279979 @default.
- W2132394474 hasRelatedWork W2973151968 @default.
- W2132394474 hasRelatedWork W3121394074 @default.
- W2132394474 hasRelatedWork W3121951982 @default.
- W2132394474 hasRelatedWork W3122428314 @default.
- W2132394474 hasRelatedWork W3124115591 @default.
- W2132394474 hasRelatedWork W3125179811 @default.
- W2132394474 hasRelatedWork W3125612907 @default.
- W2132394474 hasRelatedWork W3140462126 @default.
- W2132394474 hasRelatedWork W3192670739 @default.
- W2132394474 isParatext "false" @default.
- W2132394474 isRetracted "false" @default.
- W2132394474 magId "2132394474" @default.
- W2132394474 workType "article" @default.