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• W2135273412 abstract "Domestic and wild animal population movements are important in the spread of disease. There are many recent examples of disease spread that have occurred as a result of intentional movements of livestock or wildlife. Understanding the volume of these movements and the risks associated with them is fundamental in elucidating the epidemiology of these diseases, some of which might entail zoonotic risks. The importance of the worldwide animal trade is reviewed and the role of the unregulated trade in animals is highlighted. A range of key examples are discussed in which animal movements have resulted in the introduction of pathogens to previously disease-free areas. Measures based on heightened surveillance are proposed that mitigate the risks of new pathogen introductions. Domestic and wild animal population movements are important in the spread of disease. There are many recent examples of disease spread that have occurred as a result of intentional movements of livestock or wildlife. Understanding the volume of these movements and the risks associated with them is fundamental in elucidating the epidemiology of these diseases, some of which might entail zoonotic risks. The importance of the worldwide animal trade is reviewed and the role of the unregulated trade in animals is highlighted. A range of key examples are discussed in which animal movements have resulted in the introduction of pathogens to previously disease-free areas. Measures based on heightened surveillance are proposed that mitigate the risks of new pathogen introductions. Infectious diseases are transmitted between hosts by a variety of mechanisms, including direct, airborne and vector-borne transmission. Control of animal-to-animal transmission of disease agents is a key concept in infectious disease epidemiology; however, a more sensible approach might be to prevent the types of contact that lead to transmission in the first place. In humans, it is often difficult to prevent contacts, particularly with the ease of long-distance travel [1Wilson M.E. Travel and the emergence of infectious diseases.Emerg. Infect. Dis. 1995; 1: 39-46Crossref PubMed Scopus (256) Google Scholar]. However, in livestock and animals, movements can be the subject of legislation or strict controls and there is a real opportunity to reduce disease transmission. The importance of animal movements is, of course, well understood and international regulations [e.g. from the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE; Box 1) ] exist to mitigate the risks involved [2Kellar J.A. The application of risk analysis to international trade in animal products.Rev. Sci. Tech. 1993; 12: 1023-1044PubMed Google Scholar]. In spite of these regulations, outbreaks occur regularly as a result of both legal and illegal animal movements.Useful web addressesInternational organizationsFood and Agriculture Organization: www.fao.orgWorld Health Organization: www.who.intWorld Organization for Animal Health: www.oie.intWorld Trade Organization: www.wto.intAfrican Union–Inter African Bureau for Animal Research: www.au-ibar.orgOrganization for Economic Co-operation and Development: www.oecd.orgInternational regulatory bodiesCouncil of Europe: www.coe.intEuropean Union: europa.eu.intConvention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora: www.cites.orgWorld Conservation Union: www.iucn.orgConvention on Biological Diversity: www.biodiv.orgInternational Air Transport Association: www.iata.orgNational regulatory and research bodiesUnited Kingdom Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs: www.defra.gov.ukUnited Kingdom PET Passport Scheme: www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/quarantine/index.htmUnited Kingdom Foresight Project: www.foresight.gov.ukUnited States Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service: www.aphis.usda.govUnited States Centers for Disease Control: www.cdc.govUniversity of Edinburgh: www.ed.ac.uk Food and Agriculture Organization: www.fao.org World Health Organization: www.who.int World Organization for Animal Health: www.oie.int World Trade Organization: www.wto.int African Union–Inter African Bureau for Animal Research: www.au-ibar.org Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development: www.oecd.org Council of Europe: www.coe.int European Union: europa.eu.int Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora: www.cites.org World Conservation Union: www.iucn.org Convention on Biological Diversity: www.biodiv.org International Air Transport Association: www.iata.org United Kingdom Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs: www.defra.gov.uk United Kingdom PET Passport Scheme: www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/quarantine/index.htm United Kingdom Foresight Project: www.foresight.gov.uk United States Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service: www.aphis.usda.gov United States Centers for Disease Control: www.cdc.gov University of Edinburgh: www.ed.ac.uk In this review, we examine several issues that relate to the movement of domestic and wild animals and discuss the risks that these movements entail – at local, regional and global scales – with regard to the spread of disease. First, we present data on livestock movements at a global level, and highlight the scale of wildlife movements as a result of translocation by humans. Second, we provide key case studies of animal and animal-to-human (zoonotic) disease introductions in different parts of the world that have resulted in subsequent disease transmission and new outbreaks, with an emphasis on how introduction of the disease agents could have been prevented either through intervention or regulation. The trade in livestock, wildlife and animal products is enormous and complex, and occurs on many different scales. There are no overriding rules to control these movements and much of the trade is still based on bilateral agreements between countries. However, countries that are members of the World Trade Organization are bound by the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm), which concerns food safety and animal and plant health regulations. Countries are encouraged to base their sanitary and phytosanitary measures on existing international standards. The international standards relating to animal health and zoonoses were developed by the OIE and are stated in the aquatic and terrestrial animal health codes (http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/fcode/en_index.htm and http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/a_summry.htm, respectively). The aim of the codes is to assure the sanitary safety of the international trade in terrestrial animals and their products by detailing the health measures that should be used by the veterinary authorities. The important role of a good veterinary infrastructure to minimize the risks of disease spread has been emphasized [3Thiermann A. Emerging diseases and implications for global trade.Rev. Sci. Tech. 2004; 23: 701-707PubMed Google Scholar]. The relevant legislation for international wildlife trade [4Cooper M.E. Rosser A.M. International regulation of wildlife trade: relevant legislation and organisations.Rev. Sci. Tech. 2002; 21: 103-123PubMed Google Scholar] relates to three main areas: animal health, animal welfare and the international movement of endangered species. The animal health regulations relevant for livestock trade (see earlier) also apply to non-domesticated animals. However, additional regulations exist for wildlife to protect endangered species from overexploitation from trade, in the form of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Detailed guidelines have also been developed by the World Conservation Union (IUCN) to minimize disease risks associated with the intentional movement of wildlife for conservation or game management purposes: for example, the supplementation of populations, reintroduction of endangered species, removal of problem animals and the release of confiscated animals [4Cooper M.E. Rosser A.M. International regulation of wildlife trade: relevant legislation and organisations.Rev. Sci. Tech. 2002; 21: 103-123PubMed Google Scholar] (Table 1).Table 1Laws and other measures relevant to the trade and movement of domestic and wild animalsaAdapted from Ref. [4].LevelAnimal healthAnimal welfareEndangered speciesInternationalWorld Trade Organization and Sanitary and Phytosanitary AgreementInternational Air Transport Association regulationsCITESInternational Animal Health Code and International Aquatic Animal Health Code (World Organization for Animal Health - OIE)International Animal Health Code and International Aquatic Animal Health Code (World Organization for Animal Health - OIE)CBDIUCN guidelinesRegionalEuropean Union directives (numerous)European Union Regulation (transport of animals)European Union and CITES regulationCouncil of Europe Convention (transport of animals)NationalLaws on control of disease and movementAnti-cruelty laws, welfare codesLaws implementing CITES and CBD, species protectionSub-nationalLocal restrictions on animal movementa Adapted from Ref. 4Cooper M.E. Rosser A.M. International regulation of wildlife trade: relevant legislation and organisations.Rev. Sci. Tech. 2002; 21: 103-123PubMed Google Scholar. Open table in a new tab The international trade in livestock is big business; for example, in 1996, China exported US$ 48 million, US$ 294 million and US$ 121 million worth of cattle, swine and poultry, respectively [5Carter, C.A. and Li, X. (1999) Economic reform and the changing pattern of China's agricultural trade (working paper no. 99-003). Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Davis. http://ideas.repec.org/p/cdl/aredav/1044.htmlGoogle Scholar]. In 1999, Sudan exported 1 616 363 sheep, 435 cattle, 40 501 goats and 159 483 camels, mainly to Egypt and the Middle East [6Aklilu, Y. et al. (2002) An audit of the livestock marketing status in Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan (vol. I). Community-Based Animal Health and Participatory Epidemiology Unit, Pan African Programme for the Control of Epizootics and Organization of African Unity/Interafrican Bureau for Animal Resources. http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC11334.htmGoogle Scholar]. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Global Livestock Production and Health Atlas (GLiPHA; http://www.fao.org/ag/aga/glipha/index.jsp) also provides data on live livestock imports for most countries of the world. For example, Australia exported 895 982 heads of cattle, 5 421 408 sheep, 2976 horses, and 5 asses in 2000 (Table 2), with large numbers of live sheep exported to the Middle East [7Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2000) Monthly Statistics of International Trade OECD (vols. 2000-1–2000-12). http://lysander.sourceoecd.org/Google Scholar].Table 2Examples of the volume of live imports of different livestock species from a range of countries in 2002aSource: FAO GLiPHA, available at http://www.fao.org/ag/aga/glipha.CountrySheepPigsChickensCattleBelgium52 261693 891136 25461 054UK0231 42735125966USA139 1625 741 27569522 505 279China30221163100211 432Brazil4951368137219 242Mozambique2876867841809Egypt68 195Data not available553792 492India0943204674Philippines44713662529117 146a Source: FAO GLiPHA, available at http://www.fao.org/ag/aga/glipha. Open table in a new tab Unregulated (illegal or informal) trade is, by its nature, difficult to quantify, although available data for some regions of the world show that unregulated trade is substantial. Although there are no official records, it has been documented that, for example, 75 000 head of cattle move from Somalia to Kenya annually, and that up to 850 000 goats move from Somalia to the Middle East (which accounts for >95% of all goat imports from the eastern Africa region) [8Little, P. (2005) Unofficial trade when States are weak: the case of cross-border commerce in the Horn of Africa (research paper of UNU-WIDER No. 2005/13). Expert Group on Development Issues (EGDI), World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), United Nations University. http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/publications.htmGoogle Scholar]. Indeed, in the case of cattle trading with Kenya, political instability resulted in a large increase in the value of unofficial trade. This coincided with a collapse in the animal health infrastructure of Somalia and a resulting lack of animal export controls. Diseases known to have been circulating in Somalia include both zoonotic and non-zoonotic infectious diseases: anthrax, babesiosis, brucellosis, contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, contagious caprine pleuropneumonia, foot and mouth disease (FMD), heartwater, peste des petits ruminants, rabies, Rift Valley fever, rinderpest and trypanosomiasis, among others [9Food and Agriculture Organization (2004) Somalia: towards a livestock sector strategy – final report (Report No. 04/001 IC–SOM) FAO/World Bank/European Union http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOMALIAEXTN/Resources/so_LS_final_rpt.pdfGoogle Scholar]. Unofficially traded animals are a much greater risk factor for disease spread because they are not necessarily subject to veterinary controls. It has been reported that much of the human brucellosis problem in Saudi Arabia, which has an incidence of 40 cases per 100 000 people nationally, is the result of unscreened and unregulated imports that come mainly from Africa [10Memish Z. Brucellosis control in Saudi Arabia: prospects and challenges.J. Chemother. 2001; 13: 11-17PubMed Google Scholar]. The picture that emerges from a consideration of these various data sources is one of a highly interconnected world in which animals move locally, regionally and across large international distances. The global wildlife trade is also huge, with an annual turnover estimated at billions of dollars and involving hundreds of millions of individual plants and animals (http://www.traffic.org/25/wild1.htm). Precise estimates of its scale are difficult because much is conducted through informal or illegal networks but recent figures suggest that ∼40 000 live primates, four million live birds, 640 000 live reptiles and 350 million live tropical fish are traded globally each year [11Karesh W.B. et al.Wildlife trade and global disease emergence.Emerg. Infect. Dis. 2005; 11: 1000-1002Crossref PubMed Google Scholar]. In Asia, the substantial regional trade in wild animals is estimated to result in several billion direct and indirect contacts among wildlife, humans and domestic animals each year [11Karesh W.B. et al.Wildlife trade and global disease emergence.Emerg. Infect. Dis. 2005; 11: 1000-1002Crossref PubMed Google Scholar]. Despite the widespread recognition of the risks of disease transmission associated with wildlife translocation, and the legislation and regulation in place to minimize disease risks [4Cooper M.E. Rosser A.M. International regulation of wildlife trade: relevant legislation and organisations.Rev. Sci. Tech. 2002; 21: 103-123PubMed Google Scholar, 12Woodford M.H. International disease implications for wildlife translocation.J. Zoo Wildl. Med. 1993; 24: 265-270Google Scholar, 13Cunningham A.A. Disease risks of wildlife translocations.Conserv. Biol. 1996; 10: 349-353Crossref Scopus (290) Google Scholar, 14Daszak P. et al.Emerging infectious diseases of wildlife – threats to biodiversity and human health.Science. 2000; 287: 443-449Crossref PubMed Scopus (3007) Google Scholar], new diseases continue to emerge as a result of wildlife trade. Here, we present key examples from the past five years that illustrate the continuing threat to human, livestock and wildlife health. Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and highly pathogenic avian influenza (e.g. H5N1) are emerging infections that have the potential for pandemic spread with massive public health and economic consequences. Both diseases are maintained in wildlife reservoir hosts: H5N1 in wild fowl and SARS in horseshoe bats (Rhinolophus species) in China [15Li W. et al.Bats are natural reservoirs of SARS-like Coronaviruses.Science. 2005; 310: 676-679Crossref PubMed Scopus (1797) Google Scholar, 16Lau S.K. et al.Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-like virus in Chinese horseshoe bats.Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 2005; 102: 14040-14045Crossref PubMed Scopus (1178) Google Scholar]. For SARS, the trade in bats is likely to have brought infected animals into contact with susceptible amplifying hosts such as the masked palm civet (Parguma larvata) at some point in the wildlife supply chain, establishing a market cycle in which susceptible people and animals could subsequently become infected [15Li W. et al.Bats are natural reservoirs of SARS-like Coronaviruses.Science. 2005; 310: 676-679Crossref PubMed Scopus (1797) Google Scholar, 16Lau S.K. et al.Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-like virus in Chinese horseshoe bats.Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 2005; 102: 14040-14045Crossref PubMed Scopus (1178) Google Scholar]. For avian influenza, these ‘wet markets’ could also function as network hubs for potential cross-species transmission. However, the international trade in birds also poses considerable risks for long-distance transmission of H5N1, as highlighted by the detection of infected hawk eagles imported illegally from Thailand to Belgium [17Van Borm S. et al.Highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus in smuggled Thai eagles, Belgium.Emerg. Infect. Dis. 2005; 11: 702-705Crossref PubMed Scopus (186) Google Scholar]. The disease risks of the wild bird trade have been brought into sharp relief by the importation of H5N1-infected birds destined for the UK pet market [18National Emergency Epidemiology GroupEpidemiology Report on Avian Influenza in a Quarantine Premises in Essex. Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (UK), 2005Google Scholar] and, at the time of submission of this review, a temporary ban on the importation of wild birds had been implemented by the UK government. The recent detection of Pseudamphistomum truncatum (an opisthorchid fluke parasite) in the English otter population has been linked with the introduction of two freshwater fishes: the sunbleak (Leucaspius delineatus) and the topmouth gudgeon (Pseudorasbora parva), which can function as intermediate hosts for the fluke. These species were newly introduced into the UK by an ornamental fish supplier in Hampshire in the mid-1980s and their escape led to the colonization of many river systems in southern England [19Pinder A.C. Gozlan R.E. Sunbleak and topmouth gudgeon - two new additions to Britain's freshwater fishes.British Wildlife. 2003; 15: 77-83Google Scholar]. The translocation of amphibians is implicated in the emergence of amphibian diseases such as chytridiomycosis and ranavirus infections, which might be a major contributing factor in the widespread decline and extinction of amphibian species worldwide [20Daszak P. et al.Emerging infectious diseases and amphibian population declines.Emerg. Infect. Dis. 1999; 5: 735-748Crossref PubMed Scopus (768) Google Scholar]. Chytridiomycosis, which has been associated with amphibian mortalities and population declines in Central America and Australia, has also been linked to the introduction of cane toads (Bufo marinus) into Australia [20Daszak P. et al.Emerging infectious diseases and amphibian population declines.Emerg. Infect. Dis. 1999; 5: 735-748Crossref PubMed Scopus (768) Google Scholar]. Also, chytridiomycosis has appeared recently in the UK, with confirmed cases in an established breeding population of North American bullfrogs (Rana catesbeiana), which is an introduced species [21Cunningham A.A. et al.Emergence of amphibian chytridiomycosis in Britain.Vet. Rec. 2005; 157: 386-387PubMed Google Scholar]. Recent movements of R. catesbeiana and B. marinus might also have disseminated ranaviral diseases such as tadpole oedema virus [20Daszak P. et al.Emerging infectious diseases and amphibian population declines.Emerg. Infect. Dis. 1999; 5: 735-748Crossref PubMed Scopus (768) Google Scholar]. In Australia, where B. marinus was introduced to Queensland in 1935, ranaviral antibodies can be identified in this species throughout its geographic range [22Zupanovic Z. et al.Giant toads Bufo marinus in Australia and Venezuela have antibodies against ‘ranaviruses’.Dis. Aquat. Organ. 1998; 32: 1-8Crossref PubMed Scopus (42) Google Scholar]. In addition to the well-recognized threat that animal translocations and invasions into new geographic areas pose for species extinctions and biodiversity, the large wildlife trade clearly poses great dangers for the emergence of human and animal pathogens. It is doubtful whether the disease risks associated with the international wildlife trade, let alone additional welfare and conservation-related problems, can ever be justified simply to supply a demand for pets or recreational hunting. The dilemma is perhaps more acute in areas where the wildlife trade is associated with food and medicines, particularly in Asia, where the trade could be an important element in rural livelihoods and food security. In addition, translocation of wildlife can be an important tool for both conservation and animal welfare. In February 2000, the UK adopted the Pet Travel Scheme (PETS) to enable pets with the appropriate documentation to move between the UK and certain countries. This represented the first major change in UK quarantine regulations since the 1901 Importation of Dogs Act. The scheme is primarily designed to prevent the importation of rabies, with secondary measures to prevent the introduction of the cestode parasite Echinococcus multilocularis, which is currently endemic in continental Europe and can be transmitted from canids to humans to cause potentially fatal alveolar echinococcosis. Eighty-one countries now qualify under the scheme but quarantine remains the only option for non-listed countries. The PETS is a model for the use of legislation to minimize risks: the risks of importing rabies under the scheme are small. However, other zoonotic diseases continue to pose a substantial risk and there are few formal checks for these under the system. Figure 1 shows the volume of dog and cat movements into the UK following the introduction of the PETS. Leishmania infantum is the predominant cause of both visceral and cutaneous leishmaniasis throughout the Mediterranean region, including southern France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey and North Africa [23Trotz-Williams L.A. Trees A.J. Systematic review of the distribution of the major vector-borne parasitic infections in dogs and cats in Europe.Vet. Rec. 2003; 152: 97-105Crossref PubMed Scopus (112) Google Scholar]; the main reservoir host is the domestic dog. Seropositivity rates of canine leishmaniasis can be >30% [24Ferroglio E. et al.Canine leishmaniasis, Italy.Emerg. Infect. Dis. 2005; 11: 1618-1620Crossref PubMed Scopus (74) Google Scholar] in the Mediterranean, with patterns of infection that reflect the distribution of the sand fly vector (Phelobotomus species) [25Trees A. Shaw S. Imported diseases in small animals.In Pract. 1999; 21: 482-491Crossref Scopus (15) Google Scholar, 26Bongiorno G. et al.Host preferences of phlebotomine sand flies at a hypoendemic focus of canine leishmaniasis in central Italy.Acta Trop. 2003; 88: 109-116Crossref PubMed Scopus (104) Google Scholar]. In Brazil, where canine visceral leishmaniasis is an important emerging disease, canine infection in endemic areas can be as high as 67% [27Moreira E.D. et al.Assessment of an optimized dog-culling program in the dynamics of canine Leishmania transmission.Vet. Parasitol. 2004; 122: 245-252Crossref PubMed Scopus (74) Google Scholar]. To control the disease, a mass culling of seropositive dogs has been adopted in several areas but has not been effective [28Courtenay O. et al.Infectiousness in a cohort of Brazilian dogs: why culling fails to control visceral leishmaniasis in areas of high transmission.J. Infect. Dis. 2002; 186: 1314-1320Crossref PubMed Scopus (245) Google Scholar]. A feasible alternative to culling dogs is to fit collars treated with the insecticide deltamethrin; preliminary results have shown a large drop in the number of bites by sand flies and infection rates in dogs [29Halbig P. et al.Further evidence that deltamethrin-impregnated collars protect domestic dogs from sandfly bites.Med. Vet. Entomol. 2000; 14: 223-226Crossref PubMed Scopus (37) Google Scholar, 30Killick-Kendrick R. et al.Protection of dogs from bites of phlebotomine sandflies by deltamethrin collars for control of canine leishmaniasis.Med. Vet. Entomol. 1997; 11: 105-111Crossref PubMed Scopus (125) Google Scholar, 31Reithinger R. et al.Are insecticide-impregnated dog collars a feasible alternative to dog culling as a strategy for controlling canine visceral leishmaniasis in Brazil?.Int. J. Parasitol. 2004; 34: 55-62Crossref PubMed Scopus (103) Google Scholar]. This might be the only way to control the increasing spread of canine visceral leishmaniasis and could be recommended as a control measure for dogs leaving and re-entering the UK under PETS. Quarantine is not effective in preventing the introduction of leishmaniasis due to the long incubation period of the disease. Outbreaks of leishmaniasis have occurred in dogs in the USA as a result of Mediterranean-based military personnel who have returned home with their pets. In addition, there has been an apparent increase in the incidence of leishmaniasis in US hunting dogs [32Enserink M. Infectious diseases – has Leishmaniasis become endemic in the US?.Science. 2000; 290: 1881-1883Crossref PubMed Scopus (70) Google Scholar] – although the cause remains unclear, it could be a result of either animal movements or spread of the vector. The chances of leishmaniasis becoming established in domestic dogs in the UK are small because, currently, Phelobotomus species are not known to be present in the UK. However, if climate change does affect air temperatures substantially, the sand fly vector could become established in the UK and, potentially, could maintain endemic leishmaniasis and other ‘exotic’ parasitic diseases [33Martens W.J.M. et al.Sensitivity of malaria, schistosomiasis and dengue to global warming.Clim. Change. 1997; 35: 145-156Crossref Scopus (178) Google Scholar], the introduction of which would probably result from the movement of domestic pets. In addition to leishmaniasis, diseases such as heartworm (Dirofilaria immitis), babesiosis (Babesia canis), ehrlichiosis (Ehrlichia canis) and echinococcosis (Echinococcus granulosus and E. multilocularis) are all likely to be moved with domestic pets into the UK and elsewhere [23Trotz-Williams L.A. Trees A.J. Systematic review of the distribution of the major vector-borne parasitic infections in dogs and cats in Europe.Vet. Rec. 2003; 152: 97-105Crossref PubMed Scopus (112) Google Scholar, 34Genchi C. et al.Is heartworm disease really spreading in Europe?.Vet. Parasitol. 2005; 133: 137-148Crossref PubMed Scopus (175) Google Scholar]. The responsibility falls on domestic pet owners in such a situation who should ensure the use of anthelminthics – agents that destroy or expel parasitic intestinal worms – and, possibly, insecticide-treated collars. Owners should also be advised about preventative measures before pet travel. E. multilocularis is common in red foxes in Hokkaido, northern Japan, where the prevalence of infection in foxes is as high as 40% and high worm burdens are recorded in some individuals [35Konno K. et al.Prevention of alveolar echinococcosis – ecosystem and risk management perspectives in Japan.Acta Trop. 2003; 89: 33-40Crossref PubMed Scopus (6) Google Scholar]. DNA sequencing of parasite isolates from this area show that it was probably introduced in the 1960s from a neighbouring island [36Satoh M. et al.Short report: Echinococcus multilocularis confirmed on Kunashiri Island, 15 kilometers from the eastern part of Hokkaido, Japan.Am. J. Trop. Med. Hyg. 2005; 72: 284-288PubMed Google Scholar] through the movement of infected foxes. This disease now presents an important public health problem, with a human incidence of 0.33 per 100 000 people [35Konno K. et al.Prevention of alveolar echinococcosis – ecosystem and risk management perspectives in Japan.Acta Trop. 2003; 89: 33-40Crossref PubMed Scopus (6) Google Scholar], or ∼10 cases annually. Domestic dogs have become part of the transmission cycle and close contact between humans and their pets is a major risk factor. A recent risk analysis [37Doi R. et al.Nippon Koshu Eisei Zasshi. 2003; 50: 639-649PubMed Google Scholar] showed that the movement of pet animals between Hokkaido and the rest of Japan is likely to result in further geographical spread of the parasite, particularly because there are few movement controls or programmes for screening and treatment. Rabies is a prime example of an infectious disease in which transmission can be enhanced by animal movements. Flores Island in Indonesia was free of rabies until 1997 [38Windiyaningsih C. et al.The rabies epidemic on Flores Island, Indonesia (1998–2003).J. Med. Assoc. Thai. 2004; 87: 1389-1393PubMed Google Scholar]; in that year, three dogs were imported from a rabies-endemic area and this was sufficient to result in 113 human deaths (mainly children) and the culling of almost 50% of the dog population in some areas as part of an unsuccessful control campaign [39Bingham J. Rabies on Flores Island, Indonesia: is eradication possible in the near future?.in: Dodet B. Meslin F.-X. Fourth International Symposium on Rabies Control in Asia. John Libbey, 2001: 148-155Google Scholar]. Flores Island is now endemic for rabies, which has become a major public health issue, and dealing w" @default.
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