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• W2146346079 abstract "Tacit collusion plays an important role in merger policy: competition agencies sometimes block mergers on the grounds that they will generate „coordinated effects‟, an increased likelihood of collusion. The tools available to competition authorities to evaluate such theories are limited, although there have been some recent contributions by Kovacic, Marshall, Marx and Schulenberg (2007) and Davis and Sabbattini (2008). The latter authors propose an approach to coordinated effects merger simulation in markets where multi-product firms operate in differentiated product markets. As far as the authors of this paper are aware, we provide the first full empirical implementation of a coordinated effects merger simulation model in a differentiated product market. We use our model to study the network server market and, specifically, we examine the effect of the merger between HP and Compaq on their and their rivals‟ collective incentives and ability to sustain tacit collusion. Our preliminary results suggest that the incentives to collude in the network server market are substantial, but actively decreased following the merger between HP and Compaq. In addition to exploring the incentives for collusion on one market we also examine the impact of (i) multi-market contact on firms‟ incentive and ability to sustain tacit coordination and (ii) a competitive fringe of smaller players who co-exist with a subset of the larger players in an industry who tacitly collude. Finally, we examine the impact of competition agencies enforcing prohibitions on such concerted practices. We find that the incentives to collude can be reduced dramatically, if the fines charged on cartel participants are large enough even if the probability of successful enforcement action following detection is low. Most importantly, by taking the economic theory of tacit collusion seriously in an empirical example, we establish that the intuition many economists have for the effect of mergers on the incentives to tacitly collude is actually wrong." @default.
• W2146346079 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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• W2146346079 date "2009-01-01" @default.
• W2146346079 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
• W2146346079 title "Estimating the 'Coordinated Effects' of Mergers *" @default.
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