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• W2144695778 abstract "KyklosVolume 48, Issue 1 p. 19-42 Do Top Managers Work Harder When They Are Monitored? HarryG. Barkma*, HarryG. Barkma* *Wim Bogers-professor of Business Administration, Department of Business Administration. University of Tilburg, The Netherlands.Search for more papers by this author HarryG. Barkma*, HarryG. Barkma* *Wim Bogers-professor of Business Administration, Department of Business Administration. University of Tilburg, The Netherlands.Search for more papers by this author First published: February 1995 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1995.tb02313.xCitations: 66 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Akerlof , G. ( 1982 ): Labor contracts as partial gift exchange , Quarterly Journal of Economics , Vol. 97 , 543 – 569 . Alchian , A.A. and H. Demsetz ( 1972 ): Production, information costs and economic organization , American Economic Review , Vol. 62 , 777 – 795 . Arrow , K.J. 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Wruck ( 1988 ): Stock prices and top management changes , Journal of Financial Economics , Vol. 20 , 461 – 492 . Weisbach , M.S. ( 1988 ): Outside directors and CEO turnover , Journal of Financial Economics , Vol. 20 , 431 – 460 . Williamson , O.E. ( 1975 ): Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications , New York : The Free Press . Williamson , O.E. ( 1985 ): The economic institutions of capitalism , New York : The Free Press . Citing Literature Volume48, Issue1February 1995Pages 19-42 ReferencesRelatedInformation" @default.
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