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• W2137024500 abstract "One of Michael Polanyi's most important contributions philosophy is his clarification of the structure of tacit based upon two terms of awareness. For instance, in driving a nail, we are not only aware of the nail, but also aware of the hammer and the feelings in our palm and fingers that grasp the hammer. According Polanyi, our awareness of the nail is focal awareness, and the awareness of the hammer and the feelings in our palm and fingers is subsidiary awareness. rests on the dynamic relationship between these two terms of awareness. In order grasp an object (a comprehensive entity), we need integrate its various clues, particulars. Here we can identify the two terms of tacit knowing. Our subsidiary awareness of various clues, particulars and parts constitutes the first term of tacit knowing, and our focal awareness of the comprehensive object is the second term. We rely on the former so as know the latter. manifests itself in the dynamic process of attending the first term the second term. Tacit is a from-to knowing.1 In the 1960s, Polanyi's theory of tacit came fruition. In revealing the conceptual potential of the theory of tacit solve a series of philosophical problems, Polanyi also brieflydiscussed the connection between his theory and other philosophical traditions. Phenomenology was one of them. Polanyi's theory of tacit intersects phenomenology primarily at three points: intentionality, and embodiment. With regard the relation between tacit and intentionality, Polanyi says the following: Brentano (1942, orig. publ. 1847) has taught that consciousness necessarily attends an object, and that only a conscious mental act can attend an object. My analysis of tacit has amplified this view of consciousness. It ells us not only that consciousness is intentional, but also that it always has roots which it attends its object. It includes a tacit awareness of its subsidiaries.2 In Polanyi's view, the from-to structure of tacit clarifies the nature of consciousness more adequately than does Brentano's theory of intentionality. It not only displays intentionality, that is, the vectorial quality of consciousness, but also reveals the fact that such directedness of consciousness is based upon a tacit awareness of the subsidiaries. In addition its to aspect, consciousness also has a from aspect. As will be shown below, an important corollary of the from-to structure of tacit is the thesis of knowing by indwelling. It is in that Polanyi sees the connection between the theory of tacit and Heidegger's notion of being-in-the-world. In the preface the Torchbook edition of Personal Knowledge (1964), Polanyi claims: All understanding is based upon our dwelling in the particulars of that which we comprehend. Such is a participation of ours in the existence of that which we comprehend; it is Heidegger's being-in-the-world.3 He further claims, is being-in-the-world. Every act of tacit shifts our existence, re-directing, contracting our participation in the world. Existentialism and phenomenology have studied such processes under other names. We must re-interpret such observations now in terms of the more concrete structure of tacit knowing.4 I have tried clarify the epistemological implications of Heidegger's notion of in the perspective of the theory of tacit elsewhere, in the direction pointed out by Polanyi.5 Although the claim that Indwelling is being-in-the-world is suggestive and inspiring, there is an important difference between Polanyi's indwelling and Heidegger's being-in-the-world, of which Polanyi seems not quite conscious. As will be shown below, while Polanyi's thesis of by is founded upon his insight into the unique position of our body in the universe, Heidegger does not take Dasein as being essentially embodied. …" @default.
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• W2137024500 date "2008-01-01" @default.
• W2137024500 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W2137024500 title "Embodiment in Polanyi’s Theory of Tacit Knowing" @default.
• W2137024500 doi "https://doi.org/10.5840/philtoday200852227" @default.
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