Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2133084672> ?p ?o ?g. }
- W2133084672 abstract "This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and heterogeneous moral hazard. Each of the three outcomes can be summarized by a single closed-form equation. In assignment models without moral hazard, allocation depends only on firm size and the equilibrium is efficient. Here, talent assignment is distorted by the agency problem as firms involving higher risk or disutility choose less talented CEOs. Such firms also pay higher salaries in the cross-section, but economy-wide increases in risk or the disutility of being a CEO (e.g. due to regulation) do not affect pay. The strength of incentives depends only on the disutility of effort and is independent of risk and risk aversion. If the CEO affects the volatility as well as mean of firm returns, incentives rise and are increasing in risk and risk aversion. We calibrate the efficiency losses from various forms of poor corporate governance, such as failures in monitoring and inefficiencies in CEO assignment. The losses from misallocation of talent are orders of magnitude higher than from inefficient risk-sharing." @default.
- W2133084672 created "2016-06-24" @default.
- W2133084672 creator A5031996018 @default.
- W2133084672 creator A5069579613 @default.
- W2133084672 date "2010-05-01" @default.
- W2133084672 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
- W2133084672 title "Risk and the CEO Market: Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs?" @default.
- W2133084672 cites W1490571554 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W1505035400 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W1526941477 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W1528172230 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W1580213523 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W1832017560 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W1892980290 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W1991795148 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W1992333307 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W1995959404 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2007872900 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2009931790 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2022317253 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2030034216 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2031038102 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2031190735 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2041317668 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2048478822 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2048644900 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2055022672 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2061322650 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2063503639 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2099879836 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2106580408 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2112024505 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2117776294 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2118250026 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2132594562 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2137247886 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2142008025 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2154288561 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2170723386 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2270170809 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2339730834 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W2741066288 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W3023928359 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W3121591358 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W3122028926 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W3123108620 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W3123622759 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W3123982724 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W3124258145 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W3124379587 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W3124737373 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W3125541797 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W3125882780 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W3125947162 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W3135490280 @default.
- W2133084672 cites W313770687 @default.
- W2133084672 doi "https://doi.org/10.3386/w15987" @default.
- W2133084672 hasPublicationYear "2010" @default.
- W2133084672 type Work @default.
- W2133084672 sameAs 2133084672 @default.
- W2133084672 citedByCount "0" @default.
- W2133084672 crossrefType "report" @default.
- W2133084672 hasAuthorship W2133084672A5031996018 @default.
- W2133084672 hasAuthorship W2133084672A5069579613 @default.
- W2133084672 hasBestOaLocation W21330846722 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConcept C10138342 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConcept C106159729 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConcept C120757647 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConcept C129915516 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConcept C144133560 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConcept C151392489 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConcept C175444787 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConcept C200707436 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConcept C205706631 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConcept C2780202544 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConcept C29122968 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConcept C36673458 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConcept C39389867 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConcept C91602232 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConceptScore W2133084672C10138342 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConceptScore W2133084672C106159729 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConceptScore W2133084672C120757647 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConceptScore W2133084672C129915516 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConceptScore W2133084672C144133560 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConceptScore W2133084672C151392489 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConceptScore W2133084672C162324750 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConceptScore W2133084672C175444787 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConceptScore W2133084672C200707436 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConceptScore W2133084672C205706631 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConceptScore W2133084672C2780202544 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConceptScore W2133084672C29122968 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConceptScore W2133084672C36673458 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConceptScore W2133084672C39389867 @default.
- W2133084672 hasConceptScore W2133084672C91602232 @default.
- W2133084672 hasLocation W21330846721 @default.
- W2133084672 hasLocation W21330846722 @default.
- W2133084672 hasOpenAccess W2133084672 @default.
- W2133084672 hasPrimaryLocation W21330846721 @default.
- W2133084672 hasRelatedWork W1520827662 @default.